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PROVIDENT SECURITIES CO. 
No. 74-758 
PROVIDENT SECURITIES CO. 
Cert to CA 9 
(Ely, Trask, Wallace) 
Federal/Civil 
Cross -Petition for Cert to 
Timely 
v. CA 9 (Ely, Trask, Wallace) Timely 
FOREMOST-McKESSON, INC. Federal/Civil 
1. SUMMARY: Provident instituted an action in USDC N.D. Cal., 
seeking a declaration of non-liability under 16(b) of the Securities and Exchang e .:- . 
Act of 1934, 15 U.S. C. § 78p(b), for a transaction involving its purchase and 
sale of Foremost's securities. Foremost ' counterclaimed for a declaration of 
liability and damages. The DC (Schnacke) granted Provident's motion for 
summary judgment and CA 9 affirmed on different grounds. (Ely, Trask, 
Wallace). Foremost seeks cert, contending that the CA' s interpretation of when 
~
a person becomes a "statutory insider" under § 16(b) conflicts with decisions fro El 
..-......-- ............ ~- ---------.. .....__ -.......----
CA 2 and CA 8. Provident has filed a conditional cross-petition in which it seeks 
to raise arg~ents regarding the particular transaction which were either 
rejected or ignored by CA 9. 
2. FACTS: In 1968 Provident, a personal holding company, decided to 
liquidate and began seeking a purchaser for its assets. It entered into 
negotiations with Foremost and, although originally insisting that any sale should 
V ·n,} _J.e for cash, finally agreed to accept a substantial amount of Foremost's 
/r}~~v 1~ c~nvertible debentures and cash in exchange for two-thirds of its assets. In ro ---~ 
~Y, f" , addition, Foremost agreed to promptly file a registration statement for the 
~~debentures, which were issued solely for purposes of this transaction, to 
. r·~ permit Provident to offer them to the public, To accomplish that, arrangemente 
~ were made for Provident to sell $25,000,000 of the debentures, approximately 
one-half of what it would re-ceive, to a group of underwriters. 
The transaction unfolded as follows: On October 15, 1969 Foremost 
delivered a check and the debentures to Provident; the latter were immediately . 
. In 
convertible into common stock in an amount excess of 10% of Foremost's 
outstanding shares. On October 20 Provident instructed its liquidating trustee 
to distribute the debentures which were not to be sold to its shareholders. On 
'I '., 
October 21 Provident entered into a contract with the underwriters whereby it 
agreed to sell Foremost debentures having a face value of $25,000,000 for 
$25,366,666. 66; the "time of purchase'' was specified to be October 28, 1969. 
On October 24, 1969 the trustee actually distributed the remaining debentures 
to Provident's shareholders; at that point Provident no longer had a 1 Oo/o owner-
ship of Foremost. On October 28 the contract between Provident and the under-
writers was performed by both parties. Thereafter Provident continued to 
liquidate according to California law, a process that was completed in August, 
1970. 
Provident then filed this action against Foremost seeking a declaration of 
nonliability under § 16(b), which permits the issuer of securities to recover 
short-swing profits (i.e., profits from a purchase and sale or·· sale and purchase 
of securities within a six-month period) from certain corporate insiders. The 
latter group includes persons who own "~ore than 10 per centum of any class 
of any equity security •.• 11 15 U.S. C. § 78p(a). Foremost counterclaimed 
for a declaration of liability and recovery of profits, and both parties moved 
for summary judgment. 
The USDC N.D. Cal. (Schnacke) granted Provident's motion and denied 
Foremost's. It noted that Foremost did not contend that speculation was invoh·e c 
~~here and that Foremost had insisted upon, if not dictated, the form of the trans-
;;J""" action. These facts, together with the small amount of profit realized by 
Provident, persuaded the DC that it should not engage in a "mindlessly literal " ------
application of § 16 (b). ------
CA 9 affirmed, but on different grounds. (Ely, Trask, Wallace). 
___..,. 
At the outset, the CA observed that this Court has recently held that ''potential 
for speculative abuse" must be shown in order to establish § 16(b) li~bility 
for "unorthodox" financial t:_~tions. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973). However, this was essentially~ highly 
orthodox cash-for-stock deal, thus permitting strict liability to attach and, in 
any event, the facts that Provident entered the transaction voluntarily and could 
have acquired inside information during the protracted negotiations satisfied 
the Kern County test. 
Next, theCA considered Provident's argument that it was not a 10% 
owner at the time of the October 28 sale because it had distributed half of the 
debentures to its shareholders on October 24. Thus, it contended, it was not 
liable under the following proviso to § 16(b): 
./ This subsection shall not be construed to cover any 
transaction where such beneficial owner [i. e. , of 1 O% of 
the shares] was not su :-, h both at the time of the purchase 
and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved. 
However, theCA was of the view that the "sale" actually occurred on October 21 
when Provident entered into a binding contract with the underwriters. The 
~----~------------------------- ---------
price was fixed at that time and, although there were some conditions to be 
fulfilled, none of them subjected Provident to market risks. 
The CA then turned to the "purchase" aspect of the transaction. It ------------- ___.... -- ' -
noted that Provident had not owned 1 O% -- indeed any -- of Foremost's sec uri ties 
prior to October 15, and that it had not purchased any more securities between 
that date and the October 21 sale. Thus, under the above-quoted proviso, 
Provident would be liable for its profit if the phrase "at the time of" were 
interpreted to mean 11 simultaneously with, ,11 but not if it were interpreted to 
mean 11prior to. 11 
TheCA adopted the latter reading. It reasoned that § l6(b) was intended 
to reach only persons who do not intend to alter their investment in the corpora-
tion, but decide to capitalize on ins ide information and make a quick killing. 
Persons who own more than l O% of the corporation are presumed to have access 
to such information. However, the presumption does not apply to a person who 
does not own 10% at the time that he makes his decision to buy, so a purchase 
under those circumstances is not considered the first step in an illegal short-
swing deal. 
j 
CA 9 acknowledged that its interpretation conflicted with cases from 
CA 2, ~·, Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F. 2d 299 (2d Cir. 
1'956), af£ 1g 104F.Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 
(1956), and CA 8, ~·, Emerson Electric Co. v. Reliance Electric Co., 
434 F. 2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970), af£ 1d on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972), but 
believed that it was supported by the legislative history of § 16(b) and language 
used by this Court in Kern County. Finally, it observed that a person who owns 
more than 10%, sells below 1 O%, and then purchases above that amount rn:ight 
very well have been acting on information gained as a result of his original 
position as a statutory insider, so that its holding in this case would not apply 
to a sale/purchase. 
Foremost seeks cert in No. 74-742, pointing to the conflict and arguing 
that CA 2 and CA 8 are correct. Provident responds that CA 9 is right and 
I 
expresses confidence that CAs 2 and 8 will agree the next time they consider 
the matter. 
Provident has filed a conditional eros s -petition, No. 74-758, in which 
------------
it argues that its transaction with Foremost was a merger which is 
,---- -~ ---
"unorthodox" under Kern County, and that there was no potential for abuse here. 
It also points to a clause in its contract with the underwriters which it says 
placed the risk of a decline in market price on it, so that the date of the sale 
was really October 28. Finally, it contends that it was merely an agent for its 
shareholders so the debentures should have been considered their property .and 
~ - - - --- - -------------
that, for the same reason, its sale of assets was exempt from§ l6(b) under 
SEC Rule l6a-4, l 7 C. F. R. § 240. 16a-4. Provident admits that none of 
these quest ions 't1. important, but argues that the Court shou+d take the whole 
case or not take it at all. 
·' Foremost agrees that these arguments are unimportant and asserts that 
CA 9 properly rejected them. With respect to the last of Provident's contentions, 
Foremost points out that the liquidation proceedings continued for another 10 
months after this transaction was completed and under California law they could 
have been 'revoked either by a vote of the shareholders or the court. Thus, the · 
notion that Provident was merely an intermediary for its shareholders is a 
fiction. 
3. ISSUES: No. 74-742: (a) Does the transaction by which a person 
first acquires more than lOo/o of a corporation's securities count as a "purchase' ' 
~--~------------~---------------
for purposes of applying § 16(b)? 
·. 
•, 
No. 74-758: (b) Was Foremost required to show "potential for abuse" 
in order to establish Provident's liability under § 16(b) and, if so, did such 
potential exist? (c) Did the "sale" of debentures to the underwriters occur 
on October 21 or October 28? (d) Was Provident the beneficial owner of the 
debentures or was it merely an agent for its shareholders? 
4. DISCUSSION: It is undisputed that there is a direct conflict among 
the Circuits on Issue (a) and the question would seem to be of sufficient 
importance to require resolution by this Court. On the merits, the legislative --------------- - --........__ --- -
history cited by CA 9 does not compel its conclusion but there is a certain logic 
to its position. For example, if Congress did not intend that both the purchase 
and sale be influenced by inside information the six-month time period would seenl 
to be superfluous. On the other hand, the critical phrase mod~fies "sale and 
purchase" as well as "purchase and sale" and CA 9 admits that it would have to 
r-ead it differently in the former situation. It also may be that a person who is 
attempting to acquire stock sufficient to give him more than 10o/o ownership 
could obtain inside information during the negotiations, as CA 9 seemed to 
acknowledge in its discussion of the Kern County is sue. In short, Is sue (a) 
. is substantial, a conflict exists, and review is warranted. 
CA 9 does appear to have resolved the issues presented by the cross-l petition correctly. With respect to the "orthodoxy" of the transaction, this was 
certainly not a merger. 
~
Prov~t sold only 2/3 of its assets, retained its 
-----
liabilities, and remained in existence for a considerable period of time after 
the transfer was completed. Similarly, the Securities Exchange Act defines 
"sale" to includ e "any contract to sell . " 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(14). Thus, 
even if the C ctober 2 1 contract might have been terminated in the event of a 
significant decline in the value of Foremost stock, CA 9 1 s conclusion that the 
sale occurred on that date is not unreasonable. Moreover, Provident's board 
of directors was aware of possible § 16 (b) problems so it is probably no 
accident that the contract's "time of purchase" was after the distribution of 
some debentures to Provident's shareholders. 
Finally, it should be noted that denial of the cross-petition would not 
necessarily preclude Provident from advancing the arguments rejected by CA 9, 
see Stelos Co. v. Hosiery Motor-Mend Corp., 295 U.S. 237 (1935), and it has 
suggested that it will do just that. See Cross-Petn at 2 n. 1. Thus, ii the 
Court does not wish to consider Issues (b)-(d) it should grant the pet'ition in 
No. 74-742 limited to Issue (a). 
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July 7, 1975 
No. 74-742, Foremost-McKesson, Inc. vs. Provident 
Securities Company. 
The purpose of this brief memo, dictated during 
the summer, is to aid my memory as to the issues presented, 
and to record my quite tentative reaction after a prelimi-
nary reading of the opinions and briefs. 
* * * * * 
We took this case to resolve a conflict among cir-
cuits as to an issue under Section 16(b) of the Securities 
Act of 1934. The facts are complex, and I will merely sketch 
them. Provident was a personal holding company of the wealthy 
Crocker family in California. It decided to liquidate and 
distribute its assets, and entered into negotiations with 
Foremost-McKesson (Foremost) for the sale of most of its 
assets. From the outset, Provident, desiring to liquidate 
by distributing cash to its stockholders, sought a cash 
transaction. In the end, however, Foremost insisted upon 
purchasing uhe assets by issuing and delivering to Provident 
No. 74-742 2. 
convertible debentures, plus a relatively small amount of 
cash. Although Provident wanted Foremost to sell the de-
bentures itself and make payment in cash, the eventual 
compromise agreement provided that substantially simul-
taneously with the closing, Foremost would register the 
debentures so they could be sold immediately by Provident 
for cash -- which in turn could be distributed to its 
stockholders. 
The closing occurre~ on October 15, 1969, at which 
Foremost delivered a check and the debentures to Provident. 
Prior to acquisition of the debentures, Provident had no 
legal or beneficial ownership in any security of Foremost. 
The debentures created a debtor/creditor relationship; they 
carried no voting rights; and none of the debentures was 
converted by Provident. 
Provident had entered into an underwriting agreement 
with Dillion, Reed, pursuant to which the underwriters purchased 
the debentures (at a profit to Provident of about $366,000). 
The underwriting agreement was closed on October 28, when 
Provident delivered the debentures to the underwriters and 
received payment in cash -- which was distributed in due time 
. . 
No. 74-742 3. 
in the liquidation of Provident. 
The question is whether the approximately $366,000 
of "profit" (the difference between the base value at which 
Provident received the debentures and the price at which 
they were sold to the underwriters) is a profit which must 
be paid over to the issuing company (Foremost) under 16(b). 
District Court Decision 
The district court decided the case before our 
decision in Kern County. Following decisions in CA9, CAS, 
and CA2, the district court held that 16(b) should be 
applied in light of the evils intended to be prevented. 
The DC said: 
Foremost contends for a starkly literal 
reading of Section 16(b), which would make 
Provident, by virtue of its short-lived 
position as holder of the convertible 
debentures of Foremost, accountable to it 
as provided in 16(b) for the relatively 
small profit resulting from the under-
writing described above, without regard 
to the overall character of the trans-
action and its ultimate effect. It makes 
no claim that any of the evils against 
which 16(b) were directed were present 
in this, or that Provident derived inside 
information, profit or advantage from its 
all but momentary status as an 'insider' 
No. 74-742 4. 
of Foremost. To require Provident to pay 
over to Foremost the amount the latter 
seeks under Section 16(b) would be to 
confer a c9mp lete windfall upon Foremost 
and would be utterly at war with any 
concept of equity known to this Court. 
(Petition for cert, p. 38-A.) 
Opinion of CA9 
CA9 affirmed the judgment of the district court 
in favor of Provident, but on a different theory. This 
Court's decision in Kern County was handed down before CA9 
considered the case. In Kern County we had distinguished --
although none too clearly -- between "unorthodox" transactions 
(such as stock conversions, exchanges pursuant to merger and 
other corporate reorganizations) and the more normal trans-
actions where cash is exchanged for stock. CA9 concluded that 
the Provident-Foremost transaction "was essentially a cash 
for stock transaction~ and not within the rationale of Kern 
County. It noted that 16(b) presumes that a shareholder who 
owns 10 percent of a corporation •,s stock has access to inside 
information; that although this presumption may be rebutted, 
it was not rebutted in this case, and therefore Provident must 
be presumed to have had access to inside information from 
No. 74-742 5. 
Foremost's management. There was, however, no evidence 
to this effect (I believe). CA9 further noted that this 
was an entirely voluntary transaction, as distinguished 
from being compelled to receive a security by virtue of 
a merger or reorganization. 
CA9 nevertheless held for Provident on the basis 
of language in 16(b), providing as follows: 
This subsection shall not be construed 
to cover any transaction where such 
beneficial owner was not such both at 
the time of the purchase and sale, or 
the sale and purchase, of the security 
involved 
After a lengthy discussion of this language, of its 
legislative history, and of decisions in other circuits, CA9 
held that the defendant in a 16(b) suit must be an "insider" 
at both the time of purchase and sale: 
Every Section 16(b) fact situation in-
volves a pair of transactions -- an 
initial transaction and a closing 
transaction ••• In this case Provident 
was not a statutory insider at the time 
of its initial purchase. The only 
possible Section 16(b) transaction was 
the sale of the debentures to the 
underwriters. 
* * * * * 
... (, 
No. 74-742 6. 
Although we took the case to decide the conflict 
based on CA9's interpretation of 16(b), I am incl~ned to 
agree with the district court that this was not the type of 
transaction intended to be covered by 16(b). If I adhere 
to this view, I would not reach the question which prompted 
us to take the case. That would be a close one for me. 
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell DATE: Sept. 19, 1975 
FROM: Carl R. Schenker 
No. 74-742 Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. 
Provident Sec. Co. 
I recommend reversal. 
The case presents two significant questions: (1) Does 
Kern County make § 16(b) inapplicable? (2) If not, does the 
"at the time of the purchase and sale" proviso make § 16(b) 
~~~/~.v::. A. Kern County -0P'1 vv .~ v- .t v'-'-~ ,....,-. 
~~ r.~1v~ { tl ~/,- •lA-/1' ~ :_,AJ~~p/ 
inapplicable? 
The Kern County principle is that certain transactions {,-~ 
l• l fl~ /~ 
within the literal compass of § 16(b) are not within its ,.~,v~ 
purposes and the statute therefore should not be construed of~. 
to include them. Your dictated aid-to-memory indicates that ~ , 1 ~ ifJ I VI- • • .. ~ 
s-1¥-· you are disposed to apply the Kern County principle here. 
I am inclined to disagree, but I should emphasize that I 
doubt my capacity to "educate" you on an issue that turns on 
the practicalities of the business world. I will therefore 
primarily try to indicate the problems I see in fitting this 
case into the analytical framework of Kern County. 
Kern County, somewhat simplified, involved the following: 
0 made a tender offer to K shareholders and became a 10% 
beneficial owner. K reacted by negotiating for a defensive 
2. 
merger with a holding company of T. , In anticipation of the 
merger, 0 gave T an option on any T stock it might acquire by 
virtue of a merger. 0 then became the owner of T stock by 
operation of the merger. The option was granted and the merger 
took place within six months of O's becoming a 10% owner of K. 
It was undisputed that O's acquisition of K stock by tender 
offer was a "purchase." The issue in Kern County was whether 
either the merger or the option was a "sale" within the meaning -
\ of§ 16(b). The Court held that neither event occasioned 
a "sale," because in neither case was there an opportunity \}-
for 0 to tr·ade on the basis of inside information. In the 
case of the merger, 0 was prevented from acquiring inside 
information after its purchase by the hostility of the K 
management, and the terms of the "sale" were negotiated between 
K and T. In the case of the option, 0 was again acting without 
inside information, and it was "selling" to the issuer of the 
securities, who would have more information than 0 about the 
security. Thus, in Kern County the holding of no "sale" as to ().i.a_o 
H.-.t.. 
the merger and the option was supported by two factors: (1) · ~~ 
the "impossibility" of 0 having inside information and (2) { ?~ 
, ~...c.-1-' 




It will be convenient to This case differs in both respects. 
discuss factor (2) first. 
~~ 
C-11\<..~ 1- ' 
~~ 
t~ 
As I have just indicated, the Kern County holding was ~~~ 
1. Factor (2). 
supported in part by the fact that the closing transactions "r· 
3. 
were "abuse proof." But here the closing transaction was 
subject to speculative abuse if Provident had inside information. 
The closing transaction was an ordinary sale. It was not -imposed upon Provident as the fait accompli of others (unlike 
in the Kern County merger). And Provident's purchasers were 
not more informed than Provident about the security traded 
(unlike in the Kern County option). The whole second leg of 
support for Kern County's holding is thus missing. 
This places in stark relief an important difference between 
the cases. The holding in Kern County was that the closing 
transaction was not a "sale". But here there can be no doubt 
that the closing transaction was a wholly conventional cash-
for- stock "sale" within the clear embrace of the statute . 
Holding § 16(b) inapplicable here would thus require holding 
that the opening transaction was not a "purchase." It does 
not seem to me that the purposes of the statute can ever be 
served fully by excluding an opening transaction from its 
operation. No matter how one acquires securities, if one sells 
in a transaction that could be abused, the evil of insider 
trading is possible. In short, I don't think Kern County 
should be extended to embrace a contention that an opening trans-
action (at least when it is an acquisition) is not a statutory 
event ("purchase"). 
4. 
2. Factor (1). 
Although Kern County involved both factors (1) and (2), 
it could be held consistently with it that factor (1) suffices 
to make § 16(b) inapplicable. It therefore is necessary to 
consider whether it was "impossible" for Provident to get 
access to inside information. 
The exact content of "impossibility" is unclear. Kern 
County never used that word. The Court said at one point that 
"it [was] totally unrealistic to assume or infer from the 
facts before us that [0] either had or was likely to have 
access to inside information ..•. " (411 U.S. at 596 , 
Emphasis added). At another point the Court said: There is 
nothing "to indicate . • . the possibility: of inside informa-
tion being available." (411 U.S. at 599. Emphasis added). 
"Possibility" suggests that less threat of abuse is required 
to make the statute applicable than is suggested by "likely". 
The different wording points out the central difficulty of 
factor (1) analysis. Kern County allows a certain inquiry 
into the actual facts of a case to assess the potential for 
abuse. But too specific an inquiry would convert § 16(b) 
into Rule lO(b)-5. That is, too specific an inquiry would 
prevent § 16(b) from serving its purpose as a "rule of thumb" 
prophylactic. The Kern County test, at the extreme, cannot 
encompass an inquiry into whether there actually was use of 
inside information. 
5. 
I feel that Provident's argument here takes the factor 
(1) inquiry too far down the road toward Rule lO(b)-5. 
Provident apparently contends at one point that the inquiry 
in unorthodox transaction cases is to be whether there was 
in fact acquisition of inside information. (Brief at 42.) 
And Provident's overextension of Kern County can be seen in 
its detailed argument on the inside information point. 
Provident contends both that it did not acquire inside informa-
tion from the negotiations and that it could not acquire 
information from its position as a mere debenture holder. 
Kern County seems to support the argument that Provident 
could not have gained information from its status as a debenture 
holder. Debenture holders, even if they hold convertible 
debentures, are outsiders as a practical matter. The access 
conveyed by stock ownership is not likely to be had without 
exercise of the convertibility rights. If the hostility of 
managemen~ in Kern County sufficed to rebut the presumption 
of insider information on the part of a 10% stockholdesit 
seems that an argument based on debenture status should be 
acceptable. 
J -r~ 
, I have more trouble, however, with the argument that 
) Provident did not acquire inside information from its negotia-
I 
tions with Foremost. There were extensive negotiations and 
contact between the two firms before (and to a certain extent 
after) the sale. One can easily imagine negotiated transactions 
like this where inside information would pass to the party in 
6. 
Provident's position. The potential recipient of the security 
would frequently demand information on the financial status 
of the issuer, though Provident contends no such information 
passed here. In such a case it is easy to see room for the 
abuse suggested by CA9. The recipient might realize that the 
issuer would have to pass a dividend to finance the purchase 
of the assets, and the recipient could therefore sell after the 
announcement of the purchase but before the announcement of 
the passed dividend. The possibility of the acquisition of 
inside information in these circumstances should suffice 
for § 16(b) liability, since it will sometimes occur. The 
situation is different from the hostility in Kern County 
where it could be presumed that as a general matter no inside 
information would pass. 
This is concededly a difficult line to draw. But if 
§ 16(b) is to operate as it was intended to, at some point 
inquiry into the actual facts must cease and attention must 
focus on the potential for abuse. Where there are cooperative 
negotiations, the potential for abuse seems large enough to 
justify cutting off the inquiry into actual facts. 
One last rock remains to be turned over. Is information 
potentially available in pretransaction negotiations acquired 
by virtue of stock ownership? In Kern County it was 
contended that 0 might have speculated on the basis of 
knowledge that its tender offer would stimulate a defensive 
merger that would drive K stock up and therefore profit 0. 
7. 
This argument was rejected. The Court reasoned that if 0 
was so speculating, the information on which it was relying 
was knowledge of stock market mechanics, not "information 
obtained from substantial stockholding that did not yet exist." 
(411 U.S. at 582). Provident argues briefly that any informa-
tion it may have acquired in the cooperative negotiations was 
similarly not acquired from actual stockholding. (Brief 
at 38.) There may be some factual difficulty in this argument 
because the cooperation continued after the sale to at least 
some extent (further valuation of the Provident properties). 
But there is a more fundamental flaw in the argument. 
Ait is true that, as in Kern County, pretransaction negotiations 
would not furnish information derived from present stockholdings. 
But this case is different from Kern County because the informa-
tion in question is not information that any sophisticated 
investor could have. It would seem undue formalism to apply 
the Kern County language that rigidly. When inside information 
is acquired in the very course of acquiring stock, it should 
be within the compass of § 16(b). 
B. The Proviso 
I find the proviso question very difficult. The 
statutory text, legislative history, and legislative purpose 
are all opaque, but I would conclude that the initial purchase 
is covered. 
The proviso reads: 
This subsection shall not be construed to cover 
any transaction where [the 10%] beneficial owner 
was not such both at the time of the purchase 
and sale. . . . 
8. 
I think we can safely start from the premise that the 
phrase "at the time of the purchase" is subject to construction 
either as "prior to the purchase" or as "simultaneously with 
the purchase." {Compare Reliance Elec. Co., where it could be 
concluded that "at the time of the . . . sale" had a literal 
meaning~ Given this premise of ambiguity, we are cast back --
upon legislative history and legislative purpose. CA9 drew 
content for the proviso from the legislative history. But 
since this Court said in Reliance Elec. Co. that "the legis-
lative history affords no explanation of the purpose of the 
proviso"(404 U.S. at 424), the legislative purpose seems a 
more logical source to turn to first. 
1. Legislative Purpose. 
To evaluate the legislative purpose of the proviso, 
it is useful to turn initially to the purpose of the whole 
section. It was enacted to prevent abusive trading practices 
based on inside information. But it must be noted that there 
are two ways to trade on the basis of inside information. 
(Let's take the example of a 10% stockholder.) The first way 
is for a stockholder who is already a statutory insider to 
determine on the basis of inside information to make a 
profitable purchase and sale (i.e., "double-transaction abuse"). --
9. 
The second way is for a stockholder who becomes an insider 
by virtue of a purchase to determine on the basis of (newly 
available) inside information to make a profitable sale (i.e., 
"single-transaction abuse"). (Note, "Insider Liability for 
Short-Swing Profits: The Substance and Function of the 
Pragmatic Approach," 72 Mich. L. Rev. 593, 598-99 (1974). 
(This is Mark Pomerantz' Note.)) 
Congress' purpose in enacting § 16(b) clearly embraced 
at least elimination of double-transaction abuses that met 
the "rule of thumb" criteria adopted. But an argument could 
be made that the congressional purpose did not extend to 
preventing single-transaction abuses that met the "rule of 
thumb" criteria. This argument goes to the effect of 
the statute, not the proviso. But examining it helps in 
evaluating the purposesthat might lie behind the proviso. 
In addition, some of the arguments advanced in Provident's 
brief are really directed less at the meaning of the proviso 
than at the proposition that § 16(b) does not reach single-
transaction abuses. (Provident does not explicitly make 
this point, since it seems to take the position that single-
transaction abuses by those who become directors or officers 
after a purchase are covered. (Resp's Brief at 19-20)). 
The following excerpt from the Michigan Note details 
the argument that Congress intended to reach only double-
transaction abuses: 
The congressional hearings and reports discussing the 
------------~r---·~ provlSlon eventually enacted as section 16(b) repeatedly describe its 
purpose in terms referring to double- rather than single-transaction 
abuse-the curbing of "short-term," "in-and-out" speculation on the 
basis of inside information.u Furthermore, the examples in the con-
gTessional hearings and reports of the kind of abuse intended to be 
reached by section 16(b) include no instances of single-transaction 
abuse, but in all cases describe situations in which advance informa-
tion tainted both the purchase and the sale.42 
The case from the statute itself is even more clear. Fir.,t, .I ..... .,tel. 
ute speaks in conjunctive terms of "profit realized ... from any pur-
chase and sale, or sale and purchase ... ,"43 implying that Congress 
did not intend section 16(b) to deter abuse of inside information in a 
single transaction unless the abuse was converted into a trading profit 
by means of a second transaction.44 This implication is supported by 
the statutory provision {or recovery, which provides that the profit 
realized from a sale of shares is to be calculated with reference to the 
price paid for their purchase.4~ Such a scheme is appropriate if the 
purchase and the sale are part of the same profit-making scheme, that 
is, if the situation is one of double-transaction abuse. The mechanism 
is less appropriate, however, for certain instances of single-transac-
tion abuse. Assume, for example, that an i.nsider, in a purchase free 
of any possibility of abuse, buys stock at 85. The price rises to 100 be-
cause of generally favorable economic conditions. At this point the 
insider becomes privy to advance information about a development 
that will send the stock price tumbling to 50, so he sells at 100. The \ 
recovery under section 16(b) would be 15 dollars per share, but ad-
vance information has allowed the insider to avert losses of 50 dollars 
per share. Thus, the measure of damages is inadequate if the purpose 
of the statute is to inhibit single-transaction aquses. 
A similar analysis applies to the failure of the statute to reach 
transactions occurring more than six months apart. In situations of 
double-transaction abuse, where inside information motivates the ini-
tial transaction as well as the final one, the six-month time limit is 
quite reasonable-the inside information typically relates to a tem-
porary price fluctuation and is thus worthless if it cannot be turned 
to profit within six months. For instance, an investor who receives in-
formation in January about a temporary price rise in February will 
not buy in anticipation of the up-swing if he cannot sell and be as-
sured of retaining his profits until July.46 Furthermore, a primary 
function of the six-month limitation period is "to serve as an indica-
tor of the existence of the prohibited short-swing intention."47 The 
( 
fact that an insider's purchase is quickly followed by a sale makes it 
more reasonable to assume that the purchase was the beginning of a 
short-swing based on advance information, rather than a legitimate 
10. 
investment decision. In the co_llt~xt of single-transaction abuse, how-
e~er, the six-month time limit is illogical. Since the defendant's first 
transaction is, by hypothesis, completely innocent its only function 
as a basis for liability is to start the six-month clock ticking. Though 
the investor may later use inside information in deciding to make a 
sale, he will not be liable under section 16(b) unless he has made a 
fortuitous and unrelated purchase within the preceding six months. 
Even more conv~ncing is the statutory exemption for securities 
"acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously con-
tracted."48 1£ Congress was concerned about abuse of inside informa-
tion with reference to the sale only in the "purchase and sale" 
situation it would be absurd to create an exception for certain inno-
cent purchases. Indeed, the "debt previously contracted' exemption 
indicates that when a section 16(b) purchase presents no possibility 
of abuse, the possibility of abuse with respect to a subsequent sale 
should be irrelevant.49 
It may be argued that Congress manifested an intent to deal with 
single-transaction abuse when it expressly provided that the statute 
should apply "irrespective of any intention on the part of" the insider 
not to get out on a 'short-swing.~0 This provision may be read to in-
dicate that Congress wanted to eliminate any suggestion that some 
connection in motivation between the purchase and sale was neces-
sary. In fact, the statutory provision cuts the other way. It removes 
the question of intent from the facts to be considered because Con-
gress feared that requiring the plaintiff to prove the defendant's 
intent to sell or to disprove his intent not to sell would be too onerous. 
Therefore, Congress sought to establish an irrebuttable presumption 
that the two transactions were linked in a single speculative plan.G1 
11. 
12. 
I do not find this argument ultimately persuasive. 
The bulk of the argument is directed to the proposition 
that the provisions of the statute are ill-tailored to prevent 
single-transaction abuses. But it has always been recognized 
that § 16(b) is a "rule of thumb" statute. The fact that 
the objective criteria specified by Congress do a better job 
of preventing double-transaction abuses does not weigh very 
heavily against a conclusion that single-transaction abuses 
are covered. 
And there is at least one very significant indication l 
that Congress intended in g~eral to reach single-transaction 
abuses. In the statutory "preamble" Congress stated its 
purpose to be "preventing the unfair use of information which 
may have been obtained by a [10%] beneficial owner . 
by reason of his relationship to the issuer .• " Although 
Provident cites the preamble in support of its contention, 
the language seems more compatible with coverage of single-
transaction abuses. A stockholder who decides to sell on 
the basis of inside information acquired after becoming a 
10% owner has made "unfair use" of information acquired "by 
reason of his relationship to the issuer," even though he 
has not made an "in and out" decision on the basis of the 
inside information. Thus the statutory "preamble" supports 
the conclusion that single-transaction abuses are covered. 
7 
13. 
The reasoning that all the examples of abuse of insider 
information discussed by Congress involved double-transaction 
abuse can also not be deemed conclusive. If Congress meant 
to reach single-transaction abuses, as is suggest .ed . by the 
statutory preamble, the focus on double-transaction abuses 
is perhaps explicable by their more outrageous nature. In 
addition, the report accompanying a draft of § 16(b) as 
enacted states simply that "[t]he expressed purpose of this 
provision is to prevent the unfair use of inside information." 
(S. Rep. No. 792 to accompany S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 
(Apr. 20, 1934)). While CA9 seems correct that earlier drafts 
were clearly aimed at double-transaction abuses, the broader 
statement of purpose may be explicable on the basis of the 
elimination of criminal penalties. (See infra at 14-16.) 
It thus seems appropriate to conclude that in general 7 
Congress intended to prevent single-transaction abuses as 
1 
well as double-transaction abuses. The question becomes 
whether the proviso was intended to exempt 10% stockholders 
from single-transaction liability. The difficulty with 
1. This Court gave apparent sanction to the view by 
citing with approval Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. ~r 
1959), which held that one who is a director at the time 
of sale need not also have-been one at the time of purchase. 
(See Reliance Elec. Co., 404 U.S. at 424 n. 4.) 




~ /t>'YD ~-~ 
$ 
14. 
the CA9 result is that once some single-transaction liability 
is conceded, it is difficult to conclude that the proviso was 
meant to exempt stockholders. (? 
t' 
We begin again with the ambiguity of the proviso. If 
we work from the hypothesis that the general statutory purpose 
is to prevent both double - and single - transaction abuse, 
an exemptive effect for the proviso cannot be inferred from 
the purpose of the statute. Indeed, i f the purpose of the 
statute supported an exemptive effect, no exemption would 
be needed. (That is, if the statute~e intended to reach 
only double-transaction abuses, no exemption from liability 
for certain single-transaction abuses would be required.) 
Since an explanation more consistent with the purpose of 
the statute appears for the pro.viso (see infra at 16-:1,7), the 
exemptive effect contended for by Provident is not compelled 
by the purpose of the statute. 
2. Legislative history. 
Since neither the text of the statute nor the legislative 
purpose support an exemptive interpretation, legislative history 
is the final recourse. As already noted, in Reliance Elec. Co. 
this Court found that legislative history provided no explana-
tion of the meaning of the proviso. (See supra at 8.) 
Despite that conclusion CA9 relied on legislative history to 
support its conclusion. I think the CA9 analysis should be 
rejected. 
15. 
CA9 relied largely on language in S. 2693 strongly 
indicating that liability attached only to stockholders who 
were already statutory insiders. Section 5(b) of S. 2693 
provided: 
It shall be unlawful for any director, officer, or 
owner of securities, owning ... more than 5 per 
centum of any class of stock ... . 
(1) To purchase any such registered security 
with the intention or expectation of selling the 
same security within six months, and any profit 
made by such person . . . shall inure to and be 
recoverable by the issuer .... 
But the fact that this provision was proposed at one time 
actually does little to point to a stockholder exemption from 
single-transaction liability. 
The S. 2693 language embraced directors, officers, and 
stockholders. It clearly contemplated that purchases by any 
of these would be covered only if the "insider" status 
existed at the time of purchase. And it is hard to imagine 
a criminal provision being drafted otherwise. This piece 
of legislative history may therefore indicate that all of 
§ 16(b) was originally directed only at double-transaction 
abuse. But that focus was apparently abandoned when criminal 
2 
sanctions were abandoned. It is difficult to see how 
S. 2693 supports a differentiation between stockholders on 
the one hand and directors and officers on the other as 
to single-transaction liability. Absent at least some 
2. See footnote 1 supra. 
legislative history supporting such a differentiation, the 
inference drawn by CA9 from S. 2693 seems impermissible. 
3. Resolution. 
16. 
If we conclude that the background of S. 2693 does not 
in fact give the illumination that this Court found lacking 
in Reliance Elec. Co., we are left with the bare ambiguity 
of the statute. Having reached that point, it seems that the 
principle of construction enunciated in Reliance Elec. Co. 
should be applied. There the Court wrote: "To be sure, 
where alternative constructions of the terms of § 16(b) are 
possible, those terms are to be given the construction that 
best serves the congressional purpose. • . . " (404 U.S. at 
424. It should be noted that the deleted words in the quoted 
sentence are "of curbing short-swing speculation by corporate 
insiders." This language is suggestive of a double-transaction 
construction of the statute, but that question was, of course, 
not under consideration.) 
If the Reliance Elec. Co. rule of construction governs 
and the statutory purpose embraces the curbing of single-
transaction abuses, the "simultaneously with the purchase" 
construction should be adopted. Meaning would then be found 
for the proviso by construing it to deal with the minimization 
of liability by step transactions. Reliance Elec. Co. has 
already held that the proviso is to be read as allowing 
minimization of liability by step sales. The symmetrical 
I 
17. 
allowance of minimization of liability by step purchase$ 
furthers the purpose of preventing single-transaction abuses 
while giving meaning to the statutory language. (This solution 
has been advocated by L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1060 
(2d ed 1961) on just that basis.) 
I think this construction finds further support in two 
factors. First, it allows the words "at the time of" to be 
given the meaning "simultaneously with" in all cases, while 
CA9 realized that its result would require the phrase to be 
given one construction for opening transactions and another 
for closing transactions. Second, this is the construction 
that the SEC has always urged for § 16(b). Although the SEC 
it not participating here as amicus, it has long urged that 
the qualifying purchase is a § 16 (b) transaction. er agree with 
Provident that Foremost-McKesson's argument on the meaning 
of the proviso based on Rule 16b-2 is not conclusive. The 
Rule would have meaning whether or not the qualifying 
transaction is covered. The SEC might be unable to point 
to any action it has taken predicated on the construction 
urged here. But the position itself has long been taken, 
and given the closeness of the case, the SEC position should 
be weighty.) 
4. Counter Arguments 
I am fairly confident that the proviso argument relied 
upon by CA 9 and Provident is without merit. Thus on an 
18. 
analytical basis I think that CA9 can be affirmed only if the 
Kern County argument is accepted. Despite my confidence, I 
think one aspect of Reliance Elec. Co. would point to affirmance 
on CA9's rationale. There, after noting that the purpose of 
the proviso was unclear, the Court said: "[I]tmay be that 
Congress regarded one with a long-term investment as more 
likely to have access to inside information than one who moves 
in and out of the 10% category." (404 U.S. at 424). This 
speculative assignment of purpose suggests that the congres-
sional purpose in regulating stockholders was to reach only 
double-transaction abuses. But I think the Reliance Elec. Co. 
result did not depend on t hat remark. It focuses, rather , 
on sa tisfying t he tension between the statutory purpose and 
finding some meaning for the proviso. On the basis of that 
approach, my result here is sound. The court in Reliance 
Elec. Co. was not forced to consider whether the statute 
governed single-transaction abuses. 
Summary 
Kern County analysis seems inappropriate here because 
the closing transaction was subject to abuse. If Kern County 
is applicable, I don't think it governs because there was 
potential for abuse of inside information. 
The argument that the proviso exempts the qualifying 
~ purchase from the reach of § 16(b) collapses and largely -
of its own weight. The proviso can have that effect only 
19. 
if the section otherwise covers single-transaction abuses. 
But no legislative history points to an exemptive effect, so 
the purpose of the proviso remains unclear. Since it remains 
unclear what the purpose of the priviso is, it should be 
construed to effectuate the hypothesized statutory purpose 
of covering single-transaction abuses. It can be so construed 
and still have meaning if it is limited to the minimization 




To: Justice Powell 10-EJ-75 
From: Carl Schenker 
Re: Foremost-McKesson, No. 74-742 
This memo embodies the last minute research you asked for in 
this case. 
1. The 7th Circuit View 
As we discussed this afternoon, the 7th Circuit has just adopted 
the "dual-transaction" analysis of§ 16(b). Judge Swygert writes 
in the opinion "that in enacting section 16(b) Congress had in mind 
a specific type of two-part transaction consisting MX either of 
a purchase and subsequent sale, or a sale ard subsequent repnrchase, 
and did not intend section 16(b) to apply to every separate purchase 
or sale as to which some use of inside information is a theoretical 
possibility." (Slip op'n at 15-16.) 
~ There is nothing startling in what the 7th Circuit has to say~ 
~A-t m~ "1. d..u.Al· -tY"~s~ ~ ~. 
In ~act, I find the op1nion less persuasive than Pomerantz' argu-
ments. The 7th Circuit bases KKK its entire argument on the 
legislative history that CA9 relied upon; that is, its argument 
is based on the previous draft that clearly anticipated dual-
transaction analysis, but which included criminal sanctions.~~~ 
~~At,r)cA7 takes no account of the possibility that the basis of liability 
might have been widened when the criminal sanctions were dropped 
from the bill. In adnition, it takes no account of KKK cases 
like Adler, which imposed single-transaction liability upon officers 
and directors (and which this Court cited with approval in Relianre 
Electric.) While CA7 may be right, I don't think they make a 
very persuasive case. 
Furthermore, if I am reading the opinion correctly, they 
really ~M~~KM dropped the ball on the meaning of the proviso. 
Apparently CA7 held that the proviso means that only the ownership 
percentage before the opening transaction is to be considered. (Slip 
op'n at 19.) This could not be the case. First, if it were, then 
the single-transaction approach is to be derived from the proviso 
rather than from the statute itself. But I gather that CA7 intends 
to apply this holding in director and officer cases as well as in stock-
holderK cases. Second, this construction of the proviso is not con-
sistent with Reliance Electric. The Court there clearly contemplated 
that there would be inquiry into the stockholding before a KIK~~ 
closing transaction. But, CA7 apparently would not do so. Rather, 
it would hold that the last M 10% of stock sold would never be the 
basis for liability, since 
(Slip op'n at 18 n.l2.) 
I Thus, CA7 would appa r ently 
~~ 1'\'\\.lsT 
10% s tockowne rA_ 'lllllt Lpreexis t insider status. 
hold that if a 25% owner disposed of all 
of his stock at once, he would be liable only for for the ~MXXKX pro-
fits on 15% of the sales. No matter what construction ms made of 
the proviso, it seems that the entire profit on a single sale should 





In fact, after some effort, I can't think of a construction of 
the proviso that makes sense within an overall interpretation of 
the statute to reach only dual-transaction abuses. (This might stand 
some further thought,) I should add that upon rechecking Pomerantz' 
note JC found that he doesn't address himself to this problem. It 
does seem to me that someone attributed the proviso to an excess of 
caution. 
2. The Date of 8iaexRxakiemx Sale Problem 
You were right to resurrect this problem from the ash heap. 
CA9 seems to have overlooked the possible "nonbinding" effect of 
,f 5 (h) (found in the Appendix at page 7 following page Al34). 
That provision made a condition of the underwriters' duty to perfcrm 
the XKIIHXKXXXII absence of adverse market changes in Foremost 
stock between the date of the contract and the date of the KXKI 
sale. CA7 considered only the possible effect of ,f 7, which allowed 
the underwriters to terminate the contract between the date of the 
contract and the effective date of the registtation statement if 
there were adverse changes in the overall market picture. Since 
the registration statement became effective the same date as the 
underwriting agreement was signed (and before any eistribution), 
,f 7 was considered of no help to RM Provident. 
I have not had time to do original research into the law on 
I.A. 
this matter. B~ CA9 KIKXM~ clearly contemplated that such a clause 
might mean that the"sale" was not MXXlU!lflUI effectuated until 
closing. I would think two questions might be asked about ,f 5. 
......... ,_, .., 
First, DMKK since CA9 would presumably have considered ,f 5 n 
XMXKRKKXM relevant, why did it fail to consider the paragraph? 
(Did Provident fail to raise the matter below?) Second, is there 
any consequence to the fact that ,f 5 was a condition of the under-
writers' performance, while ,f 7 expressly allowed termination. 
(I doubt it.) 
lr;") I·:::.-
Octobe r 6,, 1975 
No. 74-742 Foremost-McKesson v. Provident 
Chronology (1969) 
August 1969 Negotiations resulted in "tentative Agreement". 
September 3 - Provident Board decided to recommend dissolution 
and liquidation to its stockholders and adoption 
of plan of liquidation. 
September 8 - Foremost sought permission from Commissioner 
of Corporations to issue and transfer its 
Debentures to Provident. 
September 25 - Purchase agreement executed pursuant to which 
Foremost would purchase .about 2/3 of Provident's 
assets in exchange of $4,250,000 in cash and 
$49,750,000 in Convertible Debentures. Under 
the agreement, Foremost was obligated to 
register one half of the debentures. 
October 15 - Closing under Purchase Agreement. Foremost 
delivered the cash and a $40,000,000 Debenture -
which was later split into one Debenture for 
$25 million and one for $15 million. (The 
remaining $9,750,000 of Debentures were delivered 
later - namely on October 20, except for $2,500,000 
held in escrow). 
October 21 - Provident, Foremost and Dillon Reed entered 
Underwriting Agreement for sale of $25,000,000 
of Debentures. 
October 24 - Provident distributed to its stockholders as a 
liquid dividend $22,250,000 of Debentures. 
October 28 - Closing under Underwriting Agreement: Provident 
transferred the $25 million Debenture to Under-
' writer for $25,366,666. 
October 29 - Provident distributed this cash to its stockholders. 
·· -
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~ Powell, J . ~ 
Blackmun, J. ~ ..... ~ ... ~ 
. ct.~~. 
~L,.~...._~~ 
Rel111 quist , J. ~ 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Carl Schenker DATE: November 19, 1975 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 74-742 Foremost-McKesson v. 
Provident Securities 
This memorandum will reflect my initial, perhaps super-
ficial, reaction to the draft of November 17. I commend you 
on getting it out expeditiously, and the draft reflects 
careful thought and research. 
The following comments are not "criticism". Rather, 
they are a part of a process designed to result in an opinion 
that reflects the best of our combined thinking and draftsmanship: 
1. I have drafted two or three riders, that you will 
find attached. The only important one is a revision of the 
I 
introductory paragraph. I am not sure that/have it exactly 
right, but I would like something along this line. 
2. I would prefer a somewhat fuller statement of the 
facts. Your succinct statement is perhaps all that is 
necessary to address the narrow issue which the opinion 
resolves. Yet, the facts of most 16(b) cases foreshadow the 
ultimate outcome. The bar is interested, and the unfamiliar 
reader should have a fairly full factual presentation in 
the text. 
In the limited time available to me today, I have not 
reviewed your footnotes except in the most cursor.y fashion. 
L.. 
I think the text and footnotes combined should identify the 
other main issues raised, and state that we do not reach them. 
These issues include (i) the Kern County "unorthodox trans-
action" position of the district court, and (ii) the view 
that I have that the critical "sale" did not occur until 
October 2S (the closing under the underwriting agreement) 
and at that time Provident was not a 10% holder. 
3. Take another look at your discussion of the contra 
decisions in Stella and Emerson Electric (CAS). I have 
thought that both of those cases take myopic views of 16(b), 
and particularly the exemptive provisions. In Stella, as 
you did note, the district court seemed obsessed with the 
"sale-repurchase sequence", and gave little or no attention 
to the more typical type of transaction such as that 
involved in this case. In Emerson, while the rationale was 
somewhat more "affirmative" (as you say)Jthe illustration 
you quote (51% acquisition· followed by manipulation) is 
atypical in respect to 16(b). If one goes to the trouble 
of acquiring 51% of another corporation he is likely to 
retain control rather than "gut" his own acquisition. In 
the typical tender offer situation, the objective is to 
attain 51% and retain it. In any event, the "horrible 
example" dreamed up by CAS would be a classic lOb-5 case. 
Accordingly, I suggest that at least you relegate this example 
to a footnote. I would not dignify it by textual treatment. 
Jo 
4. Subject to further thought and to your views, I 
would be inclined not to commence Part III on page 7. Rather, 
I would start Part III at the top of page 9 with the legis-
lative history. This is hardly a major suggestion, but at 
the moment it seems to have merit. 
5. Your discussion of the legislative history is excellent 
and persuasive. I have not compared it with similar discus-
sions in (i) CA9's opinion, (ii) respondent's brief, and (iii) 
the amicus brief filed on behalf of Gulf and Weston. If you 
.:~r J.---1-u. '--<t~ 
have not done so, take a look with the view to possibly 
• \ 
strengthening - in footnote or text - the draft. I do recall, 
for example, the reference in the amicus brief (p. 14) to 
the Senate Report which refers .to the "benefit of advance 
information", which is helpful. Possibly you have it i 'ftone 
of your notes - which I have not examined carefully. 
6. I am generally with you (subject to the above 
comments) to the beginning of the last paragraph on p. 15. 
At this point, it seems to me that the opinion "fades away" 
without emphasis of several considerations which I deem 
important. Without attempting to put them in any particular tYJ'-.:6 .,v 
1 
or to articulate them with precision, they include the 
following: 
(a) The discussion in the cases and commentaries 
as to whether the language of the exemptive provision 
should be construed to mean "before the purchase", 
"after the purchase", or "simultaneously with the 
'+. 
purchase", simply makes no sense to me. As a matter of 
"plain language" one must turn the sentence "on its head" 
to construe "at the time of the purchase" to mean "after 
the purchase". But apart from semantics, as you noted, 
there can be no presumption that inside informat·ion is 
available to a purchaser until after he has become an 
insider. The decision to purchase a security is the 
critical act. This necessarily precedes - often by a 
significant interval of time - the actual consummation 
of a purchase. The relevance of "insider information" 
relates only to the decisional process; not to the 
mechanical execution of a purchase. Thus, there is a 
perfectly rational basis for construing this language 
as meaning what it would normally mean, i.e., that before 
one becomes a statutory purchaser, enjoying "insider 
status", he must have completed the purchase. Prior to 
that time he is a statutory outsider. Against this back-
ground of reality, the language "at the time of purchase" 
can mean only one thing. 
(b) The exemptive provision applies only to 
beneficial owners of more than 10%, not to officers and 
directors. Congress must have had a purpose in mind for 
this deliberate distinction. The CA2 and CA8 decisions have, 
in effect, obliterated the distinction, something we have 
decided not to do. In truth, as you know from our discus-
sions, even one who enjoys the status of a 10% stockholder is 
·, 
J. 
not entitled by virtue of that status to any inside 
information. To be sure, if such a stockholder is able 
to place a representative on the board, the stockholder 
may end up obtaining the information. This would certainly 
be true if an individual owned 10% and also served as an 
officer or a director. But absent a presence on the 
board there would be a clear violation of lOb-S for a 
corporation (or its officers or directors) to disclose 
to any stockholder information not available to all 
holders. 
Not only is a 10% stockholder not entitled to 
information by virtue of that status, the fairly 
typical situation today involves a tender offer resulting 
in an adversary position • . The amicus brief for Gulf 
and Weston presents this situation with some force. 
(c) You have, as I recall, one s entence mentioning 
the availability of lOb-5 remedies. I consider this a 
fairly major point that should be elaborated. 
(d) Section 16(b) creates liability without fault 
where it is applicable. Putting this another way, it 
creates a conclusive presumption of wrongdoing without 
regard to the facts, and imposes liability on the basis 
of a purely mechanical formula. Where the operative 
language is clear and explicit, we must accept congres-
sional judgment - absent constitutional infirmity. But 
here no one- no court and) to my knowledge)no commentator-
Note: 
o. 
thinks that the language of the priviso is clear or 
explicit. Viewed in the light ' most favorable to 
petitioner's arguments in this case, the language is 
ambiguous. And the "ambiguity" is perceived not so much 
from the language of the proviso as from what seems to 
be undesirable results in some instances (the sale-
repurchase, for example) if the language is applied in 
accordance with its normal meaning. 
It is one thing, however, to be concerned about 
undesirable results that do not impose liability, and 
which may well be prevented by lOb-S or other provisions. 
It is quite something else to construe admittedly 
ambiguous language to impose such liability by an 
irrebuttable presumption of fault. 
This point was very much in the minds of some of 
the Justices who voted to affirm in this case. It 
merits appropriate emphasis. 
There is something of a problem as to how to work the fore-
going thoughts into the structure of your draft. I think I 
would add a new Part IV, following your fine discussion of the 
legislative history, and address it in policy considerations 
that are supportive of that history and our holding. I think 
most of the foregoing ideas could be blended into such a 
discussion. I have not reread Kern County, but it may be that 
some of the language in it would be helpful either as a 
"springboard" or as tangentially relevant. 
7. I have not focused on present Part IV, and will 
try to do this upon my return from Harvard. 
I • 
8. Nor have I had an opportunity to review the 
footnotes, beyond some haphazard reading. I agree with you 
c that they seem to~ fulsome, and may include some topics that 
could well be omitted entirely. I do not like to have the 
footnotes outweigh the text; nor, should they indicate views 
on issues not before the Court. 
This is a hurried memorandum, so that you will have 
the essence of my preliminary thinking before I go away. 
L. F. P. , Jr. 
ss 
1 p 88 11/19/75 Rider A1 p. 15 (Foremost-McKesson) 
But the insider status was viewed as deriving from the fact 
of stock ownership and its consequent access to inside 
information. The focus of concern was on preventing a 
large stockholder from profiting by trading on the basis 
of such information. It would hardly be consistent with 
this view of the threat to impose liability on the basis 
of a purchase when there was no insider status and 
presumptively no access to information unavailable to 
investors at large. 
11/19/75 lfp/ss Rider A, p. 9 ~Foremost-McKesson) 
III. 
The exemptive provision, which applies only to 
beneficial owners of more than 10% of the security involved 
and not to other statutory insiders, must have been 
included in the Act for a purpose. We look first to the 
legislative history. Although the extensive record of 
that history is bereft of any explicit explanation of 
congressional purpose and intent, see Reliance Electric 
~· v. Emerson Electric Co., supra at 424, the evolution 
of § 16(b) from its initial proposal through passage 
does shed significant light on the exemptive provision. 
lfp/ss 11/19/75 Rider A, p. 1 (Foremost-MCKesson) 
This case presents an unresolved issue under § 16(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 896, 15 
u.s.c. § 78p(b). That section of the Act was designed to 
prevent corporate officers, directors and the beneficial 
owners of more than 10% of a corporation's equity 
securities from profiteering on the basis of insider 
information through short-swing transactions. Section 
16(b) contains an exemptive proviso excluding "any 
transaction where such beneficial owner [of more than 
10%] was not such both at the time of the purchase and 
sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security 
involved * * *"· The question presented here is whether 
a person who purchases more than 10% of a corporation's 
equity securities, and thereafter sells them within six 
months, was a beneficial owner of such securities "at 
the time of the purchase" as well as at the time of the 
sale. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit answered this qu~stion in the negative. 506 F.2d 
601 (1974). We affirm. 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Mmoran~m 
_____ (_l~ ____ l_~-j-------, 19 ______ _ 
L_ . 
-;'-/-- stz 
0 ~,_f f;l t.A-~ 
4.r do I .fL~ j ....._ f 
'jl'v>-- /L u ~~ &..__...(_ 
{,-.,..:._ tt.... b ~.._. ; ,;_ ~A-t , .... y I 
fLyk w~-IL ;. t6tt&<. 
( A.. • 
\ (?s; \ 
CS/gg 12-8-75 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Carl R. Schenker 
Rider A, p. 20. No. 74-742 Foremost 
I think your presumption analysis may be summarized 
as follows: Section 16(b) defines insiders as including those 
who own 10% . From the fact of ownership it is presumed that 
a trading stockholder (1) has access to inside information and 
(2) has misused inside information. It is, however, irrational 
to infer (1) and (2) until one who is already an insider purchases 
and sells. 
I don't think this analysis can carry us very far. 
First, (1) and (2) are not both presumed from the fact of 
ownership. Second, the perceived irrationality assumes that 
§ 16(b) deals only with dual-transaction abuses and not with 
single-transaction abuses, while that is the very question at 
issue. 
First. The commentators who have par sed carefully 
the operation of § 16(b) agree that the section includes two -
presumptions. Presumption (1) is that 10% ownership gives one -
inside information. Presumption (2) is that a purchase and 
sale (or sale and purchase) within 6 months was based on use 
of the inside information. That is, access is presumed from 
the fact of ownership, but misuse is presumed from the fact of 
2. 
a short-swing transaction. (This bifurcation can be seen 
in the CA 9 analysis. 506 F. 2d 611-614.) 
Second: Even if we clarified this point, the 
analysis in Rider A does not work. The central thrust of 
Rider A is that it is irrational to conjoin a presumption of 
access and a presumption of misuse unless both the purchase 
and sale followed the fact of insider status. In other words, 
Presumption 2 may only rationally mean that a purchase-and-sale 
after access to information was based on misuse of information. 
But note that this position also implies that it is irrational 
to presume misuse of inside information in the sale of stock 
unless there was a presumptive misuse in the purchase of the 
stock. I think that is demonstrably not so. Congress would 
be entitled to presume that a sale shortly after any substantial 
purchase reflects a misuse of inside information available 
after the purchase. (See the appendix for an elaborated discussion). 
Let's call this Presumption 2'. It could legislate to cover 
that kind of abuse. 
I am not arguing that Congress incorporated Presumption 
2' into§ 16(b). [Maybe it did as to directors and 
officers, but we are holding that it didn't as to 10% owners 
because of the proviso.] I am only arguing that it could 
rationally enact a statute tha( incorporated Presumption 2'. 
From the foregoing I would make two arguments. First, 
~ 
you statements in Rider A are far too sweeping in their 
A 
strong suggestion that a statute including Presumption 2' might 
be unconstitutional. Second, the very question that this opinion 
addresses is whether or not the proviso was intended to negate 
Presumption 2' for stockholders. If Presumption 2' were 
irrational, it would be valid to argue Congress couldn't have 
intended it. But since Presumption 2' is rational, Rider A is 
a bootstrap argument. (Please note that the CA 9 argument based 
on presumptions recognized this point. 506 F. 2d at 611-614. 
It therefore argues not that Presumption 2' is irrational, but 
that Congress demonstrated that it wanted Presumption 2 by 
deleting tippee liability. The argument is that tippees were 
3. 
outsiders, as are 10% owners before the purchase. Therefore 
the deletion of tippee liability shows an intention to exclude 
outsiders, including those who owned less than 10% before 
purchase. This argument, however, does not work because 
10% owners are insiders after the purchase, while tippees are 
always outsiders. The deletion of tippee liability therefore 
proves nothing about Presumption 2 or Presumption 2' when it is 
conjoined with Presumption 1.) 
Suggestion: I wrestled with this presumption 
argument before rejecting its inclusion in the draft. But 
I am now perfectly clear on its bootstrapping nature. And I 
think the weakness of the CA 9 argument demonstrates that it 
can't be remedied . For that reason I prefer the alternative 
suggested in your previous memo to me. The liability without 
fault argument is not a bootstrapping argument. Congress knew 
it was imposing liability without fault and definitely did not 
want to make it too broad. Of course, that desire doesn't 
answer the question whether it chose to incorporate Presumption 
2 or Presumption 2', but it allows a more coherent and analytically 
sound policy argument. You seem to feel that my argument on 
this point was not strong enough. I recommend strongly that we 
rework my section together to tone it to the pitch you want 
rather than sticking with the presumption analysis. 
Appendix: Imagine for a moment that Congress 
deliberately and unambiguously set out to pass a statute that 
4. 
covered both dual-transaction abuses and single-transaction 
abuses. It could follow a thought-process like this: 
(1) One who purchases over the 10% level may or may not have 
made that purchase on inside information. (If the purchase 
was based on inside information, that information was not 
derived from the fact of relationship to the corporation, but 
from some other source.) When he sells within 6 months there 
are three possibilities. (a) He had inside -information when 
he bought and intended to sell on the short-swing. 
(b) After he became an insider, he acquired information and 
sold on the short-swing. (c) Both the purchase and the sale 
were inn~ 
l3) As you have pointed out to me, one who purchases 
~ ~  substantial block ~sually does so for purposes of long-term 
~ investment (especially when he has the prospect of control);) 
;{' ~~ ((4) Therefore, when a substantial purchas« sells 
~--~ within 6 months, the profits can be taken out of the sale because 
~~-~ (3) makes it rational to assume a significant probability of 
either (a) or (b) abuse. 
In a (b) abuse situation of an innocent purchase 
followed by an abusive sale, the rationality stems from essentially 
the same two presumptions that operate at present in§ 16(b). 
When one becomes an insider, he has access to inside information. 
When such a person sells within 6 months he was trading on that 
information. The rationali ty for covering (a) situations is 
5. 
is slightly different, but it need not be discussed. Congress 
would be entirely justified in saying that (b) abuses were so 
likely that the rule was justified on that basis alone. Since 
you can't tell an (a) abuse from a (b) abuse, Congress would 
be entitled to subsume both under the same rule. 
The possibility remains that many (c) situations 
of an innocent purchase followed by an innocent sale would be 
covered by this statute. But it is not irrational to cover 
these situations in order to reach all of the (a) and (b) 
situations. This is especially true because the "only" penalty 
~ imposed upon the (c) people is loss of profits. This is liability 
without fault, but of a very limited variety. 
Carl 
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Re: Foremost-McKes son v. Provident, No. 74-742 
Throat clearing. I have been working my way up to preparing 
a memo that would allow us to discuss the basic strategy that the 
opinion should take. My strategical problem is that there ·aPe IS a_ 
at l•11t ~io case; not presented here that we want to hold harmless 
in this opini9n (as I un~tand our previous discussions). This ~~ 
~· ~$:/~ b..d . . 
~s a longer range ' matter than the immediate problem that has arisen 
AA'\ 
so I will discuss that ·~tter YYXYM¥ at the second part of the 
memorandum. I will turn first to my shorter range problem: Did 
--........... --- --~ 
the ~ Conference vote the right way in Provident. (Please read 
on before you come to the conclusion that I'm a sore loser.) 
A. The KKKM basic outcome. 
As you know, the Court's previous foray into the meaning of 
the proviso in § 16(b) was KK in Reliance Electric. There the 
question presented was what the words "at the time of • . • sale" 
meant. They were held to mean that a beneficial owner could 
"minimize" his liability by making step sales. 
Reliance Electric's facts are easily summarized:* R The 
stockholder bought 1~ of the corporation, then sold in two blocks 
of $X 6% and 9%. 
The stockholder contended that the proviso "both at the time 
of the purchase and sale" excluded any liability for either s a le. 
But the Court found that ques tion not MK to be properly presented 
in the case. Thus it confined itself to the further contention 
that the ~ second sale should not be covered. The Court 
held that the "plain meaning" of the phrase "at the time of • • . sale" 
;yl ;-e'l ~--TVU J~ & '--h; ~· ~Qf) ~ 0..0 iS~CI 
~s. 
was that the second sale was excluded from operation of the 
statute because after the 6% sale, a 1'J'% owner was no longer 
a "beneficial owner of more than 10%." Seems sound enough. 
Now let's consider Provident. Provident became a more KMXM 
than !XX 10% owner XMX in a single pnrchase of 15%. It then 
sold HX 6%. The Conference has voted to hold that the words 
"both at the time of the purchase ••• "mean that since Provident 
was not a 10% owner at the time of the original purchase, its 








6 - 9 
/ cessary / to p 
Provident 
"at the • . sale" 
the K]QI s down 
be 
11M'4k~~~'~'.' ~ 
Th~oblem is that if Provident is right RelianceXMHKK MUST 
be wrong. Let me demonstrate: ~KXKM Imagine that all three 
of the following transactions take place within 6 months--
XKXll a 15% purchase 
a 6% sale 
a 9% sale 
In World A, Stella and Reliance are the c ontr olling cas es. The 
stockholder would therefore be liable for lX 6%. In World X B 
Provident is the contr~ing prcedent. The stockholder is liable 
for nothing. The trouble is not that the amount of liability 
changes. The trouble is that Rrovident makes Reliance irrelevant~ 
Reliance KHni:KXXIDfK is only pertinent to the extent that 11 sales ' made 
after one gets to less than 10% are safe. But they will always 
It ,, 
be safe under Provident because that case holds that the purchase 
by which one becomes a KlfKKHXMKM beneficial owner will never 
be a statutory "purchas e." Therefore no sale can be matched against 
it, whether or not the stockholder held 10% at the time of 
the sa le. 
I have had some trouble conveying some of this to people 
~ orally. 
KKXK~Xlf~lf.MMXX.KKU ~ ~n order to be sure the point is clear 
let me repeat it. would only apply when a 
~A#,. s~ockholder was sell ing 111 his "basic" 10% because at no other 
~~.JYt'1me would he fail to be a "more than 10%,. owner"at the time of 
) d1 ~ , , . sale," But Provident holds that the hans action by which 
\c;''v~ one act\ ires "more than 10%" status is not a "purchase." Therefore 
jY <~r;hen a stockholder# sells out that stock, there is no \\ purchasel' 
~~'V~~~r his KXM ''sale1' to be matched against . Accordingly, the Provident 
'-!'\ ~ ~11 
~ construction of "at the time of"'--.L ... sal? r enders Reliance's 
"------ 'If' . . • .. . 9 ~ 
1[1-"F}f~·· _(~.,/ ~.c~ns~t- r~u0wct,io~n of "at the time of 'the purchase" sup~~u~ ~~ can take two basic ~lf.K approache~ One could say It; r) 
that Congress didn't realize 
~(..~~ 
thi~ its all a mistake; Provident 
~
is right; the~ anguage ~ superfluous; it wasn't MRMIM« evident 
that the language was superfluous in Reliance because we weren't 
considering the whole ~ clause. 
Or one could seek to find a way to prevent the "at the time of 
• sale" language from being superfluous. KMIDUI Believe it or 
~ 
not, there are ways. 
Let me start first with the most plausible. As you may recal\ +{Jl 
~· ~\(t~ ,, fKiiL'A· 
from my original memorandum in this case, I said that th~oviso -
could be given meaning by construing it to permit minimization 
of KK liability b~ step purchases. (Obviously this is the 
converse of Reliance.) That would work out as follows: Imagine 
that the following threetransactions all occur withinX six months--
a« 9% purchase 
a 6% purchase 
a 15% sale 
Under the Schenker interpretation this 9 + 6 - 15 sequence 
would result in liability of 6%. That result would obtain because 
of the language "at the time of the purchase." At the time of the first 
"more than 
XKK purchase the stockholder was not a 110%"owner, so the 9% li£ 
"buy" was not a statutory "purchase." ~IJ But the 6% purchase 
makes one a statutory insider under the general principle of Stella 
(which, of course, also applies if one buys all 15% in one "swell 
foop"). Therfore one is an insider when all 15% is sold, but 
only I::XXX 6% of the"sales" have a ~purchasJ' to be matched against. 
RMIIXMMK To emphasize the role of Stella in this case, let's rename 
this the Stella-Schenker approachQ 
~()-.j 
Reliance retains its role under the Stella-Schenker appr&dch, 
as can be seen by imagining the following four transactions to occur 
within 6 months--
a 7% purchase 
a\\ 8% purchase 
1 6% sale 
a 9% sale. 
This 7 + 8 - 6 - 9 sequence would yield liability of 6% , under 
the Stella-Schenker interpretation because of Reliance. "At the time 
of the [8%] purchase," the stockholder made a matchable transaction 
under the statute. KHK All 8% of that amount could be recaptured 
in later sales but for Relianc@. Because under Reliance the 6% 
sale means that"at the time"of the 9% sale (which includes 2% of 
the Stella "purchase") the stockholder was not a more than 10% 
owner. Thus Reliance and the "at the time of l.tMK • • • sale" t:uwL. 
-to (red~ .ffAu "'~ r""~ 
language have meaning under the Stella-Schenker approac~ Note ~ 
that in this context under frovident, Reliance would be irrelevant: 
neither the 6% nor the 9% "unloading" is a "sale" because "at the 
~ uX0 
time \\ purchase"A.the stockholder IMia IU!l t a "more than 10%" 
owner. 
This Stella-Schenker-Reliance approach seems relatmvely 
~ straightforawrd. As I mentioned in my original memo, Loss adopts 
it. But he does so because he views the "at the time of the 
purchase" I~~ language to be ambivalent and thinks this 
interpretation comports with the purposes of the KKK statute. He 
does not appe~r to notice that this interpretation is necessary 
to avoid rendering the Reliance interpretation of "at the time of 
• sale" superfluous. 
OK. That is approach # 1 to a nonsuperfluous construction 
"at the time of . . . sale." Under 
,......,_ 
that interpretation both "at the time of the purchase" and "a t the 
time of ••• sale" are relatively straightforward. XK 
It is necessary to sketch another kind of case to complete 
the picture under the Stella-Schenker-Reliance interpretation. 
Imagine the following four transactions all occur within a six 
month period: 
an 11% purchase 
a 4% purchase 
a 6% sale 
a 9% sale 
Under the Stella-Schenker-Reliance approach the result in this 
11 + 4 - 6 - 9 ~~· is liability for 6%. Th.e "Schenll:er" aspect 
f h 0~ h . 1 h. b h o t e appraec ~s not re evant to t ~s case ecause t ere are no 
step KKXKK purchases. Stella makes the entire 15% of holding 
a potential "purchase," but Reliance saves harmless the 9% sale. 
UNder Provident, of course, liability would be 4%. Th.e 11% holding 
was not a "purchase," so the 4% is the only "purchase" available 
against which to match the 6% sale. 
Ok. 'That fleshes out the reasonable interpretation of "at the 
time of the purchase" which 11!~ the Relianc~ interpretation 
of "at the time of ••• sale" not superfluous. Now let's look 
at some of the MMRMXKMKKKIKXXKXK~KKXX~~ other ways to prevent 
"at the time of • • • s;:-le" from being superfluous. ·k 
Let's call epproach · # 2 the Zero interpretation. Under 
the Zero interpretation, one could construe "at the time of ••. sale" 
to mean that the stockholder must hold "more than 10%" after the 
saleg In other words, unless one had "more than 10%" left after 
the sale in a purchase/sale case, one would not be liable. Imagine 
~·( Please note that there are two ways to prevent the phrase "at the 
ximexa£xxk.ex11M time of ••• sale" from being superfluous. ONe is 
to construe "at the time ~f the purchase" in such a fashion that 
"at the time of • . • sale" M1D!MKXJOifAM~~ can still mean what it 
~KK was said to mean in Reliance. 'That's interpretation# 1. Th.e 
other is to say that Reliance was wrong, and that"at the KKI. time 
os ..• sale" means something other than what Reliance said. 'That's 
interpretatiorf # 2 ~ 
this case anyway you like to take it: it is a loser. For 
illustration, imagine the following three transactions within 
six months: 
an 11% purchase 
a 4% purchase 
a 15% sale 
Under Provident, the stockholder would have liability for 4%. 
Under Stella-Schenker-Reliince, the stockholder would be liable 
~-Mil 
for 15% (not having availed himself of . Under the Zero 
approach he would have liability for nothing, since he didn't 
have "more than 10%" left after the KK1U: sale. 
But the Zero approach does make eat the time of .sale" 
mean something. Combined with Provident it prevents the superfluity 
when 
of the phrase that results/~ the Reliance X~~XM~ approachis 
combined with Provident. There are two big problems with the Zero 
approach. The first, obviously, is Reliance. The more important 
is that everybody agrees that the statute would really be gutted 
by such an approach, and that it can't mean this. XHX 
The Zero approach would be bad law, but at least it prevents 
superfluity and not a great deal of KXXXMKN~JXXM~ tortured construc-
tion is necessary to reach it. XKKM~~~MXMK Approach # 3J 
to which we now turn, would be very tortured but it also avoids 
superfluity. Let's call approaah # 3 the Juggernaut approach. 
(Totally arbitrary.) Under the Juggernaut approach, one would 
construe (as in if 1) the "at the time of the purchase" phrase. 
the result 
liability 
The Juggernaut approach would XKKM~~ interpret the proviso 
to mean that whenever a Provident insider made an additional 
purchase he «KK would be liable for aales matched against all 
"purchases," whether or not they themselves were purchases that 
would have passed muster under Provident. The only ~~KMKK 
limitation on liability is that in Reliance for step sales. To 
paraphrase, under Juggernaut fiKKKX~M~ nonstatutory purchases 
~ ~ ~ becomes statutory purchases when a KHM statutory purchase is followed 
by a statutory'' sale .'t Let me illustrate this before I try to 
j ustmfy it. 
First, imagine the following three transactions ~KX within 
six months '1 
a 9% purchase 
a 6% purchase 
a 15% sale 
Under Provident there would be no liability here. Under Stella-
Schenker-Reliance there would be 6% liability. Under Juggernaut 
there would be no liability. The Provident t6st is applied 
to KKXRM determine that nemther the 9% not the 6% purchase was 
L .. \PM-~ '!/ 
a statutory~en the statutory ''salel' has no transaction 
against which to be matched. Second, imagine the following three 
transactions within six months: 
an 11% purchase 
a 4% purchase 
a 15% sale. 
Under Provident, there would be 4% liability. Under Stella-Schenker-
Reliance there would ee 15% liability. Under Juggenaut there would 
be 15% liability. The Provident test is utlized to identify the 
4% purchase as one MXKH made by a statutory insi er. The 4% 
purchase is thus a ~:KKMXMXM~~X}UI~lf.MXX.M statutory "purchase" 
followed by a statutory "sale." Under Juggernaut such behavior 
converts nonstatutory KKlK "purchases" within six MMXK months of 
the"sale" into "statutory purchases". Therefore all 15% of the 
liability is capturable. KKiiXKKK 
Reliance~ however, would also enter any case where there were 
step sales to allow minimization of K liability. Thus, in 
an ltx~*X 11 + 4 - 6 - 9 sequence, liability under Juggernaut 
would be 6%. Under Provident, of course, it would be 4% and under 
Stella-Schenker-Reliance it would also be 6%. 
To hazaed a generalization that I am not sure would prove out 
logically in all cases, the Juggernaut liabilitywould be the same 
as Stella-Schenker-Reliance in any case where one made a purchase 
afte r becoming a Provident insider, but would be the same as in 
Provident in any case where no purchases were made after becommng 
a statutory inscbder. Obviously, neither 11at the time of the purchase" 
nor "at the time of ••• sale" is treated as sy.perfluous. 
Before I try to justify Juggernaut on the XMK language of 
the statute, let me say why it makes some sense as a theoretical 
matter. Compare Stockholder Innocent with Stockholder Pernicious. 
Innocent engages in a 7 + 8 - 15 sequence. Under the basic theory 
of Provident, he is a good guy because neither of his ~R purchases 
was made on the basis of inside IKf~ information. He is 
therefore entitled to sell his holdings free of liability. Pernicious 
engages in an 11 + 4 - 15 sequence. He is a real bum. His 11% 
holdings gave him inside informationQ That put him in a position 
to learn iQside infarmatiou iadieatiag· that a killing could be made 
in the stock. He then rushed out, bought an additional 4% and un-
loaded all of it. He is a pretty low form MXf of life. 
Now, does the statute allow us to draw this disti~ction? 
The proviso reads in ful~ "This subsection shall not be construed 
to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such 
both at the time of the purchase and sale • II The use of the . . 
word "transaction" shows that "purchase and sale" come as a unit 
in the statute. ~KXXXKX~KKKKIKKM Pernicious proceeded by means 
of a nonstatutory purchaee + a statutory purchase + a statutory 
sale. The statutor¥ purchase + the statutory sale constituted 
a statutory "transaction." Thus he has realized profit on "any 
purchase and sale" while being a beneficial owner "both at the 
time of the purchase and sale." X1iMXKXMX.HX.KXRiNX:KI}1KXiGUUlX10Ufi:l:}f 
~KKK Although the original purchase would not have been 
a XXX statutory purchase, the second purchase and the sale are 
clearly within the statute. Since the stockholder has acted 
on the basis of inside information, we will ~»XX get him for all 
his sales. 
I guess I don!t need to say that the rationale is more 
convincing than the attempt to twist it out of the statute. I think 
this is a rather tortured ~MH«M approach. 
Let's turn finally to the ~!lis-Chalmers approach. The 7th 
Circuit has construed XMXK the proviso in the following fashion: 
The use of the word "transaction" in the provism shows that 
a purchase/sale and a sale/purchase should be thought of as a 
unit. The proviso theeefore should be read to mean "both at the 
x±max3fxxkRX~Hx~kaxexaHsxxaie;x8xxxkexxale purchase/sale, ££ the 
sale/purchase." Thus, when one looks to time, one asks only a 
single time question in each case: What was the stockholder before 
"'~ the initial .transae.t:ian.. The "both" is the first part of a "both 
in a 
time 
• or" construction. Thus there is no second time question 
the 
given case. Under KKK this construction, Rnt:xMKK "at the 
/construction of Relia!ce 
of • • • sale" is not KHtGUfftMH superfluous. Rather, it is 
misconceive~, unnecessary. 
[0 
The Allis-Chalmer* approach has two MXXX~ difficulties. 
ONe is that Reliance is on the books. The second is that 
"both • • • or" is very unusual English. 
~XHHXDRX~X.K.MXKMMXXX~mt~ 
five possible ~ solutions to the fact 
So, there you have fixex~axxiklex~RRKXXH~XiGH&xa£XKKKX~~RXKMX 
that Provident renders 
~iJxx~xaxiiHHXJXXRHHRXiRgxKMlXKKKKXK~XXIHM«K the Reliance 
interpretation of "at the time of ••• sale" superfluous: (1) 
Say IX the language is superfluous and Reliance was wrong; (2) 
adopt the stepped-up purchase analysis (Schenker); (3) the 
Zero approach; (4) the Juggernaut approach; and(t~e Allis-
! ( 
Chal ers a roacq. (A ~ \..'-.1~ .~ fv ~( ~ ({..PJ...u));t J~ ~ 
~~ P--ur-J-f~D . .$.ee. ~,') 
' N rn for a mbment to the "bothat the time of the • • • 
sale or purchase" part of the proviso. It should be noted that 
the most likely construction of that part of the proviso is 
that one must own "more than 10%" before the lfii:KIDO!K:IiXXKK 
sale and after the purchase. Under that construction the 
"at the time of ••• [re]purcbsse" would not be superfluous, 
4o 
because it would preben~he application of liability in an 11 - 4 + 
2 sequence. Of course, under the Allis-Chalmers approach there 
might be liability in an ~ 11 - 4 + 2 sequence, since the 
~ifKMK sale/purchase transaction would create a progit when one 
was a "more than 10% owner" "at the time of the sale/purchase"--i.e., 
befu re the sale;· But that result is also out of whack with 
Reliance. Therefore I don't think that the lat t er part of the 
proviso casts much light on the first part. 
My problem is that I don!t know how to write the Provident 
~sult under the shadow of Reliance. What do I say about it? 
What is Justice Stewnr~ in particular going to do when he realize& 
that Reliance looks pretty silly in ~ light of Provident. 
Let's look at our options. The first option is to plow 
right ahead and simply dump on Reliance on the XKKRM~ theory that 
in fact the language is superfluous: either because it out -
and-out is superfluous or because the Allis-Chalmers is 
correct. The second alternative is to the 
$ 
time of • sale" languag~ther than ._ ____ 
This MN«lMXMKXKMH means starting out by dumping on Reliance 
not as superfluous but as wrong. Then we adopt ~ the 
Zero approach, the Juggernaut appro~ch, or the Schenker approach. 
The Zero approach is simply unaccep~ble; the Juggernaut approach 
is very tortured; the Schenker approach comes easiest. It is 
tortured to the extent that "at the time of" means simultaneously 
with purchases and bec6ore sales. But that basic fact of"at the 
time of" meaning different things in :MXX differamt areas is nKfA 
almost a necessity of the statute. If it doesn't have that 
flexible meaning and Provident is correct, there will be no 
liability in an 11 - 11 + 11 situation, 'Because if "at the time 
of"always MMHK.KXM1!lto!.Kmeans "before," you never get the 11 - 11 + 11 
stockholder. 
Those are~wo alternatives. There is a third possibility: 
ignore all this. Then you end up with egg on your face rather than 
xxMXi«H Justice Stewart, though it is possible no one but 
me will ever notice this. I have talked to Stewart's clerk and 
Blackmun's clerk assigned to this case and neither of them had thought 
of the problem. We could also say that we leave the possibility 
that Juggernaut is the real meaning until we have a case ~RKMH 
presenting the meaning of the "at the time of • o o sale" language. 
But that obviously just points up what a MMXKXRKIKIH~ mess Reliance 
has created. Perxonally, I haven ! t changed my initial view that 
the Schenker approach is correct, but I am yours to command. 
B. The strategic problem. 
I had planned to discuss this at greater length, but the 
~irst part of the memo is too long to allow that. As I said, there 
lA ~. ~ 
.are t ue ea£W~B· we want to hold harmless in this opinion~ ooQ1 lit ai:K 
ii iasa A: a person buys 5% of a corporation's stock, becomes a 
director, and sells his stock all within six months. ~a etfi~ 
i.s ~ase C: a "m~ran ~o e-wHEH" &ei:t-s below 
~ ~ :1JQa) Ce.4e A 
e in an 
Case A and Case B are very similar cases. In both an "outsider" 
performs an event that makes him an "insider" and then unloads his 
stock. In Case A he becomes a director; in Case B he buys his JO'ro 1 
stock. Now, you are familiar from our previous discussions with 
the dual-transaction analysis of § 16(b). Under that approach, 
there should be no liability in either CAse A or CAse B. But, 
as I've said before, XKKX those results would stem not from the 
proviso (which of course doesn't even apply to directors) but 
from the basic structure of the statute. But the proviso MKK 
was put in. It says that"More than 10%" stockholders have to 
be such "both at the :¥1l time of the purchase and tale." There is 
no such requirement for directors. NKK If the proviso controls t~s 
case as to stockholders, then by negative implication the result 
would be the opposite XK without the proviso. Since the proviso 
doesn ( t apply to directors/officers, by negative implication 
Case A is KMM~Nl a situation for liability. It is enough for 
an officer or director that he be such either at the time of 
purchase of his stock or at the time of sale. The only wa¥ to 
avoid this conclusion is to say that the proviso deals with another 
problem entirely. But even the commentators who support dual-
transaction analysis can't suggest what that might be. 
The reason this point is troubling is demonstrated by Reliance. 
In Rel i ance the Court chose to deal wit h just a portion of t he 
statute; it now appears that the Court's hands are ~M»K somewhat 
locked by that e rror. The same thing could happen here. Tf 
the Court relies on the proviso when it shouldn 't because the dual-
transaction analysis is right, then the eAse A is controlled by 
that approach when the case comes up. 
I KKIXK think we should rely on the proviso (assuming that 
the Court pres ses on on its present path). I don't see what else 
the proviso might mean. I think Case A should make for liability, 
even though KK the stat ute may primarily be aimed at dual-transaction 
abuses. I am prepared to write Provident that way--bu t somebody has 
to tell me wha t to do abou t Rel i ance . 
lfp/ss 1/13/76 No. 74-742 Foremost-MCKesson, Inc. 
v. Providet Securities Co. -
This case is here on certiorari to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Section 16(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 allows a corporation 
to recover the profits realized by an officer, director, 
or beneficial owner of more than 10% of its shares, where 
there has been a purchase and sale of its shares within 
a six-months' period. 
We took this case to determine the meaning of an 
exemptive provision which specifies that the statute 
does not cover any transaction where the beneficial 
owner was not such both "at the time of" the purchase and 
the sale of the shares involved. 
As the facts of this case are too complex for oral 
summary, I will announce only our decision. 
We conclude, in view of the language of the exemptive 
provision, that a beneficial owner is accountable for 
profits, in a purchase-sale seQuence, only if he was 
such an owner "before the purchase", as well as at the 





As the respondent in this case was not a statutory 
beneficial owner before the purchase, the subsequent sale 
within six months was not subject to § 16(b). 
The Court of Appeals was of the same view. Accordingly, 
we affirm its judgment. 
The Chief Justice and Justices Brennan, _Stewart, 
Marshall, Blackmun and Rehnquist join in the opinion of 
the Court. Mr. Justice White joins in all but Part IV-C 
thereof. 
Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration 
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JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
January 7, 1976 
4 C/._.; ];~ 
Re: No. 74-742 - Foremost-McKesson~ ~ 
Provident Securities Co. 
Dear Lewis: 
I join your very good 
except for Part IV C. Would 
opinion in this case ~ 
you please add an · 
appropriate note to this effect at the bottom of 
your opinion? 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to Conference 
Mr. Justice White joins in the 
judgment of the Court, and in all 
but Part IV-C of the Court's 
opinion. 
.:§ttpTnn.t <q~t of t!r.t .,tti:tt~ ;§tatta 
~aaltinghm. ~. QJ. 2ll~J.l.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
January 7, 1976 
Re: No. 74-742 - Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. 
Provident Securities Co. 
Dear Lewis: 
I join your very good opinion in this case 
except for Part IV C. Would you please add an 
appropriate note to this effect at the bottom of 
your opinion? ' 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
Jiu:vrtmt Qtttud ttf t4t ~tb ~tldts 
'llasftiugfttn, !9. Qt. 2llgt'!~ 
January 8, 197 6 
/ 
Re: No. 74-742 --Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident 
Securities Company 
Dear Lewis: 




Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
.·, .. 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~u.p:rtntt '!fltlttt ltf tqt ~b ~taftg 
Jfasftinghtn. ~. <!f. 2ll.;t'!~ 
January 9, 197 6 
Re: 74-742 - Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident 
Securities Co. 
Dear Lewis: 
I join your proposed opinion. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
,_ "!<-.,: ~:~ 
. 2. 
held that GW was liable only for 'the profits realized 
on the purchase and sale of the second block of 
securities. At the same time, however, the Seventh 
Circuit adjusted the calculations of profits in such a 
way that GW's liability actually was increased even . 
though fewer shares were involved. (The District Court 
had valued the $93 million note at its discounted value 
as of the day of the transaction; the Seventh Circuit 
required it to be valued at face because GW eventually 
received full payment.) 
The issue in No. 75-580 is AC's contention 
that GW is liable for its profits on both blocks of 
securities purchased and sold. Since the result below 
anticipated our decision in No. 74-742, the Seventh 
Circuit reached the correct result on this point. 
Although we reserved judgment in No. 74-742 on some of 
the Seventh Circuit's language, the case need not be 
taken on that score. 
* This should be denied. 
* * * * * 
No. 74-758 Provident Securities Co. v. 
Foremost-McKesson Inc. 
This is a cross-petition by respondent in the 
case we decided, apparently filed as a precautionary 
measure. It raises alternative arguments which we did not 
reach. 
The cross-petition should be denied. 
* GW's objection to the valuation principle 
utilized by the Seventh Circuit on the second block of stock 
has been presented in a cross-petition for certiorari, 
No. 75-890 (filed December 23, 1975). Denying No. 75-580 
will not prejudice our taking No. 75-890 should it appear 
certworthy on its own merits. 
L.F .P., Jr. 
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CHAMBERS DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 74-742 
Foremost-McKesson, Inc., I On Writ of Certiorari 
Petitioner, to the United States 
v. Court of Appeals for 
Provident Securities Company. the Ninth Circuit. 
[January -, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opm1on of the 
Court. 
This case presents an unresolved issue under § 16 (b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Act), 48 
Stat. 896, 15 U. S. C. § 78p (b). That section of the 
Act was designed to prevent a corporate director or officer 
or "the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum" 
of a corporation 1 from profiteering through short-swing 
transactions on the basis of inside information. It pro-
vides that a corporation may capture for itself the profits 
realized on a purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of 
its securities within six months by a director, officer, or 
beneficial owner.2 Section 16 (b)'s last sentence, how-
~The corporate "insiders'' whose trading is regulated by § 16 (b) 
are defined in § 16 (a) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78p (a), as "[e]very 
person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more 
than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than 
an exempted security) which is registered pursuant to Section 12 of 
this title, or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such 
security." 
2 Section 16 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 78p (b), reads in full: 
"(b) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information 
which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, 
or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit 
realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and pur-
74-742-0PINION 
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ever, provides that it "shall not be construed to cover 
any transaction where such beneficial owner was not 
such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale 
and purchase, of the security involved ... . " The ques-
tion presented here is whether a person purchasing securi-
ties that put his holdings above the 10% level is a bene-
ficial owner "at the time of the purchase" so that he must 
account for profits realized on a sale of those securities 
within six months. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit answered this question in the nega-
tive. 506 F. 2d 601 (1974). We affirm. 
I 
Respondent, Provident Securities Co., was a personal 
holding company. In 1968 Provident decided tentatively 
to liquidate and dissolve, and it engaged an agent to find 
a purchaser for its assets. Petitioner, Foremost-McKes-
son, Inc., emerged as a potential purchaser, but extensive 
chase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted 
security) within any period of less than six months, unless such 
security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt pre-
viously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, 
irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficia.! owner, 
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the 
security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a 
period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may be 
instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent juirsdiction 
by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the 
name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to 
bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail dilligently 
to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought 
more than two years after the date such profit was realized. This 
subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such 
beneficial owner was not such at the time of the purchase and sale, 
or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any trans-
action or transactions which the Commission by rules and regula-
tions may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this 
subsection." 
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negotiations were required to resolve a disagreement over 
the nature of the consideration Foremost would pay. 
Provident wanted cash in order to facilitate its dissolu-
tion, while Foremost wanted to pay with its own securi-
ties. Eventually a compromise was reached whereby 
Provident agreed to accept Foremost convertible deben-
·tures and Foremost agreed to cooperate in the registra-
tion and sale to the public of up to half of the debentures. 
Provident and Foremost executed a purchase agree-
ment embodying their deal on September 25, 1969. The 
agreement provided that Foremost would buy two-thirds 
of Provident's assets for $4.25 million in cash and $49.75 
million in Foremost convertible subordinated debentures.8 
The agreement further provided that Foremost would 
register under the Securities Act of 1933 $25 million in 
principal amount of the debentures and would participate 
in an underwriting agreement by which those debentures 
would be sold to the public. At the closing on October 
15, 1969, Foremost delivered to Provident the cash and a 
$40 million debenture that was subsequently exchanged 
for two debentures in the principal amounts of $25 mil-
lion and $15 million. Foremost also delivered a $2.5 mil-
lion debenture to an escrow on the closing date. On 
October 20 Foremost delivered to Provident a $7.25 mil-
lion debenture representing the balance of the purchase 
price. These debentures were immediately convertible 
into more than 10% of Foremost's outstanding common 
stock. 
On October 21 Provident, Foremost, and a group of 
underwriters executed an underwriting agreement to be 
closed October 28. The agreement provided for sale 
to the underwriters of the $25 million debenture.4 On 
3 The debentures were issued expressly to acquire Provident's 
assets, and all of them were used for that purpose. 
4 The underwriters delivered $25,366,666.66 in cash to Foremost. 
That amount represented a purchase price of 1011,4% of the 
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October 24 Provident distributed the $15 million and 
$7.25 million debentures to its stockholders, reducing the 
amount of Foremost common into which the company's 
holdings were convertible to less than 10%. On October 
28 the closing under the underwriting agreement was 
accomplished. Provident thereafter distributed the cash 
proceeds of the debenture sale to its stockholders and 
dissolved. 
Provident's holdings in Foremost debentures as of 
October 20 were large enough to make it a beneficial 
owner of Foremost within the meaning of§ 16.5 Having 
acquired and disposed of these securities within six 
months, Provident faced the prospect of a suit by Fore~ 
most to recover the profits realized on the sale of the 
debenture to the underwriters. Foremost therefore sued 
for a declaration that it was not liable to Foremost under 
§ 16 (b). The District Court granted summary judg~ 
ment for Provident and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Provident's principal argument below for nonliability 
was based on Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., 411 U. S. 582 (1973). There we held 
that an "unorthodox transaction" in securities that did 
not present the possibility of speculative abuse of inside 
information was not a ''sale'~ within the meaning of 
principal amount of the debentures ($25,312,500.00) plus interest 
accrued from the date the contract was executed to the date of 
closing ($54,166.66). The amount of profit, if any, realized by 
Provident has never been established. 
5 A beneficial owner is one who owns more than 10% of an 
"equity security" registered pursuant to § 12 of the Act. See n. 1, 
supra. The owner of debentures convertible into more than 10% 
of a corporation's registered common stock is a beneficial owner 
within the meaning of the Act. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
§§3 (a)(lO), (11), 15 U.S. C. §78c (a)(10), (11); Rule 16a-2 (b). 
17 CFR § 240.16a-2a (b) (1975). Foremost's common stock was 
registered; thus Provident's holdings made it a beneficial owner. 
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§ 16 (b). Provident contended that its reluctant accept-
ance of Foremost debentures in exchange for its assets 
was an "unorthodox transaction" not presenting the pos-
sibility of speculative abuse and therefore was not a 
"purchase" within the meaning of § 16 (b). Although 
the District Court's pre-Kern County opinion had 
adopted this type of analysis, 331 F. Supp. 791 (ND 
Cal. 1971), the Court of Appeals rejected it, reasoning 
that Provident's acquisition of the debentures was not 
"unorthodox" and that the circumstances did not preclude 
the possibility of speculative abuse. 
The Court of Appeals then considered two theories 
of nonliability based on § 16 (b)'s exemptive provision: 
"This subsection shall not be construed to cover any 
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such 
both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale 
and purchase . . . ." The first was Provident's argu-
:rp.ent that it was not a beneficial owner "at the time 
qf ... sale." After the October 24 distribution of some 
debentures to stockholders, the debentures held by Provi-
dent were convertible into less than 10% of Foremost's 
outstanding common stock. Provident contended that 
its sale to the underwriters did not occur until the under-
writing agreement was closed on October 28. If this 
were the case, the sale would not have been covered by 
§ 16 (b), since Provident would not have been a bene-
ficial owner "at the time of ... sale." 6 The Court of 
Appeals rejected this argument because it found that 
the sale occurred on October 21 upon execution of the 
underwriting agreement. 7 
6 This contention was based on Reliance Elect.ric Co. v. Emerson 
Electric Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972). There we held that a sale made 
after a former beneficial owner had a.lready reduced its holdings 
below 10% was exempted from § 16 (b) by the "at the time of ..• 
sale" requirement. See n. 25, infra. 
7 Section 3 (a) (14) of the Act, 15 U.S. C. § 78c (a) (14), defines 
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The Court of Appeals then turned to the theory of 
nonliability based on the exemptive provision that we 
consider here.8 It held that in a purchase-sale sequence 
"sale" and "sell" to include "any contract to sell or otherwise 
dispose of." But Provident a.rgued that the October 28 closing date 
was the day of sale because rontmctual conditions prevented the 
contract from becoming binding until closing. The underwriting 
agreement provided in paragraph 7: 
"7. Termination of Agreement: This agreement may be termi-
nated, prior to the time the Registration Statement becomes effec-
tive, by you or by any group of Underwriters which has agreed 
hereunder to purchose in the aggregate at least 50% of the Deben-
tures, if, in your judgment or in the judgment of any such group 
of• Underwriters, there shall have occurred a material unfavorable 
change in political, financial or economic conditions generally." 
(App. A134.) 
And in paragraph 5, the agreement provided: "The several obliga-
tions of the Underwriters hereunder are subject to the following 
conditions: 
"(h) That, between the time of execution of this agreement and 
the time of purchase, there shall occur no material and unfavorable 
change, financial or otherwise (other than as referred to in the 
Registration Statement and the Prospectus), in the condition of the 
Company and its consolidated subsidiaries as a whole; and the Com-
pany will, at the time of purchase, deliver to you a certificate of 
two of its executive officers to the foregoing effect." (App. A134.) 
The Court of Appeals agreed that conditions to performance 
might prevent a contract from being a "sale" prior to closing. But 
it ruled that all significant conditions here were satisfied when the 
registration sta,tement required by paragraph 7 became effective on 
October 21, the day the underwriting agreement was executed. The 
court also fotmd that a.fter . October 21, Provident was no longer 
subject to the risk of a decline in the market for Foremost's stock. 
506 F. 2d, at 607. For reasons not apparent from the opinion, 
the court did not address the possibility that paragraph 5 (h) left 
Provident subject to market risks. See n. 8, infra. 
8 Our holding on this issue disposes of this case by precluding 
any liability on Provident's part. We therefore do not consider 
whether the Ninth Circuit properly rejected Provident's arguments 
based on Kern County and the sale not having occurred until 
October 28. 
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the phrase "at the time of the purchase," "must be 
construed to mean prior to the time when the decision 
is made." 506 F. 2d, at 614. Although Provident's 
receipt of the debentures was a "purchase" that made 
Provident a beneficial owner of Foremost, Provident was 
not a beneficial owner of Foremost "before the purchase." 
Accordingly, the exemptive provision removed the pur-
chase from the operation of § 16 (b). 
II 
The meaning of the exemptive provision has been 
disputed since § 16 (b) was first enacted. The discus-
sion has focused on the application of the provision to 
a purchase-sale sequence, the principal disagreement 
being whether "at the time of the purchase" means 
"before the purchase" or "immediately after the pur-
chase." 9 The difference in construction is determina-
tive of a beneficial owner's liability in cases such as 
Provident's where such owner sells within six months 
of purchase the securities whose acquisition made him 
a beneficial owner. The commentators divided immedi-
ately over which construction Congress intended/0 and 
9 The alternative construction to "before the purchase" is some-
times denominated "simultaneously with the purchase." See, e. g., 
Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957, 959-960 
(SDNY 1952), recognized as law of the case, 132 F. Supp. 100 
(SDNY 1955), aff'd in part, remanded in part on other grounds, 
232 F. 2d 299 (CA2), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 831 (1956). 
1° Compare C. Meyer, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 
112 (1934) (adopting a "before" construction), with Seligman, 
Problems Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 Va. L, Rev. 1, 
20 (1934) (adopting an "immediately after" construction). 
n Compare, e. g., Munter, Section 16 (b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934: An Alternative to "Burning Down t.he Barn 
in Order to Kill the Rats," 52 Cornell L. W. 69, 74-75 (1966); 
Note, Insider Liability for Short-Swing Profits: The Substance and 
Function of the Pragmatic Approach, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 5.92, 61&-
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they remain divided.11 The courts of appeal also are 
!n disagreement over the issue. 
The question of what Congress intended to accom-
plish by the exemptive provision in a purchase-sale 
sequence came to a court of appeals for the first time 
in Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F. 2d 299 
(CA2), cert. denied, 352 U.S. (1956). There the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit without discussion, 
but over a dissent, affirmed the District Judge's adoption 
of the "immediately after the purchase" construction. 
·The District Judge had been impelled to this construc-
tion at least in part by his concern over what the phrase 
"at the time of ... purchase" means in a sale-repurchase 
sequence. He reasoned: 
"If the ['before the purchase'] construction urged 
by [Graham-Paige] is placed upon the exemption 
provision, it would be possible for a person to pur-
chase a large block of stock, sell it out until his 
ownership was reduced to less than 10%, and then 
repeat the process, ad infinitum." 104 F. Supp. 
957, 959 (SDNY 1952). 
The District Judge apparently thought that since "before 
the purchase" seemed an unlikely construction of the 
exemptive provision in a sale-repurchase sequence, it 
could not be the proper construction in a purchase-sa1e 
·sequence.12 The Stella construction of the exemptive 
619 (1974); Comment, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 582 (1957) (adopting a 
"before" construction), with, e. g., 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 
1060 (2d ed, 1961) (favoring an "immediately after" construction). 
The weight of the commentary appears to be with the "before the 
purchase" construction. The ALI Federal Securities Code (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 2, 1973), § 1413 (d) and Comment, considers the 
Stella result "questionable" on the statutory language and proposes 
an amendment to codify the result. 
u Stella was decided before § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR 
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provision has been adhered to in the Second Circuit, 
Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F. 2d 348, 355-356 
(CA2), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 854 (1970); Perine v. 
William Norton & Co., 509 F. 2d 114, 118 (CA2 1974)/8 
and adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit. Emerson Electric Co. v. Reliance Electric Co., 
434 F. 2d 918, 924 (CA8 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 
404 U. S. 418 (1972).14 But in none of the foregoing 
cases did the court examine critically the legislative 
history of § 16 (b). 
The Court of Appeals considered this case against the 
background, sketched above, of ambiguity in the perti-
nent statutory language, continued disagreement among 
the commentators, and a perceived absence in the rela-
tively few decided cases of a full consideration of the 
purpose and legislative history of § 16 (b). The court 
found unpersuasive the rationales offered in Stella and 
its progeny for the "immediately after the purchase" 
construction. It noted that construing the provision to 
require that beneficial-ownership status exist before the 
§ 240.10b-5 (1975), developed £ully as a private remedy for actual 
abuses of insider information. See 6 L. Loss, supra, n. 11, at 3553. 
The sale-repurchase abuse that worried the Stella court would 
now invite § 10 (b) liability, see n. 30 infra, as well as possible lia-
bility under § 16 (b). 
1.a To rationalize its view as applied to the purchase-sale sequence, 
the court in Newmark wrote: 
'I[T]he presumed aecess to [inside] information resulting from 
[the] purchase [that makes one a beneficial owner] provides him 
with an opportunity not available to the investing public, to sell 
his shares at the moment most advantageous to him. Thus a 
purchase of shares which makes the buyer an insider creates an 
opportunity for the type of speculative abuse the statute was 
enacted to prevent." 425 F. 2d, at 356. 
1.4 When this Court decided Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson 
Electric Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972), the question presented here was 
no longer in the case. See n. 25, infra. 
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purchase in a purchase-sale sequence would not fore-
close an "immediately after the purchase" construction 
:ln a sale-repurchase sequence.15 506 F. 2d, at 614-615. 
More significantly, the Court of Appeals challenged 
directly the premise of the earlier cases that a "before 
the purchase" construction in a purchase-sale sequence 
would allow abuses Congress intended to abate. The 
court reasoned that in § 16 (b) Congress intended to 
teach only beneficial owners who both bought and sold 
on the basis of inside information that was not pre-
sumptively available to them until after they became 
statutory "insiders." 506 F. -2d, at 608-614.16 
III 
A 
· The general purpose of Congress in enacting § 16 (b) 
- is well known. See Kern County Land Co., 411 tJ. S. 
582, 591-593 (1973); Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson 
Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418, 422 (1972), and the authori-
:15 The view of the Court of Appeals that "at the trrne of" may 
mean different things according to the particular statutory sequence 
that is under construction is not unique. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. 
Co. v. Gulf & Western Industries, - F. 2d - (1975). We 
need express no opinion here on this issue. 
16 Shortly before this case was argued the Court of Appeals for 
Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion on somewhat dif-
ferent analysis. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., - F. 2d, at -. The 
'Court apparently would have reached its result even in the absence 
of the exemptive provision, reasoning that § 16 (b) covers no 
transactions by any § 16 (b) "insiders" who were not insiders 
before their initial transaction. - F. 2d, at -. Since we rely 
on the exemptive provision, we intimate no view on the proper 
analysis of a case where a director or officer makes an initial trans-
action before obtaining "insider" status. See, e. g., Adler v. 
Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840 (CA2 1959) . Nor do we have occasion here 
to assess the approach taken by the Court of Appeals for Seventh 
Circuit to the exemptive provision. - F. 2d, at - & n. -. 
'see n. 25, infra. 
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ties cited therein. Congress recognized that "insiders" 
may have access to information about their corporations 
not available to the rest of the investing public. By 
'trading on this information, these persons could reap 
profits at the expense of less well informed investors. In 
§ 16 (b) Congress sought to "curb the evils of insider 
trading [by] . . . taking the profits out of a class of 
transactions in which · the possibility of abuse was be-
lieved to be intolerably g·reat." Reliance Electric Co., 
supra, at 422. It accomplished' this by defining "directors, 
officers, and beneficial owners as those presumed to have 
access to inside information 17 and enacting a fla~ "rule 
that a corporation could recover the profits these insiders 
made on a pair of security transactions within six 
months.18 
Foremost points to this purpose, and invokes the obser-
vation in Reliance Electric Co. that "where alternative 
constructions of the terms of § 16 (b) are possible, those 
terms are to be given the construction that best serves 
the congressional purpose of curbing short-swing trading 
by corporate insiders." 404 U. S., at 424 (footnote 
omitted). From these premises Foremost argues that 
the Court of Appeals' construction of the exemptive pro-
17 The purpose of § 16 (b) is stated explicitly to be "preventing 
the unfajr use of information which may have been obtruned by 
such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relation-
ship to the issuer." 15 U. S. C. § 78p (b). 
18 Section 16 (b) states that any short-swing profits "shall inure 
to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention 
on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering 
into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not 
repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months." 
15 U. S. C. § 78p (b). 
19 In lieu of the Court of Appeals' construction, Foremost offers a 
construction whereby any purchases prior to the purchase making 
one a beneficial owner are exempted from the operation of § 16 (b). 
See L. Loss, supra, n. 11, at 1060. 
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vision must be rejected 19 because it makes § 16 (b) in-
applicable to some possible abuses of inside information 
that the statute would reach under the Stella construc-
tion.20 We find this approach unsatisfactory in its focus 
on situations that § 16 (b) may in fact not reach rather 
than on the language and purpose of the exemptive pro-
vision itself. Foremost's approach also invites an imposi-
tion of § 16 (b)'s liability without fault that is not 
consistent with the premises upon which Congress en-
acted the section. 
B 
The exemptive provision, which applies only to bene-
ficial owners and not to other statutory insiders, must 
have been included in § 16 (b) for a purpose. Although 
the extensive legislative history of the 1934 Act is bereft 
of any explicit explanation of Congress' intent, see Re-
liance Electric Co., supra, at 424, the evolution of§ 16 (b) 
from its initial proposal through passage does shed sig-
nificant light on the purpose of the exemptive provision. 
The original version of what would develop into the 
1934 Act was S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1934). It 
provided in § 15 (b) : 
"(b) It shall be unlawful for any director, officer, 
or owner of securities, owning as of record and/or 
beneficially more than 5 per centum of any class of 
stock of any issuer, any security of which is registered 
on a national securities exchange-
" ( 1) To purchase any such registered security with 
the intention or expectation of selling the same se-
curity within six months; and any profit made by 
such person on any transaction in such a registered 
security extending over a period of less than six 
20 An example of a possible abuse of inside information covered 
only under the Stella construction is the hypothetical posed in 
Newmark. See n. 13, supra. 
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months shall inure to and be recoverable by the is~ 
suer, irrespective of any intention or expectation on 
his part in entering into such transaction of holding 
the security purchased for a period exceeding six 
months." 
In the next version of the legislation, H. R. 8720, 73d 
Gong., 2d Sess. (1934), § 15 (b) read almost identically 
to § 16 (b) as it was eventually enac:ted.21 
"(b) Any profit realized by such beneficial owner, 
director, or officer from any purchase and sale or 
sale and purchase of any such registered equity 
security within a period of less than six months, un~ 
less such security was acquired in good faith in con~ 
nection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure 
to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of 
any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, 
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of 
holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing 
the security sold for a period exceeding six 
months.... This subsection shall not be construed 
to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner 
was not such both at the time of the purchase and 
sale or sale and purchase of the security involved, 
nor any transaction or transactions which the Com~ 
mission by rules and regulations may exempt as not 
comprehended within the purpose of this subsection 
of preventing the unfair use of information which 
21 As can be seen by comparing H. R. 8720's version to § 16 (b), 
supra, n. 2, the changes are relatively minor. Formally, the state-
ment of purpose has been moved to the front of the statute and 
various grammatical changes have been made. A significant substan-
tive change not apparent from the faces of the two sections is that 
§ 16 (b) beneficial owners are those owning 10% of a registered se-
curity, while H. R. 8720 retained S. 2693's 5% requirement. Com-
pare Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16 (a), 15 U. S. C. § 78p (a), 
with H. R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., § 15a ( 1934). 
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may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, 
director, or officer by reason of his relationship to 
the issuer." 
Thomas G. Corcoran, a spokesman for S. 2693's draft-
ers, introduced § 15 (b) as forbidding an insider "to 
carry on any short-term speculations in the stock. He 
cannot, with his inside information get in and out of 
stock within six months." Hearings on H. R. 7852 and 
H. R. 8720 before the House Committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 133 (1934). 
The Court of Appeals concluded that S. 2693 would 
have applied only to a beneficial owner who had that 
status before a purchase-sale sequence was initiated, 506 
F. 2d, at 611, and we agree. Foremost appears not to 
contest this point. Petitioner's Opening Brief, at 29. 
'The question thus becomes whether H. R. 8720's 
change in the language imposing liability and its addi-
tion of the exemptive provision were intended to change 
S. 2693's result in a purchase-sale sequence by a bene-
ficial owner. We think the legislative history shows no 
such intent. 
S. 2693 and its House counterpart, H. R. 7852, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), met substantial criticism on a 
number of scores, including various provisions of § 15. 
See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before the 
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess., pt. 15 (1934); Hearings on H. R. 7852 and 
H. R. 8720, supra, at 1-623.22 S. 2693 was recast into 
H. R. 8720 to take account of the criticisms that the 
22 Corcoran termed § 15 "one of the most important provisions in 
'[S. 2693] ." Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6555. 
But most of the proposed legislation was directed at regulation of 
the stock exchanges themselves and certain trading practices that 
were considered undesirable regardless of who performed them. 
See id., at 6465. Most of the hearings, therefore, dealt with other 
vroblems. 
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bill's drafters thought valid. Hearings on H. R. 7852 
and H. R. 8720, supra, at 625, 674. The primary sub-
stantive criticism directed at § 15 (b) of S. 2693 was 
that it did not prevent the use of inside information 
to reap a short-term profit in a sale-repurchase situa-
tion. See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, 
at 6557- 6558. Criticism was also directed at making 
liability for short-term profits turn on ownership "as 
of record and/ or beneficially." See id., at 6914. H. R. 
8720 remedied these perceived shortcomings by provid-
ing in § 16 (b): "Any profit realized by such beneficial 
owner, director, or officer from any purchase and sale or 
sale and purchase ... shall inure to and be recoverable 
by the issuer." 23 The term "such beneficial owner" 
drew content from § 15 (a)'s definition of a beneficial 
owner as one owning "more than 5 per centum of any 
class" of a registered security. 
The structure of the clause imposing liability in the 
revised § 15 (b) did not unambiguously retain S. 2693's 
requirement that beneficial ownership precede a pur-
chase-sale sequence. But we cannot assume easily that 
Congress intended to eliminate the requirement in the 
revised bill. The legislative history reveals that the 
requirement was made clear in the hearings, yet no com-
plaint was made about it. 
The testimony on S. 2693 demonstrates that the draft-
ers were emphatic about the requirement. In introduc-
ing the bill Corcoran pointed out a technical flaw in 
28 The other major substantive change effected in § 15 (b) by 
H. R. 8720 was the elimination of the potential criminal liability. 
The criminal liability aspect of S. 2693's version of § 15 (b) ap-
pears not to have been discussed in hearings. It may have been 
thought, however, that a criminal case could never be made out. 
The difficulties of proving the elements on which criminal liability 
turned had already led the drafters to eliminate those questions of 
fact in civil suits to recover profits. See n. 26, infra. 
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S. 2693's language: "It shall be unlawful for any direc-
tor, officer, or owner of securities, owning as of record 
and/or beneficially more than 5 per centum of any class 
of stock. ... " It was possible to construe the phrase 
"owning . . . 5 per centum" to apply to directors and 
officers as well as to stockholders, so that trading by 
directors and officers would not be subject to § 15 (b) 
'if their previous 'holdings did not exceed 5o/G . But Cor-
coran made clear that the requirement of pre-existing 
'Ownership applied only to benencial owners. 
"Mr. CoRCORAN .... The bill is not very well 
drawn there. It ought to read to cover every direc-
tor, every offioer, and every stockholder w~o own's 
more than 5 percent of the stock. That is the way 
'it was intended to reaci. 
"Mr. MAPES. That is not the language there now. 
"Mr. CoRCORAN. It is not. It is not properly 
·worded as to the 5 percent. 
"Mr. MAPES. It ought to read 'anCVor beneficially 
more than 5 percent' followed by 'is a director, or 
officer.' 
"Mr. CoRCORAN. It is badly drawn. We slipped 
on that. It ought to read 'every director and every 
officer' and. then 'every big stockholder.'" 
Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, supra, at 133; 
see Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, silpra, at 
6555. 
We thus have a legislative record that revals the draft-
ers focused directly on the fact that S. 2693 covered a 
short-term purchase-sale sequence by a beneficial owner 
only if his status existed before the purchase, and no 
concern was expressed about the wisdom of this require-
ment. But the concept was omitted from the operative 
language of the section when it was restructured to 
cover sale-repurchase sequences. In the same draft, 
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however, the exemptive provision was added to the 
section. On this record we are persuaded that the 
exemptive provision was intended to preserve the re-
quirement of beneficial ownership before the purchase. 
Later discussions of § 16 (b) in the hearings are con-
sistent with this interpretation.24 We hold that, in a 
purchase-sale sequence, a beneficial owner must account 
for profits only if he was a beneficial owner "before the 
purchase." 25 
24 "MR. PECORA. The theory was that the ownership of 5 percent 
of the stock would practically constitute him an insider, and by vir-
tue of that position he could acquire confidential information which 
he might use for his own enrichment by trading in the open market, 
against the interests of the general body of the stockholders. That 
is the main purpose sought to be served." 
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 7741. Ferdinand 
Percora was counsel to the subcommittee of the Senate Committee 
on Banking and Currency that conducted e},.'"tensive hearings on 
stock exchange opemtions prior to the enactment of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. He was also one of the draftsmen of § 15 
(b) of S. 2693. Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720 before 
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess., 83 (1934). 
25 In Reliance Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418, the Court also had 
occasion to consider the application of the exemptive provision in a 
purchase-sale sequence. There Reliance acquired 13.2% of Emer-
son's shares pnrsuant to a tender offer and within six months dis-
posed of its holdings in two sales of 3.24% and 9.96%. The Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the purchase, by which 
Reliance became a beneficial owner, was covered by§ 16 (b). But 
it ruled that Reliance was liable for the profits on only its first 
sale, because "at the time of ... sale" of the 9.96%, it was not a 
beneficial owner. 
The Court granted certiorari on Emerson's petition to review this 
construction of "at the time of ... sale," and affirmed. The con-
struction of "at the time of the purchase," however, was not before 
the Court. 404 U. S., at 420-421. Reliance thus remained liable 
for the 3.24% sale, although it would have had no liability under 
our holding today. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
has recognized correctly that the construction of "at the time of ... 
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IV 
Additional considerations support our reading of the 
legislative history as the proper one. 
A 
Section 16 (b) imposes a strict prophylactic rule with 
respect to insider, short-swing trading. In Kern County 
:Land Co., 411 U. S., at 595, we noted: 
"The statute requires the [statutorily defined] .in-
side, short-swing trader to disgorge all profits 
realized on all 'purchases and sales' within the speci-
fied time period, without proof of actual abuse of 
insider information, and without proof of intent .to 
profit on the basis of such information." 
In short, this statute imposes liability without fault 
within its narrowly drawn limits.26 
sale" in Reliance Electric Co. is superfluous in light of our con-
struction of "at the time of the purchase" here, see Allis-Chalmers 
Mfg. Co., - F. 2d, at - n. 12, but we agree that with that 
court's further · observation that the procedural posture of Reliance 
Electric Co. prevented a full consideration of the meaning of the 
exemptive provision. See ibid. We express no opinion on the in-
·terpretation of the provision by which the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh ·Circuit sought to avoid the apparent superfluity of the "at 
the time of ... sale" language. ld., at -, -, supra, n. 16. 
26 "Mr. CoRCORAN. . .. You hold the director, irrespective 
of any intention or expectation to sell the security within 6 months 
after, because it will be absolutely impossible to prove the existence 
of such intention or expectation, and you have to have this crude 
rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of having 
to prove that the director intended, at the time he bought, to get out 
• on a short swing. 
"Senator GoRE. You infer the intent from the fact. 
"Mr. CoRCORAN. From the fact. 
"Senator KEAN. Suppose he got stuck in something else, and he 
had to sell? 
[Footnote 26 is continued on p. 19] 
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Foremost recognizes the ambiguity of the exemptive 
provision, but argues that where "alternative construc-
tions" of§ 16 (b)'s terms are available, we should choose 
the construction that best serves the statute's purposes. 
Foremost relies on statements generally to this effect in 
Kern County Land Co., supra, at 595, and Reliance Elec-
, tric Co., 404 U. S., at 424. In neither of those cases, 
, however, did the Court adopt the COl!-f>~ruction that im-
posed liability, recognizing that not every ambiguity 
must be resolved in favor of the application of § 16 .(b). 
And we think it is generally appropriate not to. reach 
the harsh result of imposing § 16 (b)'s liability without 
fault on the basis of unclear language. If Congress 
wishes to impose such a result, courts must assume that 
it will do so expressly or by unmistakable inference. We 
note further that there is nothing to suggest that the 
construction urged by Foremost would serve better to 
further congressional purposes. Indeed, the legislative 
history of § 16 (b) indicates that Congress by adding the 
exemptive provision deliberately expressed a contrary 
choice. In a different context a more expansive con-
struction of § 16 (b) may well be adopted to advance its 
purposes. 
It is not irrelevant that Congress itself limited carefully 
the extraordinary liability imposed by§ 16 (b). See Re-
liance Electric Co., supra, at 422-425. Even an "insider" 
may trade freely without incurring the statutory liability 
if, for example, he spaces his transactions at intervals 
"Senator BARKLEY. All he would get would be what he put into it. 
He would get his original investment. 
"Mr. CoRCORAN. He would get his money out, but the profit goes 
to the corporation. 
"Senator KEAN. Suppose he had to sell. 
"Mr. CoRCORAN. Let him get out what he put in, but give the 
corporation the profit." 
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6557. 
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greater than six months. When Congress has so recog-
nized the need to limit carefully the "arbitrary and 
sweeping coverage" of § 16 (b), Bershad v. McDonough, 
428 F. 2d 693, 696 (CA7 W70), courts should not be 
quick to determine that, despite an acknowledged ambi-
guity, Congress intended the section to cover a particular 
transaction. 
B 
Our construction of § 16 (b) also is supported by the 
distinction Congress recognized between short-term trad-
ing by mere stockholders and such trading by directors 
·and officers. The legislative discourse revealed that Con-
gress thought that all short-swing trading by directors 
and officers was vulnerable ·to abuse because of their 
·intimate involvement in corporate affairs. But trading 
"by stockholders was viewed as being subject to abuse 
only when the size of their holdings afforde.d the potential 
of access to corporate information.27 These different 
27 This distinction is especially evident in the following exchange, 
directed to § 15 (a)'s reporting requirements for beneficial owners: 
"Senator KEAN. Suppose a man is not a director at all and does 
not want to be a director, and he happens to own 5 percent or buy 
5 percent. Do you think you are going to get him to file with the 
exchange all the time just the number of shares he has? 
"Mr. CoRCORAN. I think so, sir. 
"Senator KEAN. I think it is all right to apply it to a director or 
officer, but I think to require the ordinary investor--
"Mr. CoRCORAN. Five percent is a lot in a modem corporation. 
Many corporations are controlled by 5 percent or 10 percent. 
"Senator KEAN. They may own it or they may sell it. This ap-
plies to all corporations, and you are getting down to the point where 
you are interfering with the individual a good deal there. I agree 
with you with respect to the officers and directors. 
"Mr. CoRCORAN. A stockholder owning 5 percent is as much an 
insider as an officer or director. Whether he is a titular director or 
not, he normally is, as a practical matter of fact, a director. 
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perceptions simply reflect the realities of corporate life. 
It would not be consistent with this perceived distinc-
tion to impose liability on the basis of a purchase made 
when the percentage of stock ownership requisite to in-
sider status had not been acquired. To be sure, the 
possibility does exist that one who becomes a beneficial 
owner by a purchase will sell on the basis of information 
attained by virtue of his newly acquired holdings. But 
the purchase itself was not one posing dangers that Con-
gress considered intolerable, since it was made when the 
purchaser owned no shares or less than the percentage 
deemed necessary to make one an insider. Such a pur-
chaser is more analogous to the stockholder owning less 
than 10%, and thereby excluded entirely from the opera-
tion of § 16 (b), than to a director or officer whose every 
purchase and sale is covered by the statute. While this 
reasoning might not compel our construction of the ex-
emptive provision, it explains why Congress may have 
seen fit to draw the line it did. Cf. Adler v. Klawans, 267 
F. 2d 840, 845 (1959). 
c 
Section 16 (b)'s scope, of course, is not affected by 
whether alternative sanctions might inhibit the abuse of 
inside information. But the process of determining what 
§ 16 (b) covers, and what it does not, should not obscure 
the fact that Congress left some problems of the abuse of 
inside information to other remedies. It was thought, 
for example, that § 16 (a)'s publicity requirement 28 
"Senator KEAN. He might not be." 
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6556. It is also re-
flected in the discussion of the technical flaw in S. 2693. See id., 
at 6555-6556, at 7741-7743; Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, 
supra, at 133. 
28 Section 16 (a), 15 U.S. C. § 78p (a) provides: 
"(a) Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial 
owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity secu-
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would afford indirect protection against some potential 
misuses of inside information. 29 See Hearings on H. R. 
'7852 and R. R. 8720, supra, at 134-135; H. Rep. No. 1383, 
73d Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (to accompany H. R. 9323, 73d 
·cong., 2d Sess., passed by the House April 27, 19M, 
without the present § 16 (b)). Congress also has passed 
general antifraud statutes that sanction abusive practices 
by insiders. See Securities Act of 1933, § 17 (a), 48 Stat. 
84, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a); Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, § 10 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b); 3 L. Loss, supra, 
rity (other than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant 
to section 78l of this title, or who is a director or an officer of the 
issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of 
such security on a national securities exchange or by the effective 
date of a registration statement filed pursuant to section 78l (g) 
of this title, or within ten days after he becomes such beneficial 
owner, director, or officer, a statement with the Commission (and, 
if such security is registered on a national securities exchange, 
also with the exchange) of the amount of all equity securities of 
such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner, and within ten days 
after the close of each calendar month thereafter, if there has been 
a change in such ownership during such month, shall file with the 
Commission (and if such security is registered on a national securi-
ties exchange, shall also file with the exchange), a statement indi-
cating his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such 
changes in his ownership as have occurred during such calendar 
month." 
29 The drafters clearly thought that § 16 (a) would help deter 
a.buses not covered by § 16 (b). 
'"[Mr. Corcoran.] [S]ection 15 (a), requires every director, officer, 
'or principal holder of any securities listed on an exchange to file 
with the exchange and with the commission a statement of how 
many shares he owns and to file that statement at the end of each 
month to show whether there has been any change in his position 
during the month. That is to prevent the insider from taking ad-
vantage of information to sell or buy shares ahead of the release of 
information to the public about the company." 
·Those remarks were addressed to S. 2693. Hearings on H. R 7852 
·and H. R 8720, supra, at 132. 
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n. 11, 1423-1429, 1442-1445. Today an investor who can 
show harm from the actual use of material inside infor-
mation may have recourse, in particular, to § 10 (b) and 
Rule lOb-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1975).30 These sanc-
tions alleviate concern that ordinary investors are unpro-
tected against actual abuses of inside information by 
s~ockholder transactions not covered by § 16 (b). 
IV 
We must still consider briefly Foremost's contention 
that the "before the purchase':. construction is inconsist-
ent with other enactmen~s of Congress and ~he inter-
pretation of § 16 (b) by the Securities and Exchange 
ComVJ.ission. 
Foremost and the amicus point to §§ 16 (d) and 16 (e) 
of the Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78p (d), (e), as congressional 
actions that would not have been necessary unless one 
selling the securities whose acquisition made him a bene-
ficial owner would be liable under § 16 (b). Section 
16 (d), in part, exempts from § 16 (b) certain trans-
actions by a "dealer in the ordinary course of his busi-
ness and incident to the establishment or maintenance 
30 The dramatic development of Rule 10b-5 has now embraced 
evils that Foremost urges its construction of § 16 (b) is necessary 
to prevent. The Rule has been applied to trading by one who ac-
quired inside information in the course of negotiations with a 
corporation, such as the negotiations for Provident's purchase of the 
Foremost debentures. Van Alystyne, Noel & Co., 43 S. E. C. 1081 
(1969), 3 L. Loss, supra, at 1451. And a stockholder trading on 
information not generally known has been held subject to the sanc-
tions of the Rule. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 495 F. 2d 228 (CA2 1974) ; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur 
Co., 401 F. 2d 833 (CA2 1968). The liability of insiders who "tip" 
others, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301 (CA2 1971), 
cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1972), may even reduce the threat 
that beneficial owner~ not themselves represented on the board of 
directors will be able to acquire inside information. 
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by him of a primary or secondary market." 31 Section 
16 (e) provides an exemption for certain "foreign or 
domestic arbitrage transactions." 32 They argue simi-
larly that the SEC's Rule 16b-2, 17 CFR § 240.16b-2 
(1975), is unnecessary if our construction of § 16 (b) is 
correct. Rule 16b-2 exempts from § 16 (b) specified 
transactions "in connection with the distribution of a 
substantial block of securities." 33 
31 Section 16 (d), 15 U.S. C.§ 78p (d), provides: 
" (d) The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall not 
apply to any purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, and the pro-
visions of subsection (c) of this section shall not apply to any sale, 
of an equity security not then or therefore held by him in an in-
vestment account, b~r a dealer in the ordinary course of his business 
and incident to the establishment or maintenance by him of a pri-
mary or secondary market (otherwise than on a national securities 
exchange or an exchange exempted from registration under section 
78e of this title) for such security. The Commission may, by such 
rules and regulations as it deems necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest, define and prescribe terms and conditions with re-
spect to securities held in an investment account and transactions 
made in the ordinary course of business and incident to the estab-
lishment or maintenance of a primary or secondary market." 
"Dealer" is defined in § 3 (a) (5) of the Act, 15 U.S. C. § 78c (a) (5). 
32 Section 16 (e), 15 U. S. C. § 78p (e), provides: 
"(e) The provisions of this section shall not apply to foreign or 
domestic arbitrage transactions unless made in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the Commission may adopt in order to 
carry out the purposes of this section." 
33 Section 16 (b) provides in its final clause that it shall not 
cover "any transaction or transactions which the Commission by 
rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the 
purpose of this subsection." 15 U. S. C. ~ 78p (b). Rule 161-2 
provides: 
"(a) Any transaction of purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, 
of a security which is effected in connection with the distribution of a 
substantial block of securities shall be exempt from the provisions 
of section 16 (b) of the Act, to the extent specified in this § 240.16b-
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We do not consider these provisions to be inconsist~nt 
with our holding. Nothing on their faces would make 
them applicable to one selling the securities whose pur-
chase made him a beneficial owner. But the exemptions 
would be necessary to protect stockholders already quali-
fying as beneficial owners when they purchased 34 and 
2, as not comprehended within the purpose of said section, upon the 
following conditions: 
" ( 1) The person effecting the transaction is engaged in the busi-
ness of distributing securities and is participating in good faith, in 
the ordinary course of such business, in the distribution of such 
block of securities; 
"(2) The security involved in the transaction is (i) a part of such 
block of securities and is acquired by the person effecting the trans-
action, with a view to the distribution thereof, from the issuer or 
other person on whose behalf such securities are being distributed 
or from a person who is participating in good faith in the distribu-
tion of such block of securities, or (ii) a security purchased in good 
faith by or for the account of the person effecting the transaction 
for the purpose of stabilizing the market price of securities of the 
class being distributed or to cover an over-allotment or other short 
position created in connection with such distribution; and 
"(3) Other persons not within the purview of section 16 (b) of 
the Act are participating in the distribution of such block of securi-
ties on terms at least as favorable as those on which such person is 
participating and to an extent at least equal to the aggregate par-
ticipation of all persons exempted from the provisions of section 
16 (b) of t.he Act by this § 240.16b-2. However, the performance 
of the functions of manager of a distributing group and the receipt 
of a bona fide payment for performing such functions shall not pre-
clude an exemption which would otherwise be available under this 
§ 240.16b-2. 
"(b) The exemption of a transaction pursuant to this § 240.16b-2 
with respect to the participation therein of one party thereto shall 
not render such transaction exempt with respect to participation of 
any other party therein unless such other party also meets the 
conditions of this § 240.16b-2." 
34 The press release accompanying the SEC's promulgation of 
Rule 16b-2 demonstrates this point. It explained: "The new Rule 
[16b-2] affords an exemption for certain cases by providing that 
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they would, of course, apply to transactions by directors 
and officers as well. 
Foremost and the amicus also remind us that the 
interpretation of the exemptive provision for which they 
contend has been adopted explicitly by the SEC. In 
the past the SEC has contended for this position as an 
amicus. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, at 22-27, 
Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 404 U. S. 
418 (1972). But the Commission has not appeared as an 
amicus in this case. In any event, even if the Commis-
sion's views have not changed, we would not afford them 
the deference to which the views of the agency adminis-
tering a statute are usually entitled, for in Reliance 
Electric Co., 404 U. S., at 418, the Court rejected the 
basic theory on which the SEC based its interpretation 
of the exemptive provision. Our re-examination of the 
exemptive provision confirms the view that the SEC's 
theory did not reflect the intent of Congress. 
The judgment is 
Affirmed. 
underwriters who happen to have a member of their firm also an 
officer or director of the issuer or one of its principal stockholders 
who are regula,rly engaged in the business of buying and selling 
securities need not account to the company for profits realized from 
purchases and sales made in the distribution of a security for the 
company .... " SEC Release No. 34-264, June 8, 1935. 
1 t DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
0, 74-742 
Foremost-McKesson, Inc,, \On Writ of Certiorari 
Petitioner, to the United States 
v. Court of Appeals for 
Provident Securities Company, the Ninth Circuit. 
[January -, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This case presents an unresolved issue under § 16 (b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Act), 48 
Stat. 896, 15 U S. C. § 78p (b). That section of the 
Act was designed to prevent a corporate director or officer 
or "the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum" 
of a corporation~ from profiteering through short-swing 
transactions on the basis of inside information. It pro-
vides that a corporation may capture for itself the profits 
realized on a purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of 
1ts securities within six months by a director, officer, or 
beneficial owner 2 Section 16 (b)'s last sentence, how-
1 The corporate " ins1ders" whose trading is regulated by § 16 (b) 
are defined in § 16 (a) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78p (a), as "[e]very 
person who IS d1rectly or md1rectly the beneficial owner of more 
than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than 
an exrrnpted srcurity) whJCh 1s registered pursuant to section 78l of 
thi::; title, or who is a. director or an officer of the issuer of such 
security." 
~ 8ecnou 16 (h), 15 U. . C. 78p (b), reads in full: 
'' For thr purpo.--e of prewntmg the unfmr usc of mforrnation 
which may have been obtamed by such beneficial owner, director,. 
Jt" officer by CP:t.-:on o( hlll relationship to the issuer, any pJ::ofit 
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ever, provides that it "shall not be construed to cover 
any transaction where such beneficial owner was not 
such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale 
and purchase, of the security involved ... . " The ques~ 
tion presented here is whether a person purchasing securi-
ties that put his holdings above the 10% level is a bene-
ficial owner "at the time of the purchase" so that he must 
account for profits realized on a sale of those securities 
within six months. The Umted States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit answered this question in the nega-
tJVe. 506 F 2d 601 (1974) . We affirm. 
I 
Respondent, Provident Securities Co., was a personal 
holding company. In 1968 Provident decided tentatively 
to liquidate and dissolve, and it engaged an agent to find 
realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and pur-
chase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted 
securtty) Witlun any period of less than six months, unless such 
security was acqmred m good fa1th in connectwn with a debt pre-
viously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, 
irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, 
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the 
secur1ty purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a 
pertod exceedmg s1x months. Suit to recover such profit may be 
instltuted at law or m eqmty m any court of competent jurisdiction 
by the 1ssuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the 
name and m behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to 
brmg such smt wit.hm s1xty days after request or shall fail dilligently 
to prosecute the same thereafter, but no such suit shall be brought 
more than two years after t.he date such profit was realized. This 
subsect10n shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such 
benefic1al owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and 
salt', or the sale and purchase, of the secunty involved, or any trans-
actiOn or transact.10ns wluch the CommissiOn by rules and regula-
tions may exempt as not comprehended w1thm the purpose of this 
!:>'Ubsection_ ,. 
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a purchaser for its assets. Petitioner, Foremost-McKes-
son, Inc., emerged as a potential purchaser, but extensive 
negotiations were required to resolve a disagreement over 
the nature of the consideration Foremost would pay. 
Provident wanted cash in order to facilitate its dis-
solution, while Foremost wanted to pay with its own 
securities. 
Eventually a compromise was reached, and Provi-
dent and Foremost executed a purchase agreement 
embodymg their deal on September 25, 1969. The 
agreement provided that Foremost would buy two-thirds 
of Provident's assets for $4.25 million in cash and $49.75 
million in Foremost convertible subordinated debentures.8 
The agreement further provided that Foremost would 
register under the Securities Act of 1933 $25 million in 
principal amount of the debentures and would participate 
in an underwriting agreement by which those debentures 
would be sold to the public. At the closing on October 
15, 1969, Foremost delivered to Provident the cash and a 
$40 million debenture that was subsequently exchanged 
for two debentures m the principal amounts of $25 mil-
lion and $15 million. Foremost also delivered a $2.5 mil-
lion debenture to an escrow on the closing date. On 
October 20 Foremost delivered to Provident a $7.25 mil-
bon debenture representing the balance of the purchase 
price. These debentures were immediately convertible 
into more than 10% of Foremost's outstanding common 
'tock. 
On October 21 Provident, Foremost, and a group of 
underwriters executed an underwriting agreement to be 
closed October 28. The agreement provided for sale 
to the underwriters of the $25 million debenture. On 
The debentures were issued expressly to acquire Provident's 
assets, and all of them wer<" used for that purpose. 
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October 24 Provident distributed the $15 million ana 
17.25 million debentures to its stockholders, reducing ,the 
I , 
amount of Foremost common into which the company's 
holdings were convertible to less than 10%. On October 
28 the c1osing under the underwriting agreement was 
accomplished .. 4 Provident thereafter distributed the cash 
proceeds of the debenture sale to its stockholders and 
dissolved, . 
Provident's holdings in Foremost debentures as of 
October 20 were '~p;rge enol,:\gh to make it a beneficial 
<;>wner of For~most )V'Ithin the meaning of § 16.5 Hav.i.ng 
9.cqmred and disposed of these securities within .six 
roonths, Provident faced the prospect of a suit by Fore-
most to recover any .. pr.ofits realized on the sale of the 
debenture to the underwriters. Provident therefore S\led 
for a declaration that it was not liable to Foremost under 
§ 16 (b). ..'The District Court granted s.ummary judg-
ment for Provident al'\d the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Provident~s pcincipal argument · below for nonliability 
was based on Kern County ·Land Co. v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., 411 U. S. 582 (1973). There we held 
that an "unorthodox transaction" in securities that aid 
not present the possibility of speculative ab-use of insid.e 
,I • 
4 The underwriters delivered $25,366,666.66 In ca.sh to Foremost. 
That amount represented a purchase price of 1011,4% of the 
principal amount of the debentures ($25,312,500.00~ plus interest 
accrued from October 15 to the date of closing ($54,166.66) . The 
amount of profit realized by Provident ha.s never been estahlishfd. 
5 A benefiCial owner is one who owns more than 10% of an "equity 
secunty" registered pursuant to § 12 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 7$l. 
See n. 1, supra. The owner of debenture.s convertible mto more tha.Il 
10% of a corporation's registPred common stock is a beneficial ownel{ 
withm the meaning of the Act. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
§§3 (a)(lO), (11), 15 US. C. §78c (a)(lO), (11); Rule 16a.-2 (b) , 
17 CFR § 240.16a-2 (b) (1975) . Foremost.'s common stock wa.s 
regiswred , thus Provident's holdmgs made it a beneficial owner~ 
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information was not a "sale" within the meaning of 
§ 16 (b). Provident contended that its reluctant accept-
ance of Foremost debentures in exchange for its assets 
was an "unorthodox transaction" not presenting the pos-
sibility of speculative abuse and therefore was not a 
"purchase" within the meaning of § 16 (b) . Although 
the District Court's pre-Kern County opinion had 
adopted this type of analysis, 331 F. Supp. 787 (ND 
Cal. 1971), the Court of Appeals rejected it, reasoning 
that Provident's acquisition of the debentures was not 
"unorthodox" and that the circumstances did not pre-
clude the possibility of speculative abuse. 506 F. 2d, at 
604-605. 
The Court of Appeals then considered two theories 
of nonliability based on § 16 (b)'s exemptive provision: 
"This subsection shall not be construed to cover any 
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such 
both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale 
and purchase . o o o" The first was Provident's argu-
ment that it was not a beneficial owner "at the time 
of . . o sale." After the October 24 distribution of some 
debentures to stockholders, the debentures held by Provi-
dent were convertible into less than 10% of Foremost's 
outstanding common stock. Provident contended that 
its sale to the underwriters did not occur until the under-
wnting agreement was closed on October 28. If this 
were the case, the sale would not have been covered by 
' 16 (b), since Provident would not have been a bene-
fiCial owner "at the time of 0 0 0 sale." 6 The Court of 
Appeals rejected th1s argument because it found that 
6 Thls contention was based on Reliance Elect.ric Co. v. Emerson 
Electnc Co., 404 U. S. 418 (1972) . There we held that a sale made 
after a former beneficial owner had already reduced its holdings 
below lO% was exempted from § 16 (b) by the phrase "at. the time 
of .•. snle'' LD the exempt1ve proviSIOn. See n 25, infra. 
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the sale occurred on October 21 upon execution of the 
underwriting agreement.~ 
The Court of Appeals then turned to the theory of 
nonliability based on the exemptive provision that we 
consider here.8 It held that in a purchase-sale sequence 
7 Section 3 (a) (14) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. 78c (a) (14), defines 
"sale" and "sell" to include "any contract to sell or otherwise 
dispose of." But Provident argued that the October 28 closing date 
was the day of sale because contractual conditions prevented the 
contract from becoming bmding until closing. The underwriting 
agreement prov1ded in paragraph 7 · 
"7. Termmation of Agreement: This agreement may be termi-
nated, prior to the time the Registration Statement becomes effec-
tive, by you or by any group of Underwriters which has agreed 
llereunder to purchase in the aggregate at least 50% of the Deben-
tures, if, in your judgment or m the judgment of any such group 
'Of Underwnters, there shall have occurred a material unfavorable 
change in political, financtal or economic conditions generally." 
(App. A134.) 
And m paragraph 5, the agreement provided. "The several obliga-
tions of the Underwnters hereunder are subject to the following 
cond1twns: 
' (h) That, between the time of execution of this agreement and 
the time of purchase, there shall occur no material and unfavorable 
change, financ1al or otherwise (other than as referred to in the 
RegistratiOn Statement and the Prospectus), in the condition of the 
Company and 1ts consolidated subs1dianes as a whole; and the Com-
pany will, at the tlffie of purchase, dehver to you a certificate of 
two of 1ts execut1ve officers to the foregoing effect." (App. A134.) 
The Court of Appeals agreed that condttions to performance 
m1ght prevent a contract from bemg a "sale" prior to closing. But 
Lt ruled that all s1gmficant conditions here were satisfied when the 
reg1stratwn sk'ttement reqmred by paragraph 7 became effective on 
October 21, the day the underwntmg agreement was executed. The 
court also found that after October 21, Prov1dent was no longer 
subject to the nsk of a declme in the market for Foremost's stock. 
506 F. 2d, at 607. For reasons not apparent from the opinion, 
the court d1d not address the poss1b1llty that paragraph 5 (h) left 
Prov1dent subJect to market nsks. See n 8, mfra. 
g Our holdmg on th1s 1ssue du;;poses of th1s case by precluding, 
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the phrase "at the time of the purchase," "must be 
construed to mean prior to the time when the decision 
to purchase is made." 506 F. 2d, at 614. Although 
Provident's receipt of the debentures was a "purchase" 
that made Provident a beneficial owner of Foremost, 
Provident was not a beneficial owner of Foremost before 
the purchase. Accordingly, the exemptive provision re-
moved the purchase from the operation of § 16 (b). 
II 
The meaning of the exemptive provision has been 
disputed since § 16 (b) was first enacted. The discus-
awn has focused on the application of the provision to 
a purchase-sale sequence, the principal disagreement 
being whether "at the time of the purchase" means 
"before the purchase" or "immediately after the pur-
chase." 9 The difference in construction is determina-
tive of a beneficial owner's liability in cases such as 
Provident's where such owner sells within six months 
of purchase the securities whose acquisition made him 
a beneficial owner. The commentators divided immedi-
ately over which construction Congress intended,10 and 
they remain divided.11 The courts of appeals also are 
in d1sagreemen t over the issue. 
any liability on Provident's part. We therefore do not consider 
whether the Ninth C1rcuit properly rejected Provident's arguments 
based on Kern County and the sale not having occurred until 
October 28 
9 The alternative construction to "before the purchase" is some-. 
times denommated "simultaneously with the purchase," as It was 
by the Court of Appeals. 506 F . 2d, at 608. 
1° Compare G Meyer, The Secunties Exchange Act of 1934, at 
112 ( 1934) (adoptmg a "before" construction), with Seligman, 
Problems Under the SecuntJes Exchange Act, 21 Va. L. Rev. 1, 
19-20 (1934) (adoptmg an "Immediately after" construction) . 
11 Compare, e. (] ., Munter, Section 16 (b) of the Securities Ex-
<;ha,nge Act of 1934 . An Alternative t.o "Burning Down the Bam 
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The question of what Congress intended to accom-
plish by the exemptive provision in a purchase-sale 
sequence came to a court of appeals for the first time 
in Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F. 2d 299 
(CA2), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 831 (1956). There the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit without discus-
sion, but over a dissent, affirmed the District Court's 
adoption of the "immediately after the purchase" con-
structiOn. That court had been impelled to this construc-
tion at least in part by concern over what the phrase 
uat the time of .. . purchase" means in a sale-repurchase 
equence, reasoning 
61If the ['before the purchase'] construction urged 
by [Graham-Paige] is placed upon the exemption 
provision, It would be possible for a person to pur-
chase a large block of stock, sell it out until his 
ownership was reduced to less than 10%, and then 
repeat the process, ad infinitum." 104 F. Supp. 
957, 959 (SDNY 1952) . 
The District Court may have thought that "before 
the purchase'' seemed an unlikely construction of the 
exemptive provision in a sale-repurchase sequence, so it 
could not be the proper construction in a purchase-sale 
sequence.12 The Stella construction of the exemptive 
in Order to K1ll the Rats,'' 52 Cornell L. Q. 69, 74-75 (1966) ; 
Note, Ins1der Liability for Short-Swing Profits : The Substance and 
Functwn of the Pragmatic Approach, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 592, 616-
619 (1974), Comment, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 582 (1957) (adopting a 
"before" construction), with, e g., 2 L. Loss, Securit1es Regulation 
1060 (2d ed. 1961) (favoring an "immediately after" construction). 
The weight of the commentary appears to be w1th the "before the 
purchase" constructiOn. The ALI Federal Securities Code (Tenta-
~lVe Draft No.2, 1973) , § 1413 (d) and Comment (6), cons1ders the 
., immediately after the purchase" ~"questiOnable" on the statu- C.~ 
f.ory language and propo;;es an amendmPnt. to codify the result. 
12 Stella was decided before § 10 (b) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. 
~ 7Rl (b) , a;, Implemented by RulP lOb-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 
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provision has been adhered to in the Second Circuit, 
Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F. 2d 348, 355,.--356 
(CA2), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 854 (1970); 13 Perine v. 
William Norton & Co., 509 F. 2d 114, 118 (CA2 1974), 
and adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit, Emerson Electric Co. v. Reliance Electric Co., 
434 F. 2d 918, 923-924 (CA81970), aff'd on other grounds, 
404 U. S. 418 (1972).14 But in none of the foregoing 
cases did the court examine critically the legislative 
history of § 16 (b). 
The Court of Appeals considered this case against the 
background, sketched above, of ambiguity in the perti-
nent statutory language, continued disagreement among 
the commentators, and a perceived absence in the rela-
tively few decided cases of a full consideration of the 
purpose and legislative history of § 16 (b). The court 
found unpersuasive the rationales offered in Stella and 
its progeny for the "immediately after the purchase" 
construction. It noted that construing the provision to 
require that beneficial-ownership status exist before the 
( 1975), developed fully as a private remedy for actual abuses 
of insider information. See 6 L. Loss, supra, n. 11, at 3559. 
The sale-repurchase abuse that worried the Stella court would 
now mvite § 10 (b) liability, see n. 28, infra, as well as possible lia-
bility under § 16 (b) . 
ts To rationalize its view as applied to the purchase-sale sequence, 
the court in Newmark wrote : 
" [T]he presumed access to [inside] information resulting from 
[the] purchase [that makes one a beneficial owner] provides him 
wtth an opportunity, not available to the investing public, to sell 
hts shares at the moment most advantageous to him. Thus, a 
purchase of shares which makes the buyer an insider creates an 
opportuntty for the type of speculative abuse the statute was 
enacted to prevent." 425 F. 2d, at 356. 
14 When thts Court decided Reliance Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418, 
the question presentRd here was no longer in the case. See n. 25, 
irrfra. 
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purchase in a purchase-sale sequence would not fore-
close an "immediately after the purchase" construction 
in a sale-repurchase sequence.15 506 F. 2d, at 61~615. 
More significantly, the Court of Appeals challenged 
directly the premise of the earlier cases that a "before 
the purchase" constructiOn in a purchase-sale sequence 
would allow abuses Congress intended to abate. The 
court reasoned that in § 16 (b) Congress intended to 
reach only those beneficial owners who both bought and 
sold on the basis of mside informatiOn that was not pre-
sumptively available to them until after they became 
statutory "insiders." 506 F 2d, at 608-614/6 
II 
A 
The general purpose of Congress in enacting § 16 (b) 
is well known. See Kern County Land Co., 411 U. S., 
at 591-592#1; Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric 0 
Co., 404 U. S. 418, 422 (1972), and the authorities 
u The view of the Court of Appeals that "at the time of" may 
mean different thmgs m different contexts is not umque. See Allis-
Chalmers Mfg Co. v. Gulf & Western Industries, - F. 2d -
(1975) We express no opm10n here on this view. 
16 Shortly before thi::; case was argued the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh CircUit reached the same conclusiOn on somewhat dif-
ferent analysiS. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., - F 2d, at - . The 
court apparently would have reachrd Its rrsult even in the absence 
of the exemptive provision, reasonmg that § 16 (b) covers no 
transactiOns by any § 16 (b) msiders who were not insiders 
before their imhal transactiOn. - "F . 2d, at - . Since we rely 
on the exempttve provision, we mt1mate no view on the proper 
analysis of a case where a director or officer makes an initial trans-
actiOn before obtaining ms1der status. See, e. g., Adler v. 
Klawans, 267 F 2d 840 (CA2 1959) Nor do we have occasiOn here 
to a:;sess the approach takf'n by the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit to the rxcmpt1ve proviSIOn - F. 2d, at - & 
n. -. See n 21i, 'nfm. 
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cited therein. Congress recognized that insiders may 
have access to mformation about their corporations 
not available to the rest of the investing public. By 
trading on this information, these persons could reap 
profits at the expense of less well informed investors. In 
§ 16 (b) Congress sought to "curb the evils of insider 
trading [by] 0 0 • taking the profits out of a class of 
transactions in which the possibility of abuse was be-
lieved to be intolerably great." Reliance Electric Co., 
supra, at 422. It accomplished this by defining directors, 
officers, and beneficial owners as those presumed to have 
access to inside information 11 and enacting a flat rule 
that a corporation could recover the profits these insiders 
made on a pair of security transactions within six 
months.18 
Foremost points to this purpose, and invokes the obser-
vation in Reliance Electric Co. that "where alternative 
constructions of the terms of § 16 (b) are possible, those 
terms are to be given the construction that best serves 
the congressiOnal purpose of curbing short-swing trading 
by corporate msiders." 404 U. S., at 424 (footnote 
omitted). From these premises Foremost argues that 
the Court of Appeals' construction of the exemptive pro-
VISIOn must be reJected 19 because it makes § 16 (b) in-
17 The purpooe of § 16 (b) is stated explicitly to be "preventing 
the unfair use of information whiCh may have been obtained by 
such benefiCial owner, director, or officer by reason of h1s relation-
hlp to the Issuer." 15 U S. C. § 78p (b) . 
18 SectiOn 16 (b) states that any short-swmg profits "shall inure 
to and be recoverable by the Issuer, Irrespective of any intention 
on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer m entenng 
into such transaction of holdmg the security purchased or of not 
repurchasmg the secunty sold for a penod exceeding six months ,. 
:15 u s. c. § 78p (b) 
19 In lieu of the Court of Appeals' construction, Foremost offers a 
constructiOn whereby any purchases prwr to the purchase making 
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?J.pplicable to some possible abuses of inside information 
that the statute would reach under the Stella construe-. 
t10n.20 We find this approach unsatisfactory m its 
focus on situations that § 16 (b) may not reach rather 
than on the language and purpose of the exemptive pro-
vision itself. Foremost's approach also invites an imposi~ 
tion of § 16 (b)'s liability without fault that is not 
consistent with the premises upon which Congress en· 
acted the ection. 
B 
The exemptive provision, which applies only to bene• 
limal owners and not to other statutory insiders, must 
have been included in § 16 (b) for a purpose. Although 
the extensive legislative history of the Act is bereft 
of any explimt exp1anation of Congress' intent, see Re-
liance Electric Co., supra, at 424, the evolution of§ 16 (b) 
from its initial proposa1 through passage does shed sig· 
nificant light on the purpose of the exemptive provision. 
The original version of what would develop into the 
Act was S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).. It pro-
Vlded in § 15 (b) : 
"It shall be unlawful for any director, officer, 
or owner of securities, owning as of record and/or 
beneficially more than 5 per centum of any class of 
stock of any issuer, any security of which is registered 
on a national securities exchange--
" ( 1) To purchase any such registered security with 
the intention or expectation of selling the same se-
cunty withm six months; and any profit made by 
such person on any transaction in such a registered 
security extending over a period of less than six 
\me a benefic1al owner are exempted from the operation of § 16 (b) . 
Sf'(-' 2 L . Loss, supra, n 11, at 1060 
20 Newmark de ·cribes a possible abuse of inside mformation covered 
'only nnder the 8tPlla eonstrnrtion See n. 13, supra. 
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months shall inure to and be recoverable by the is-
suer, irrespective of any intention or expectation on 
his part in entering into such transaction of holding 
the secunty purchased for a period exceeding six 
month ," 
In the next version of the legislation, H. R. 8720, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), § 15 (b) read almost identically 
to § 16 (b) as it was eventually enacted.21 
"Any profit realized by such beneficial owner, 
director, or officer from any purchase and sale or 
sale and purchase of any such registered equity 
security within a period of less than six months, un-
less such security was acquired in good faith in con-
nection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure 
to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of 
any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, 
director, or officer in entering mto such transaction of 
holding the secunty purchased or of not repurchasing 
the secunty sold for a period exceeding six 
months. . . . This subsection shall not be construed 
to cover any transactiOn where such beneficial owner 
was not such both at the time of the purchase and 
sale or sale and purchase of the security involved, 
nor any transaction or transactions which the Com-
mission by rules and regulations may exempt as not 
comprehended w1thin the purpose of this subsection 
21 As can be seen by companng H. R.. 8720's version of § 15 (b) 
w1.th § 16 (b), supra, n . 2, the differenc!'s are relat1vely mmor. For-
mally, the statement of purpose was moved to the front of the stat-
ute and vanous grammatiCal changes were made. A significant sub-
stantiVe change not apparent from the faces of the two sect10ns IS 
that § 16 (b) benefic1al owners are those owning more than / 10% of 
a reg1st!'red sccunty, while H. R. 8720 retained S. 2693's 5% require-
ment Compare Secuntie.-; Exchange Act of 1934, § 16 (a), 15 
U S. C ~ 78p (a), w1th H. R. 8720, 73d. Cong., 2d. Sess., ~ 15 (a) 
(1934,. 
74-742-0PJNION 
14 FOREMOST-McKESSON v. PROVIDENT SECURITIES 
of preventing the unfair use of information which 
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, 
director, or officer b reason of his relationship to 
the issuer." 
Thomas G. Corcoran, a spokesman for S. 2693's draft-
ers, mtroduced § 15 (b) as forbidding an insider "to 
carry on any short-term specumtions [sic] in the stock. aJL-
He cannot, with his inside information get in and out of 
stock within siX months. ' ' Hearings on H. R. 7852 and 
H. R. 8720 before the House Committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 133 (1934) . 
The Court of Appeals concluded that S. 2693 would 
have applied only to a beneficial owner who had that 
status before a purchase-sale sequence was initiated, 506 
F. 2d, at 609, and we agree. Foremost appears not to 
contest this point. Petitioner's Opening Brief, at 29. 
The question thus becomes whether H. R. 8720's 
change in the language imposing liability and its addi-
tion of the exemptive provisiOn were intended to change 
. 2693's result in a purchase-sale sequence by a bene-
ficial owner. We think the legislative history shows no 
such intent. 
. 2693 and Its House counterpart, H. R. 7852, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), met substantial criticism on a 
number of scores, including vanous provisions of § 15. 
See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before the 
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess., pt. 15 (1934); Hearmgs on H. R. 7852 and 
H . R. 8720, supra, at 1-623.22 S. 2693 was recast into 
22 Corcoran termed § 15 "one of the most Important provisions in 
[S. 2693] " Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before the Senate 
Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6555 (1934). 
But most of the proposed legislation was d1rected at regulation of 
the stock exchanges themselves and certam trading practices that 
\vere cons1dered undesirable regardless of who performed them.. 
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H. R. 8720 to take account of the criticisms that the 
bill's drafters thought valid. Hearings on H. R. 7852 
and H. R. 8720, supra, at 625, 674. The primary sub-
stantive cntiCism directed at § 15 (b) of S. 2693 was 
that 1t d1d not prevent the use of inside information 
to reap a short-term profit in a sale-repurchase situa-
tion. See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, 
at 6557-6558. Criticism was also directed at making 
liability for short-term profits turn on ownership "as 
of record and/ or beneficially." See id., at 6914. H. R. 
8720 remedied these perceived shortcomings by provid-
ing m § 15 (b) : "Any profit realized by such beneficial 
owner, director, or officer from any purchase and sale or 
sale and purchase . . . shall mure to and be recoverable 
by the issuer." 23 The term "such beneficial owner" 
drew content from § 15 (a)'s definition of a beneficial 
owner as one owning "more than 5 per centum of any 
class" of a registered security. 
The structure of the clause imposing liability in the 
revised § 15 (b) did not unambiguously retain S. 2693's 
requirement that benefiCial ownership precede a pur-
chase-sale sequence. But we cannot assume easily that 
Congress mtended to eliminate the requirement in the 
revised bill. The legislative history reveals that the 
requirement was made clear in the hearings, yet no com-
·plaint was made about it. 
See id ., at 6465-6466 Most of the hearings, therefore, dealt with 
other problems. 
~8 The other major substantive change effected in § 15 (b) by 
H R 8720 was the ehmmatwn of the potential criminal liability. 
The cnmmal liability aspect of S. 2693's version of § 15 (b) ap-
pears not to have been diScussed m hearings. It may have been 
thought, however, that a cr1mmal case could never be made out 
The d1fficultJes of proving the mental elements on which cnmmal 
liabihty turned had already led the drafters to eliminate those ques-
t-tom: of fact. m civil smts to recover profits. See n. 26, injr{L 
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The testimony on S. 2693 demonstrates that the draft-
ers were emphatic about the requirement. In mtroduc-
ing the bill Corcoran pointed out a technical flaw in 
. 2693's language: "It shall be unlawful for any direc-
tor, officer, or owner of securities, owning as of record 
and/or beneficially more than 5 per centum of any class 
of stock .. 0 ." It was possible to construe the phrase 
"ownmg 0 , • 5 per centum" to apply to directors and 
officers as well as to stockholders, so that trading by 
directors and officers would not be subject to § 15 (b) 
tf their previous holdings did not exceed 5%. But Cor-
coran made clear that the reqmrement of pre-existing 
ownership of the specified percentage applied only to 
beneficial owners. 
''lMr. CoRCORAN.] .. . There IS a mistake in the 
draftmg. I would suggest that the language of the 
first lines of section 15 (a) seem to confine the appli-
cation of the sectiOn only to those directors and 
officers who own more than 5 percent of any class 
of securities. I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, if I 
might, that the language should be corrected so that 
the section applied to every director and every offi-
cer, irrespective of how much stock he owns; and 
also to every owner of more than 5 percent of any 
class of securities .... ' 
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6555; 
see Heanngs on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, supra, at 133. 
The legislative record thus reveals that the drafters 
focused directly on the fact that S. 2693 covered a 
short-term purchase-sale sequence by a benefiCial owner· 
only if his status existed before the purchase, and no· 
concern was expressed about the wisdom of this reqmre-
rnent. But the explicit requirement was omitted from 
the operative language of the section when It was restruc-
tured to covf'r sale-repurchase sequences. In the same 
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draft, however, the e~emptlve provision was added to 
the section. On this record we are persuaded that the 
exemptive provision was intended to preserve the re-
quirement of beneficial ownership before the purchase. 
Later discussions of § 16 (b) in the hearings are con-
Sistent with this interpretation. 24 We hold that, in a 
purchase-sale sequence, a beneficial owner must account 
for profits only if he was a beneficial owner "before the 
purchase " 25 
"' '' Mr PECORA. The theory was that the ownership of 5 percent 
of the stock would_ practiCally constitute him an insider, and by vir-
too of that position hP could acquire confidential information which 
he might use for Ius own enrichment by trading in the open market, 
agamst the mterests of the general body of the stockholders. That 
is· the mam purpose sought to be served." 
Hearmgs on Stock Exchange PractiCes, supra, at 7741. Ferdinand 
Pecora was counsel to the subcommittee of the Senate Committee 
on Bankmg and Currency that conducted extensive hearings on 
stock exchange operations pnor to the enactment of the Act. He 
was also one of the draftsmen of S. 2693. Hearings on H. R. 7852 
and H. R. 8720 before the House Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 83 (1934). 
25 In Reltance Electnc Co., 404 U S. 418, the Court also had 
occasiOn to consider the applicatiOn of the exemptive provision m a 
purchase-sale sequence. There Emerson acqUired 13.2% of the 
shares of Hebance's predecessor pursuant to a tender offer and· 
Withm s1x months disposed of its holding~; in two sales of 3.24% 
and 9.96%, The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circmt held that 
the purchase, by which Emerson became a beneficial owner, was 
covered by § 16 (b) . But. It ruled that Emefi:ion was liable for the 
profits on only 1ts first sale, because "at the time of . . salP" of 
t.he 9.96%, It was not a beneficial owm·r. 
The Court granted certiOrari on Reliance 's petition to review this 
constructiOn of "at the time of sale," and affirmed. The con-
,;truction of "at the time of the purchase," however, was not before 
the Court. !d., at 420-422 Emerson thus remained liable for 
the 3.24% sa.le, although It would have had no liability under· 
our holding today. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
h.as tecognized correctly that the constructinn uf "at the time of ... 
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IV 
Additional considerations support our reading of the 
legislative history. 
A 
Section 16 (b) imposes a strict prophylactic rule with 
respect to insider, short-swing trading. In Kern County 
Land Co., 411 U. S., at 595, we noted: 
"The statute requires the [statutorily defined] in-
side, short-swing trader to disgorge all profits 
realized on all 'purchases' and 'sales' within the speci-
fied time period, without proof of actual abuse of 
insider information, and without proof of intent to 
profit on the basis of such information." 
In short, this statute Imposes liability without fault 
within its narrowly drawn limits.26 
sale" in Reliance Electric Co. is superfluous in light of the con-
struction of "at. the time of the purchase" adopted by the Court of 
Appeal.H for the Ninth Circtut, whiCh we affirm here. See Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., - F. 2d, at - n. 12. But the procedural 
posture of Reliance Electnc Co. prevented a full consideratiOn of 
the meanmg of the exemptive provisiOn. See ibid. We express no 
opmwn on the InterpretatiOn of the provision by whiCh the Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Cucu1t sought. to avoid the apparent 
superfluity of the "at thr time of sale" language. ld., at -, 
-, supra, n. 16" 
26 "Mr CoRCORAN. . . . You hold the director, irrespective 
of any intention or expectation to sell the security within 6 months 
after, because it will be absolutely imposs1ble to prove the existence 
of such mtentwn or expectation, and you have to have this crude 
rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of having 
to prove that the dtrector intended, at the t1me he bought, to get out 
on a short swing .. 
"Senator GoRE. You infer the intent from the fact. 
"Mr CoRCORAN 
"Senator KEAN 
bad to ell ? 
From the fact. 
Suppose he got stuck in something else, and he 
[Ji'ootnotP .'36 is continued on p . .1.9] 
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As noted earher, Foremost recognizes the ambigmty 
of the exemptive provision, but argues that where "alter- ...,.-· 
nat1ve constructions" of § 16 (b)'s terms are ~lable, ;{.rl-" 
we should choose the construction that best serves the 
statute's purposes. Foremost relies on statements gener-
ally to this effect in Kern County Land Co., supra, at 
595, and Reliance Electric Co., 404 U. S., at 424. In 
neither of those cases, however, did the Court adopt the 
construction that would have imposed liability, thus 
recognizing that serving the congressional purpose does 
not require resolving every ambiguity in favor of the 
applicatiOn of § 16 (b). We reiterate that nothing sug-
gests that the construction urged by Foremost would 
serve better to further congressional purposes. Indeed, 
the legislative history of § 16 (b) indicates that by add-
ing the exemptive provision Congress deliberately ex-
pressed a contrary choice. But even if the legislative 
record were more ambiguous, we would hesitate to adopt 
Foremost's construction. It is inappropriate to reach 
the harsh result of Imposing § 16 (b)'s liability without 
.fault on the basis of unclear language. If Congress 
wishes to Impose such liability, we must assume it will 
do so expressly ·~ by unmistakable inference. b-1' 
It is not irrelevant that Congress itself limited care-
fully the strict liability imposed by § 16 (b). See Re-
liance Electric Co, supra, at 422-425. Even an insider 
may trade freely without incurring the statutory liability 
if, for example, he spaces his transactions at intervals 
"Senator BARKLEY All he would get would be what he put into it. 
He would get his original mvestment. 
"Mr. CoRCORAN He would get his money out, but the profit goes 
o the corporatiOn. 
"Senator KEAN . Suppose he had to sell 
"Mr. CoRCORAN . Let him get out what he put in, but give the 
corporatiOn the profit." 
Hrarmg~ on Stork Exchange Practices, supra, at 6556-6557. 
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greater than six months. When Congress has so recog~ 
nized the need to limit carefully the "arbitrary and 
sweeping coverage" of § 16 (b), Bershad v. McDonough, 
428 F. 2d 69·3, 696 (CA7 1970), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 
992 ( 1971) , courts should not be quick to determine that, 
despite an acknowledged ambiguity, Congress intended 
the section to cover a particular transaction. 
B 
Our construction of 16 (b) also is supported by the 
distinction Congress recognized between short-term trad-
ing by mere stockholders and such trading by directors 
and officers. The legislative discourse revealed that Con-
gress thought that all short-swing trading by directors 
and officers was vulnerable to abuse because of their 
intimate mvolvement in corporate affairs. But trading 
by mere stockholders was viewed as being subject to abuse 
only when the size of their holdings afforded the potential 
for access to corporate information.27 These different 
perceptions simply reflect the realities of corporate life. 
27 This distinction is especially evident in the following exchange, 
dtrected to the reportmg reqmrements 1mposed by § 15 (a) of 
S. 2693 on beneficwl ownert> 
"Senator KEAN. Suppose a man is not a director at all and does 
not want to be a director, and he happens to own 5 percent or buy 
5 percent. Do you think you are going to get him to file w1th the 
exchange all the time just the number of shares he has? 
"Mr. CoRCORAN. I think so, sir. 
"Senator KEAN. I think it is all right to apply it to a director or 
officer, but I think to require the ordmary investor--
"Mr. CoRCORAN Five percent 1s a lot m a modern corporation. 
Many corporatiOns are controlled by 5 percent or 10 percent. 
'Senator KEAN They may own 1t or they may sell it. This ap-
plies to all corporatiOns, and you are getting down to the point where 
you are mterfermg w1th the md!v!dual a good deal there. I agree 
vith you w1th respect to the officers and d1rectors. 
"Mr CoRCORAN, A stockholder owmng 5 percent is a. much a.n. 
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It would not be consistent with this perceived distinc-
tion to impose liability on the basis of a purchase made 
when the percentage of stock ownership requisite to in-
sider status had not been acquired. To be sure, the 
possibility does exist that one who becomes a beneficial 
owner by a purchase will sell on the basis of information 
attained by virtue of his newly acquired holdings. But 
the purchase itself was not one posing dangers that Con-
gress considered intolerable, since it was made when the 
purchaser owned no shares or less than the percentage 
deemed necessary to make one an insider. 28 Such a stock-
holder is more analogous to the stockholder owning less 
than 10% at all times, and thereby excluded entirely from 
the operation of § 16 (b), than to a director or officer whose 
every purchase and sale is covered by the statute.. While 
this reasoning might not compel our construction of the 
exemptive provision, it explains why Congress may have 
insider as an officer or director. Whether he is a titular director or 
not, he normally is, as a practical matter of fact, a director. 
"Senator KEAN . He might not be." 
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6556. It is also re-
flected in the discussion of the technical flaw in S. 2693. See id., 
at 6555, Hearings on H . R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, supra, at 133. 
See also Hearmgs on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 7741-7743. 
28 Thus, accordmg to the presumpt.ion of the statute, the pur-
chaser did not have access to ms1de mformation in makmg the 
purchase. It should be noted further that as a matter of practicali-
ties the crucial point in the acqmsition of securities is not the tech-
nical "purchase," but rather the decision to make an acquisition. 
In the case of an acquisition of a considerable block of a corpora-
tion's stock, tha.t decision may precede the "purchase" by a con-
siderable penod of time. A prudent investor will want to investi-
gatf' all available information on the corpora.twn Such an investor 
also may need time to finance the purchase, and may wish to 
effectuate purchases without mfluencing the market price. These 
realities emphasize that the acquisi tion decision by a beneficial 
owner normally Will occur well in advance of the event that is 
presumed to a.fford access to mside information 
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seen fit to draw the lme it did. Cf. Adler v. Klawans, 267 
F. 2d 40, 845 (CA2 1959) . 
c 
Section 16 (b rs scope, of course, is not affected by 
whether alternative sanctions might inhibit the abuse of 
inside information. Congress, however, has left some 
problems of the abuse of inside information to other 
·remedies. These sanctions alleviate concern that ordi-
nary investors are unprotected against actual abuses of 
inside information by transactions not covered by 
< 16 (b). For example, Congress has passed general 
antifraud statutes that sanction abusive practices by 
insiders. See Securities Act of 1933, § 17 (a), 48 Stat. 
84, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a); Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, § 10 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b) ; 3 L. Loss, supra, 
n. 11, 1423-1429, 1442-1445. Today an investor who 
can show harm from the actual use of material inside 
~information may have recourse, in particular, to § 10 (b) 
and Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1975).29 It 
also was thought that § 16 (a)'s publicity requirement 30 
2n Rule lOb-5 has been held to embrace ev1ls that Foremost urges its 
constructJon of§ 16·(b) 1s necessary to prevent. The Rule has been 
applied to tradmg by one who acqUJred ms1de mformatwn m the 
course of Iwgotlatwns w1th a corporatwn, such as the negotmtwns 
for Provident's purchase of the Foremost debentures. Van Alstyne, 
Noel & Co. , 43 S. E. C. 1080 (1969), 3 L. Loss, supra, at. 1451-
1452 . And a stockholdt>r trading on information not generally 
known has been held subJect to the sanctwns of the Rule. Shapiro 
v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Sm~th, Inc., 495 F. 2d 228 (CA2' 
1974), SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833 (CA2 1968), 
cert. demed, 394 U. S. 967 (1969) . The hability of ins1ders who 
" t1p ' others, SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301 (CA2), 
cert. demed, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971), may reduce the threat that, 
beneficml owners not themsdves represented on the board of dJrec-
tors will be able to acqmre ms1de mformatwn from officers and 
dm•ctor;,. 
Jn Section 16 (a), 15 U S. C. § 78p (a.) provid<.'s ' 
·Evrn Jwr:-;oliJI who i~ d1rectly or mrlirectly t.he fwndiriar 
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would afford indirect protection against some potential 
misuses of inside information.31 See Hearings on H. R. 
7852 and H. R. 8720, supra, at 134-135; H. Rep. No. 
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (to accompany H. R. 9323, 
73d Cong., 2d Sess., passed by the House, May 7, 1934, 
w1thoutthepresent § 16 (b) ). 
We must still consider briefly Foremost's contention 
that the "before the purchase" construction is inconsist-
owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity secu-
rity (other than an exempted secunty) which is registered pursuant 
to sect10n 78l of thts title, or who is a director or an officer of the 
issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of 
uch security on a nat10nal securities exchange or by the effective 
date of a registratiOn statement filed pursuant to section 78l (g) 
of this title, or within ten days after he becomes such beneficial 
owner, director, or officer, a statement with the Commission (and, 
if such security is registered on a national securities exchange, 
also with the exchange) of the amount of all equity securities of 
such issuer of which he ts the benefictal owner, and within ten days 
after the close of each calendar month thereafter, tf there has been 
a change in such ownership during such month, shall file with the 
Commtss1on (and if such secunty is registered on a national securi-
ties exchange, shall also file with the exchange) , a statement indi-
catmg h1s ownershtp at the close of the calendar month and such 
changes m h1s ownership as have occurred during such calendar 
month " 
n The drafters clearly thought that § 16 (a) would help deter 
abuses not covered by § 16 (b) . 
"[Mr Corcoran.] [S]ection 15 (a), requires every director, officer, 
or prmcipal holder of any securities listed on an exchange to file 
w1th the exchange and with the commission a statement of how 
many shares he owns and to file that statement at the end of each 
month to show whether there has been any change in his position 
during the month . That is to prevent the insider from taking ad-
vantage of mformat10n to sell or buy shares ahead of the release of 
information to the pubhc about the company." 
Those remarks were addressed to S. 2693 Hearings on H . R . 7852 
und H R. 8720, .~upra, at 132. 
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ent with other enactments of Congress and the interJ 
pretation of § 16 (b) by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. 
Foremost and amicus Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing 
o. point to §~ 16 (cl) ancl 16 (e) of the Act, 15 U.S. C. 
§ § 78p (d), (e), as congressional actions that would not 
have been necessary unless one selling the securities 
whose acquisition made him a beneficial owner would be 
liable under ~ 16 (b). Section 16 (d) in part, exempts 
from § 16 (b) certam transactions by a securities "dealer 
in the ordmary course of his business and incident to 
the establishment or maintenance by him of a primary 
or secondary market." a2 Section 16 (e) provides an 
exemption for certain "foreign or domestic arbitrage 
transactiOns." 33 They argue similarly that the SEC's 
Rule 16b-2, 17 CFR § 240.16b-2 ( 1975), is unnecessary 
32 Section 16 (d), 15 U. S. C. § 78p (d), provides : 
"The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall not 
apply to any purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, and the pro-
VlSlOns of subsection (c) of this section shall not apply to any sale, 
of an eqmty ::;ecnrity not. then or theretofore held by h1m m an Ill-
vestment account, by a dealer in the ordinary course of his business 
and incident to the establishment or maintenance by him of a pri-
mary or secondary market (otherwise than on a national secunties 
exchange or an exchange exempted from. registration under sectwn 
78e of this tit.lc) for such security. The Commission may, by such 
rules and rrgulations as it deems necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest , define and prescribe terms and conditions with re-
spect to securities held in an investment account and transactwns 
made in the ordinary course of business and mcident to the estab-
lishment, or maintenance of a primary or secondary market." 
" Dealer" IH drfined 111 §a (a) (5) of the Act. 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a) (5) . 
J 3 Sect10n 16 (c), 15 U.S. C. §78p (e) , provides · 
"Thr provi>iiOnR of tim; section shall not apply to foreign or 
-domestiC arbitragr transactions unless made m contravention of 
·uch rule:; and regulations as the Comm1S~:>1on may adopt in order to. 
&:a rry out the p11rpose» of th1s srction." 
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if our construction of § 16 (b) is correct. Rule 16b-2 
exempts from § 16 (b) specified transactions "in co nne~ 
tion with the distribution of a substantial block of 
securities." 84 
84 Section 16 (b) provides in its final clause that it shall not 
eover "any transaction or transactions which the Commission by 
rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the /. 
purpose of this subsection." 15 U. S. C. § 78p (b) . Rule 16f-2 u-
provides : 
"(a) Any transaction of purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, 
of a security which is effected in connection with the distribution of a 
substantial block of securities shall be exempt from the provisions 
of section 16 (b) of the Act, to the extent specified in this § 240.16b--
2, as not comprehended within the purpose of said section, upon the 
following conditions : 
" ( 1) The person effecting the transaction is engaged in the busi-
ness of distributing securities and is participating in good faith, in 
the ordinary course of such business, in the distribution of such 
block of securities; 
"(2) The security involved in the transaction is (i) a part of such 
block of securities and is acquired by the person effecting the trans-
aJction, with a view to the distribution thereof, from the issuer or 
other person on ~vhose behalf such securities are being distributed 
or from a person who is participating in good faith in the distribu-
tion of such block of securities, or (ii) a security purchased in good 
faith by or for the account of the person effecting the transaction 
for the purpose of stabilizing the market price of securities of the 
class bemg distributed or to cover an over-allotment or other short 
position created in connection with such distribution; and 
" (3) Other persons not within the purview of section 16 (b) of 
the Act are participating in the distribution of such block of securi-
ties on terms ::tt least as favorable as those on which such person is 
participating and to an extent at least equal to the aggregate par-
ticipation of all persons exempted from the provisions of section 
16 (b) of the Act by this § 240.16b-2. However, the performance· 
of the functions of manager of a distributing group and the receipt 
of a bona fide payment for performing such functions shall not pre-
clude an exemption which would otherwise be available under this 
§ 240.16b--2. 
" (b) The exemption of a transaction pursuant to this § 240.16b-2' 
with respect to the participation therein of one party thereto shalt 
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We do not consider these provisions to be inconsistent 
with our holding. Nothing on their faces would make 
them applicable to one selling the securities the pur-
chase of which made him a beneficial owner. But the 
·exemptions would be necessary to protect stockholders 
already qualifying as beneficial owners when they pur-
chased 35 and they would, of course, apply to transactions 
by directors and officers as well. 
Foremost and the amicus also remind us that the 
interpretation of the exemptive provision for which they 
contend has been adopted by the SEC in the past. See 
Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, at 22-27, Reliance 
Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418 
(1972). But the Commission has not appeared as an 
amicus in this case. In any event, even if the Commis-
sion's views have not changed we would not afford them 
the deference to which the views of the agency adminis-
tering a statute are usually entitled, for in Reliance 
Electric Co., 404 U. S., at 425-427, the Court rejected the 
basic theory on which the SEC based its interpretation 
of the exemptive provision. Our re-examination of the 
exemptive provision confirms the view that the SEC's 
theory did not reflect the intent of Congress. 
The judgment is 
Affirmed. 
not render such transaction exempt with respect to participation of 
any other party therein unless such other party also meets the 
conditions of this § 240.16b-2." 
35 The press release a.ccompanying the SEC's promulgation of 
Rule 16b-2 demonstrates this point. It explained: "The new Rule 
[16b-2] affords an exemption for certain cases by providing that 
underwriters who happen to have a member of their firm also an 
officer or director .of the issuer or one of its principal stockholders 
who are regularly engaged in the business of buying and selling 
securities need not account to the company for profits realized from 
purchases and sales made in the distribution of a security for the 
company . ... " SEC Release No. 34-26.4, June 8, 1935. 
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Foremost-McKesson, Inc,, I On Writ of Certiorari 
Petitioner, to the United States 
v, Court of Appeals for 
Provident ecurities Company, the Ninth Circuit. 
[January -, 1~76] 
MR, JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court, 
This case presents an unresolved issue under § 16 (b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Act), 48 
tat. 896, 15 U. S. C, § 78p (b), That section of the 
Act was designed to prevent a corporate director or officer 
or "the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum" of a 
corporatiOn 1 from profiteering through short-swing secu-
rities transactions on the basis of inside information. It 
provides that a corporation may capture for itself the 
profits realized on a purchase and sale, or sale and pur-
chase, of its securities within six months by a director, offi-
cer, or beneficial owner.2 Section 16 (b)'s last sentence, 
1 The corporate ''insiders" whose trading is regulated by § 16 (b) 
1tra defined in§ 16 (a) of the Act, 15 U S. C. § 78p (a), as "[e] very 
person who 1s directly or md1rectly the beneficial owner of more 
than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than 
an exempted secunty) whiCh 1s registered pursuant to section 78l of 
this title, or who is a. cbrecJ,or or a.n officer of the issuer of such 
security ' 
Section 16 (b), 15 U S. C § 78p (b), reads in full: 
"For the purpose of preventmg the unfair use of infonnation 
which may have been obtamed by such beneficial owner, director, 
or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit 
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however, provides that it 11shall not be construed to cover 
any transactiOn where such beneficial owner was not 
uch both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale 
and purchase, of the security mvolved .. .. " The ques-
tion presented here IS whether a person purchasing securi-
ties that put his holdings above the 10% level is a bene-
ficial owner Hat the time of the purchase" so that he must 
account for profits realized on a sale of those securities 
within six months. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circmt answered this question in the nega-
tive, 506 F 2d 601 (1974) , We affirm, 
I 
Respondent, Provident Securities Co., was a personal 
holding company. In 1968 Provident decided tentatively 
to liquidate and dissolve, and it engaged an agent to find 
realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and pur-
chase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted 
security) w1thin any period of less than six months, unless such 
security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt pre-
viously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, 
irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, 
director, or officer in entering mto such transaction of holding the 
secunty purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a 
period exceedmg s1x months. Suit to recover such profit may be 
instituted at law or m eqmty m any court of competent jurisdiction 
by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the 
name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to 
brmg such smt within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently 
to prosecute the same thereafter, but no such suit shall be brought 
more than two years after the date such profit was realized. This 
subsect10n shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such 
beneficml owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and 
sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any trans-
actiOn or transactions wh1ch the Comm1ss1on by rules and regula. 
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a purchaser for its assets. Petitioner, Foremost-McKes-
son, Inc., emerged as a potential purchaser, but extensive 
negotiations were required to resolve a disagreement over 
the nature of the consideration Foremost would pay, 
Provident wanted cash in order to facilitate its dis-
solution, while Foremost wanted to pay with i~ own 
securities. 
Eventually a compromise was reached, and Provi-
dent and Foremost executed a purchase agreement 
embodying their deal on September 25, 1969. The 
agreement provided that Foremost would buy two-thirds 
of Provident's assets for $4.25 million in cash and $49.75 
million in Foremost convertible subordinated debentures.3 
The agreement further provided that Foremost would 
register under the Securities Act of 19·33 $25 million in 
principal amount of the debentures and would participate 
in an underwriting agreement by which those debentures 
would be sold to the public. At the closing on October 
15, 1969, Foremost delivered to Provident the cash and a 
$40 million debenture that w~s subsequently exchanged 
for two debentures in the principal amounts of $25 mil-
lion and $15 million. Foremost also delivered a $2.5 mil-
lion debenture to an escrow on the closing date. On 
October 20 Foremost delivered to Provident a $7.25 mil-
lion debenture representing the balance of the purchase 
price. These debentures were immediately convertible 
into more than 10% of Foremost's outstanding common 
stock 
On October 21 Provident, Foremost, and a group of 
underwriters executed an underwriting agreement to be 
closed on October 28. The agreement provided for sale 
to the underwriters of the $25 million debenture. On 
s The debentures were issued expressly to acquire Provident•, 
assetsp and all of them were used for t,hat purpose. 
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October 24 Provident distributed the $15 million and 
$7.25 million debentures to its stockholders, reducing the 
amount of Foremost common into which the company's 
holdings were convertible to less than 10%. On October 
28 the closing under the underwriting agreement was 
accomplished,4 Provident thereafter distributed the cash 
proceeds of the debenture sale to its stockholders and 
· dissolved. 
Provident's holdings in Foremost debentures as of 
October 20 were large enough to make it a beneficial 
owner of Foremost within the meaning of§ 16.5 Having 
·acquired and disposed of these securities within six 
months, Provident faced the prospect of a suit by Fore-
most to recover any profits realized on the sale of the 
debenture to the underwriters. Provident therefore sued 
for a declaration that it was not liable to Foremost under 
§ 16 (b). The District Court granted summary judg-
ment for Provident and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Provident's principal argument below for nonliability 
was based on Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., 411 U. S. 582 (1973). There we held 
that an "unorthodox transaction" in securities that did 
not present the possibility of speculative abuse of inside 
4 The underwriters delivered $25,366,666.66 in cash to Foremost. 
That amount represented a purchase price of 101%,% of the 
principal amount of the debenture ($25,312,500.00) plus interest 
accrued from October 15 to t.he date of closing ($54,166.66). The 
amount of profit realized by Provident has never been established. 
3 A beneficial owner is one who owns more than 10% of an "equity 
security" registered pursuant to § 12 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78l. 
See n. 1, supra The owner of debentures convertible into more than 
10% of a corporation 's registered common stock is a beneficial owner 
withm the meaning of the Act. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
§§3 (a)(10) , 11, 15 US. C. §§78c (a)(lO) , (11) ; Rule 16a-2 (b), 
17 CFR § 240.16a-2 {b) (1975) . Foremost's common stock was 
Tfl~istered , thus Provident' holdings made it a beneficial OWJ.le~. 
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information wa not a "sale" within the meaning of 
§ 16 (b) . Provident contended that its reluctant accept-
ance of Foremost debentures in exchange for its assets 
was an "unorthodox transaction" not presenting the pos-
sibility of speculative abuse and therefore was not a 
upurchase" withm the meaning of § 16 (b). Although 
the District Court's pre-Kern County opinion had 
adopted this type of analysis, 331 F. Supp. 787 (ND 
Cal. 1971), the Court of Appeals rejected it, reasoning 
that Provident's acqmsition of the debentures was not 
"unorthodox" and that the circumstances did not pre-
clude the possibility of speculative abuse.. 506 F. 2d, at 
604-605. 
The Court of Appeals then considered two theories 
of nonliability based on § 16 (b)'s exemptive provision : 
"This subsection shall not be construed to cover any 
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such 
both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale 
and purchase 0 0 0 o11 The first was Provident's argu-
ment that it was not a beneficial owner "at the time 
of 0 0 o sale.11 After the October 24 distribution of some 
debentures to stockholders, the debentures held by Provi-
dent were convertible mto less than 10% of Foremost's 
outstanding common stock. Provident contended that 
its sale to the underwriters did not occur until the under-
writing agreement was closed on October 28. If this 
were the case, the sale would not have been covered by 
§ 16 (b), smce Provident would not have been a bene-
fimal owner "at the time of 0 0 sale." 8 The Court of 
Appeals rejected this argument because it found that 
8 This contention was based on Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson 
Electnc Co , 404 U S. 41R (1972) There the Court held that a sale 
made after a former beneficial owner had already reduced its holdings 
below 10% was exempted from § 16 (b) by the phrase "at the time 
of • • . S~Jle" m the exempbve proviston, See n. 25, infra. 
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the sale occurred on October 21 upon execution of the 
Underwriting agreement.1 
The Court of Appeals then turned to the theory of 
nonhability based on the exemptive provision that we 
consider here.8 It held that in a purchase-sale sequence 
1 Section 3 (a) (14) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a) (14), defines 
"sale" and "sell" to include "any contract to sell or otherwise 
dispose of." But Provident argued that the October 28 closing date 
was the day of sale because contractual conditions prevented the 
contract from becoming binding until closing. The underwriting 
agreement provided in paragraph 7: 
"7. Termination of Agreement : This agreement may be termi-
nated, prior to the time the Registration Statement becomes effec-
tive, by you or by any group of Underwriters which has agreed 
hereunder to purchase m the aggregate at least 50% of the Deben-
tures, if, in your judgment or m the judgment of any such group 
of Underwriters, there shall have occurred a material unfavorable 
change in political, financial or economic conditions generally." 
(App. A134 .) 
And in paragraph 5, the agreement provided: "The several obliga-
tions of the Underwriters hereunder are subject to the following 
conditions : 
" (h) That, between the time of execution of this agreement and 
the time of purchase, there shall occur no material and unfavorable 
change, financial or otherwise (other than as referred to in the 
Registration Statement and the Prospectus), in the condition of the 
Company and its consolidated subsidianes as a whole; and the Com-
pany w!ll, at the time of purchase, deliver to you a certificate of 
t,wo of its executive officers to the foregoing effect." (App. A134.) 
The Court of Appeals agreed that conditions to performance 
might prevent a contract from being a "sale" prior to closing. But 
it ruled that all sigmficant conditions here were satisfied when the 
registration statement required by paragraph 7 became effective on 
October 21 , the day the underwriting agreement was executed. The 
court also found that after October 21, Provident was no longer 
subject to the r1sk of a declme in the market for Foremost's stock. 
506 F 2d, at 607 . For reasons not apparent from Its opinion, 
the court did not address the possibility that paragraph 5 (h) left 
Provident subJect to market risks. See n. 8, infra. 
8 Dur holding: on this tssue d1sposes of this case by precludme; 
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the phrase 11at the time of the purchase," 11must be 
construed to mean prior to the time when the decision 
to purchase is made.'' 506 F. 2d, at 614. Thus, although 
Provident became a beneficial owner of Foremost by ac-
qmring the debentures, it was not a beneficial owner "at 
the time of the purchase.'' Accordingly, the exemptive 
provision prevf'nted anv § 16 (h) liability on Provident's 
par. 
II 
The meaning of the exemptive proVIsion has been 
disputed since § 16 (b) was first enacted. The discus-
sion has focused on the application of the provision to 
a purchase-sale sequence, the principal disagreement 
being whether "at the time of the purchase" means 
ubefore the purchase" or "immediately after the pur-
chase." 9 The difference in construction is determina-
tive of a beneficial owner's liability in cases such as 
Provident's where such owner sells within six months of 
purchase the securities the acquisition of which made him 
a beneficial owner. The commentators divided immedi-
ately over which construction Congress intended,t0 and 
they remain divided.11 The courts of appeals also are 
in disagreement over the issue. 
any ltabthty on Provident's part. We therefore do not consider 
whether the Court of Appeals properly rejected Provident's argu-
ments based on Kerrt County and on the sale not having occurred 
until October 28 
9 The alternative construction to "before the purchase" is some-
t imes denommated "stmultaneously wtth the purchase," as it was 
by the Court of Appeals. 506 F. 2d, at 608. 
1° Compare C. Meyer, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 
ll2 (1934) (adoptmg a "before" construction), with Seligman, 
Problems Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 Va. L. Rev. 1, 
19-20 (1934) (adoptmg an "immedtately after" construction) . 
11 Compare, e. g., Munter, Sectton 16 (b) of the Securities Ex-
~ba,nge Act of 1934: An Altema.tivA to "'Burning Down the Bam 
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The question of what Congress intended to accom-
plish by the exemptive provision in . a purchase-sale 
sequence came to a court of appeals for the first time 
in Stella v Graham-Patge Motors Corp., 232 F. 2d 299 
(CA2), cert. demed, 352 U. S. 831 (1956). There the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circmt without discus-
sion, but over a dissent, affirmed the District Court's 
adoption of the "immediately after the purchase" con-
struction. That court had been impelled to this constru0-
tion at least m part by concern over what the phrase 
"at the tJme of . purchase" means in a sale-repurchase 
equence, reasonmg 
ulf the ['before the purchase'] construction urged 
by [Graham-Paige] IS placed upon the exemption 
proviswn, It would be possible for a person to pur-
chase a large block of stock, sell it out until hi8 
ownership was reduced to less than 10%, and then 
repeat the process, ad infinitum." 104 F. Supp. 
957, 959 (SDNY 1952) . 
The District Court may have thought that "before 
the purchase" seemed an unlikely construction of the 
exemptive provision in a sale-repurchase sequence, so it 
could not be the proper construction in a purchase-sale 
equence 12 The Stella constructiOn of the exemptive 
in Order to Kill the Rats," 52 ornell L. Q. 69, 74-75 (1966); 
Note, Insider L1abthty for Short-Swing Profits: The Substance and 
Function of the Pragmatic Approach, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 592, 616-
619 (1974), Comment, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 582 (1957) (adopting a 
"before" construction), w1th, e. g., 2 L Loss, SecuntJes Regulation 
1060 (2d ed, 1961) (favormg an ' tmmedmtely after" construction) . 
The wmght of the commentary appears to be wtth the "before the 
purchase" construction The ALI Federal Securities Code (Tenta-
tive Draft No.2, 1973), § 1413 (d) and Comment (6), considers the 
tmmeduttely after the purchase'' construction "questionable" on the 
,tatutory language and proposcs an amendment to codify the result. 
12 Stella was dectded before § 10 (b) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. 
, 7~j (h), ~.~ tmj1lcmcnt.ccl. hy Rll.l<' lOh-li, 17 CFR § 240,101>-S 
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provision has been adhered to in the Second Circuit, 
Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F. 2d 348, 355-356 
(CA2), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 854 (1970); 13 Perine v. 
William Norton & Co., 509 F. 2d 114, 118 (CA2 1974), 
and adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit. Emerson Electric Co. v. Reliance Electric Co., 
434 F. 2d 918,923-924 (CA81970), aff'd on other grounds, 
404 U. S. 418 (1972) .14 But in none of the foregoing 
cases did the court examine critically the legislative 
history of § 16 (b). 
The Court of Appeals considered this case against the 
background, sketched above, of ambiguity in the perti-
nent statutory language, continued disagreement among 
the commentators, and a perceived absence in the rela-
tively few decided cases of a full consideration of the 
purpose and legislative history of § 16 (b). The court 
found unpersuasive the rationales offered in Stella and 
its progeny for the "immediately after the purchase" 
construction. It noted that construing the provision to 
require that beneficial-ownership status exist before the 
(1975), developed fully as a private remedy for actual abuses 
of mside mformat10n. See 6 L. Loss, supra, n. 11, at 3559. 
The sale-repurchase abuse that worried the Stella court would 
now mv1te § 10 (b) liability, see n. 29, infra, as well as possible lia-
bility under § 16 (b) 
13 To rationalize its view as applied to the purchase-sale sequence, 
the court in Newmark wrote : 
11 [T]he presumed a~cess to [inside] information resulting from 
[ the] purchase [that makes one a beneficial owner] provides him 
w1th an opportunity, not available to the investing public, to sell 
Ius shares at the moment most advantageous to him. Thus, a 
purchase of shares which makes the buyer an insider creates an 
opporturuty for the type of speculative abuse the statute was 
enacted to prevent." 425 F. 2d, at 356. 
14 When thiS Court demded Reliance Electric Co ., 404 U. S. 418, 
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purchase in a purchase-sale sequence would not fore-
close an "immediately after the purchase" construction 
in a sale-repurchase sequence.15 506 F. 2d, at 614-615. 
More significantly, the Court of Appeals challenged 
directly the premise of the earlier cases that a "before 
the purchase" construction in a purchase-sale sequence 
would allow abuses Congress intended to abate. The 
court reasoned that in § 16 (b) Congress intended to 
reach only those beneficial owners who both bought and 
sold on the basis of inside information, which was pre-
sumptively available to them only after they became 
statutory "insiders/' 506 F, 2d, at 608-614,16 
III 
A 
The general purpose of Congress in enacting § 16 (b) 
is well known. See Kern County Land Co., 411 U. S., 
at 591-59Q; Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric 
Co., 404 U. S. 418, 422 (1972), and the authorities 
u The view of the Court of Appeals that "at the time of" may 
mean different things in different contexts is not unique. See Allis-
Chalmers Mfg Co v. Gulf & Western lndustries, - F. 2d -
(1975) We express no opmwn here on this view. 
u Shortly before this case was argued the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion on somewhat dif-
ferent analysis. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., - F. 2d, at -. The 
court apparently would have reached its result even in the absence 
of the exemptive provision, reasoning that § 16 (b) covers no 
transactiOns by any § 16 (b) insiders who were not insiders 
before their initial transaction. - F. 2d, at -. Since we rely 
on the exemptiVe provision, we intimate no view on the proper 
analysis of a case where a director or officer makes an initial trans-
action before obtaining msider status See, e. g., Adler v. 
Klawans, 267 F . 2d 840 (CA2 1959) Nor do we have occasion here 
to assess the approa.ch taken by the Court of Appeals for the 
eventh CircUit to the exemptiVe proviSion. - F. 2d, at - & 
:n. 13. Seen 25, infra. 
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cited therein. Congress recognized that insiders may 
have access to information about their corporations 
not available to the rest of the investing public. By 
trading on this mformation, these persons could reap 
profits at the expense of less well informed investors. In 
§ 16 (b) Congress sought to "curb the evils of insider 
trading [by] . . , taking the profits out of a class of 
transactions in which the possibility of abuse was be-
lieved to be intolerably great." Reliance Electric Co., 
supra, at 422. It accomplished this by defining directors, 
officers, and beneficial owners as those presumed to have 
access to inside information 17 and enacting a flat rule 
that a corporation could recover the profits these insiders 
made on a pair of security transactions within six 
months.18 
Foremost points to this purpose, and invokes the obser-
vation in Reliance Electric Co. that "where alternative 
constructions of the terms of § 16 (b) are possible, those 
terms are to be given the construction that best serves 
the congressional purpose of curbing short-swing trading 
by corporate insiders.11 404 U. S., at 424 (footnote 
omitted) . From these premises Foremost argues that 
the Court of Appeals' construction of the exemptive pro-
vision must be rejected 19 because it makes § 16 (b) in-
1'~'" The purpose of § 16 (b) is stated explicitly to be "preventing 
the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by 
such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relation-
ship to the issuer."' 15 U. S. C. § 78p (b) . 
1 8 Section 16 (b) states that any short-swing profits "shall inure· 
to· and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention 
on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering 
into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not 
repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months." 
15 u. s. c. § 78p (b). 
19 In lieu of the Court of Appeals' construction, Foremost offers a 
ctnnstruction whereby any purcha!!!es prior to the pu;rchase makin~ 
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applicable to some possible abuses of inside information 
that the statute would reach under the Stella construc-
tion.20 We find th1s approach unsatisfactory in its 
focus on situations that § 16 (b) may not reach rather 
than on the language and purpose of the exemptive pro-
vision itself. Foremost's approach also invites an imposi-
tion of § 16 (b)'s liability without fault that is not 
consistent with the premises upon which Congress en-
acted the section. 
B 
The exemptive provision, which applies only to bene-
fiCial owners and not to other statutory insiders, must 
have been included in § 16 (b) for a purpose. Although 
the extensive legislative history of the Act is bereft 
of any explicit explanation of Congress' intent, see Re-
liance Electric Co., supra, at 424, the evolution of§ 16 (b) 
from its initial proposal through passage does shed sig-
nificant light on the purpose of the exemptive provision. 
The original version of what would develop into the 
Act was S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess, (1934) .. It pro-
vided in § 15 (b) : 
"It shall be unlawful for any director, officer, 
or owner of securities, owning as of record and/or 
beneficially more than 5 per centum of any class of 
<3tock of any issuer, any security of which is registered 
.on a national securities exchange--
" ( 1) To purchase any such registered security with 
the intention or expectation of selling the same se-
cunty within six months; and any profit made by 
such person on any transaction in such a registered 
ecunty extending over a per1od of less than six 
one a beneficial owner are exempted from the operation of§ 16 (b). 
See 2 L Loss, supra, n 11, at 1060. 
20 Newmark describes a possible abuse of inside information covered 
.only nnder the Stella construction. See n. 131 supra. 
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months shall inure to and be recoverable by the is· 
suer, irrespective of any intention or expectation on 
his part in entering into such transaction of holding 
the security purchased for a period exceeding six 
months." 
In the next version of the legislation, H. R. 8720, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess. ( 19·34), § 15 (b) read almost identically 
to § 16 (b) as it was eventually enacted.21 
"Any profit realized by such beneficial owner, 
director, or officer from any purchase and sale or 
sale and purchase of any such registered equity 
security within a period of less than six months, un-
less such security was acquired in good faith in con-
nection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure 
to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of 
any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, 
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of 
holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing 
the security sold for a period exceeding six 
months.... This subsection shall not be construed 
to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner 
was not such both at the time of the purchase and 
sale or sale and purchase of the security involved, 
nor any transaction or transactions which the Com-
mission by rules and regulations may exempt as not 
comprehended within the purpose of this subsection 
21 As can be seen by comparing H. R. 8720's version of § 15 (b) 
with § 16 (b), supra, n. 2, the differences are relatively minor. For-
mally, the statement of purpose was moved to the front of the stat-
ute and various grammatical changes were made. A significant sub-
stantive change not appa.rent from the faces of the two sections is 
that § 16 (b) beneficial owners are those owning more than 10% of 
a registered security, while H. R. 8720 retained S. 2693's 5% require-
ment, Compare Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16 (a), 15 
U. S. C. § 78p (a), with H. R . 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., § 15 (.a) 
{1934). 
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of preventing the unfair use of information which 
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, 
director, or officer by reason of his relationship to 
the issuer/$ 
Thomas G. Corcoran, a spokesman for S. 2693's draft-
ers, introduced § 15 (b) as forbidding an insider "to 
carry on any short-term speculations [sic] in the stock. 
He cannot, with his inside information get in and out of 
stock within six months." Hearings on H. R. 7852 and 
H. R. 8720 before the House Committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 133 (1934). 
The Court of Appeals concluded that § 15 (b) of S. 2693· 
would have applied only to a beneficial owner who had 
that status before a purchase-sale sequence was initiated, 
506 F. 2d, at 609, and we agree. Foremost appears not to 
contest this point. Petitioner's Opening Brief, at 29. 
The question thus becomes whether H. R. 8720's 
change in the language imposing liability and its addi-
tion of the exemptive provision were intended to change 
S. 2693's result in a purchase-sale sequence by a bene-
ficial owner. We think the legislative history shows no 
such intent. 
S. 2693 and its House counterpart, H. R. 7852, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), met substantial criticism on a 
number of scores, mcluding various provisions of § 15. 
See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before the 
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess., pt. 15 (1934); Hearings on H. R. 7852 and 
H. R. 8720, supra, at 1-623.22 S. 2693 was recast into 
22 Corcoran termed § 15 "one of the most important provisions in 
[S. 2693] ." Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before the Senate 
Commtttee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6555 (1934). 
But most of the proposed legtslat10n was directed at regulation of 
the stock exchanges themselves and certam trading practices that 
were coJlsidered undesirable regardless, of who performed the~Jl. 
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H. R. 8720 to take account of the criticisms that the 
bill's drafters thought valid. Hearings on H. R. 7852 
and H. R. 8720, supra, at 625, 674. The primary sub-
stantive criticism directed at § 15 (b) of S. 2693 was 
that it did not prevent the use of inside information 
to reap a short-term profit in a sale-repurchase situa-
tion. See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, 
at 6557-6558. Criticism was also directed at making 
liability for short-term profits turn on ownership "as 
of record and/or beneficially." See id., at 6914. H. R. 
8720 remedied these ·perceived shortcomings by provid-
ing in § 15 (b): "Any profit realized by such beneficial 
owner, director, or officer from any purchase and sale or 
sale and purchase ... shall inure to and be recoverable 'l by the issuer." 23 The term "such beneficial owner" 
was defined in § 15 (a) to mean one "who is directly or 
indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum 
of any class" of a registered security. 
The structure of the clause imposing liability in the 
revised § 15 (b) did not unambiguously retain S. 2693's 
requirement that beneficial ownership precede a pur-
chase-sale sequence. But we cannot assume easily that 
Congress intended to eliminate the requirement in the 
revised bill. The legislative history reveals that the 
requirement was made clear in the hearings, yet no com-
plaint was made about it. 
See id., at 6465-6466. Most of the hearings, therefore, dealt with 
other problems. 
28 The other major substantive change effected in § 15 (b) by 
H. R. 8720 was the elimination of the potential criminal liability. 
The criminal liability aspect of S. 2693's version of § 15 (b) re-
ceived almost no attention in hearings. But cf. Stock Exchange 
Practices, supra, at 6966. It may have been thought, however, that 
a criminal case could never be made out. The difficulties of proving 
t.he mental elements on which criminal liability turned had already 
led the drafters to eliminate those questions of fact in civil suits to 
recover profits. See n. 26, mfra. 
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The testimony on S. 2693 demonstrates that the draft-
ers were emphatic about the requirement. In introduc-
ing the bill Corcoran pointed out a technical flaw in 
S. 2693's language: "It shall be unlawful for any direc-
tor, officer, or owner of securities, owning as of record 
and/or beneficially more than 5 per centum of any class 
of stock .. .. " It was possible to construe the phrase 
"owning . . . 5 per centum" to apply to directors and 
officers as well as to mere stockholders, so that trading by 
directors and officers would not be subject to § 15 (b) 
if their previous holdings did not exceed 5%. But Cor-
·coran made clear that the requirement of pre-existing 
ownership of the specified percentage applied only to 
beneficial owners. 
"Mr. CoRCORAN. . . . The bill is not very well 
drawn there. It ought to read to cover every direc-
tor, every officer, and every stockholder who owns 
more than 5 percent of the stock. That is the way 
it was intended to read. 
"Mr. MAPES. It ought to read 'and/or bene-
ficially more than 5 percent' followed by 'is a direc-
tor, or officer.' 
"Mr. CoRCORAN. It is badly drawn. We slipped 
on that. It ought to read 'every director and every 
officer' and then 'every big stockholder.'" 
Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, supra, at 133; see 
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6555. 
The legislative record thus reveals that the drafters 
focused directly on the fact that S. 2693 covered a 
short-term purchase-sale sequence by a beneficial owner 
only if his status existed before the purchase, and no 
concern was expressed about the wisdom of this require-
ment. But the explicit requirement was omitted from 
the operative language of the section when it was restruc-
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tured to cover sale-repurchase sequences. In the same 
draft, however, the exemptive provision was added to 
the section. On th1s record we are persuaded that the 
exemptive provision was intended to preserve the re-
quirement of beneficial ownership before the purchase. 
Later discussions of the present § 16 (b) in the hearings 
are consistent with this interpretation. 24 We hold that, 
m a purchase-sale sequence, a beneficial owner must ac-
count for profits only if he was a beneficial owner "before 
t.hr purchasP.' 2 ~ 
N "Mr PECORA The theory wru:; that the ownership of 5 percent 
of the stock would practically const1tute him an insider, and by vir-
tue of that position he could acqmre confidential information whJCh 
he m1ght use for his own enrichment by trading in the open market, 
against the mterests of the general body of the stockholders. That 
is the main purpose sought to be served." 
Hearmgs on Stock Exchange PractiCes, supra, at 7741. Ferdinand 
Pecora was counsel to the subcomrmttee of the Senate Committee 
em Bankmg and Currency that conducted extensive hearings on 
stock exchange operations prior to the enactment of the Act. He 
was also one of the draftsmen of S. 2693. Heanngs on H. R. 7852 
and H. R. 8720 before the Hon~e Committee on Interstate and 
Fore1gn Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 83 (1934) 
2~ In Relwnce Electric Co., 404 U S. 418, the Court also had. 
occasion to consider the applicatiOn of the exempt1ve proviSion in a 
purchase-sale sequence There Emerson acqmred 13.2% of the 
Rhare!:' of Relinnce's predecessor pursun.nt to a tender offer and 
WJtlun s1x months dispo8cd of 1ts holdings m two sales of 3.24% 
:md 9.96% The Court of Appeals for the E1ghth Circmt held that 
rhc purchase, by wh1ch Emerson became a beneficial owner, was 
covered by § 16 (b) But 1t ruled that Emerson was liable for the 
profits on only Its first sale, because ''at the time of .. sale" of 
Lhe· 9.96%, 1t was not a beneficial owner 
The Court granted certwran on Reliance's petition to review this 
constructiOn of ''at the time of sale," and affirmed. The con-
-;tructwn of "at the time of the purchase," however, was not before' 
the Court Iii., at 420-422. Emerson thus remamed liable for 
the 3.24% sale, although 1L would have had no habliity under 
.ruJ.t hald.ln~ tnclav The Court of Appeals fo:r the Seventh C.LrruJ.t. 
',. 
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Additional considerations support our reading of the 
legislative history. 
A 
f9ection 16 (b) imposes a strict pro!'hylactic rule with 
respect to insider, short-swing trading. In Kern County 
Land Co., 411 U.S., at 595, we 11oted: 
61The statute requires the [statutorily defined] in~ 
side, short-swing trader to disgorge all profits 
reahzed on all 'purchases' and 'sales' within the speci-
fied time period, without proof of actual abuse of 
insider information, and without proof of intent to 
profit on the basis of such ipformat~on/' 
In short, this statute imposes liability without fault 
within its narrowly drawn li:rpits,26 
has noted correctly that the construction of "at the time of ... 
sale" in Reliance Electric Co. is superfluous in light of the con-
struction of "at the time of the purchase" adopted by the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which we affinn here. See Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., - F. 2d, at -- n. 12. But the procedural 
posture of Reliance Electric Co. prevented a fu~l O!,>nsideration of 
the meaning of the exemptive provision. See ibid. We express no 
opinion on the interpretation of the provision by which the Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit sought to avoid the apparent 
superfluity of the "at the time of ... sa1e" language. /d., ~t -, 
- ; supra, n. 16. 
26 "Mr. CoRCOR4N. , , . You hold th~ director, irrespective 
of any intention or expectation to sell the security within 6 :Jllonths 
after, because it will be absolutely impossible to prove the existence 
of such intention or expectation, and you have to have this crude 
rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of having 
to prove that the director intended, at the time he bought, to get out 
on a short swing. · 
41Senator GoRE. You infer the intent from the fact. 
"Mr. CoRCORAN. From the fact . 
[Footnote 26 is continued on p. 19] 
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As noted earlier, Foremost recognizes the ambiguity 
of the exemptive provision, but argues that where "alter-
native constructions" of § 16 (b)'s terms are available, 
we should choose the construction that best serves the 
statute's purposes. Foremost relies on statements gener-
ally to this effect in Kern County Land Co., supra, at 
595, and Reliance Electric Co., 404 U. S., at 424. In 
neither of those cases, however, did the Court adopt the 
construction that would have imposed liability, thus 
recognizing that serving the congressional purpose does 
r 
not require resolving every ambiguity in favor of liabil-
ity under § 16 (b). We reiterate that nothing sug-
gests that the construction urged by Foremost would 
serve better to further congressional purposes. Indeed, 
the legislative history of § 16 (b) indicates that by add-
ing the exemptive provision Congress deliberately ex-
pressed a contrary choice.. But even if the legislative' 
record were more ambiguous, we would hesitate to adopt 
Foremost's construction. It is inappropriate to reach 
the harsh result of imposing § 16 (b)'s liability without 
·fault on the basis of unclear language. If Congress 
wishes to impose such liability, we must assume it will 
do so expressly or by unmistakable inference. · 
It IS not irrelevant that Congress itself limited care-
fully the liability imposed by § 16 (b). See Reliance 
Electric Co., supra, at 422-425. Even an insider 
"Senator KEAN. Suppose he got stuck in something else, and he 
had to sell? 
"Senator BARKLEY. All he would get would be what he put into it. 
He would get his original investment. 
"Mr. CoRCORAN. He would get his money out, but the profit goes 
to the corporation. 
"Senator KEAN. Suppose he had to selL 
"Mr. CoRCORAN. Let him get out what he put in, but give thtt 
corporation the profit." 
Hea~:ings on Stock Exchange· Practices, supra, at 6556-6557, 
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may trade freely without incurring the statutory liability 
if, for example, he spaces his transactions at intervals 
greater than six months. When Congress ha.s so recog~ 
nized the need to limit carefully the "arbitrary and 
sweeping coverage" of§ 16 (b), Bershad v. McDonough, 
428 F. 2d 69'3, 696 (CA7 1970), cert. denied, 40d U. S. 
992 (1971), courts should not be qmck to determirte that, 
despite an acknowledged ambiguity, Congress intended 
the section to cover a particular transaction. 
B 
Our construction of § 16 (b) also is supported by the 
distinction Congress recognized between short-term trad-
ing by mere stockholders and such trading by directors 
and officers. The legislative discourse revealed that Con-
gress thought that all short-swing trading by directors 
and officers was vulnerable to abuse because of their 
intimate involvement in corporate affairs. But trading 
by mere stockholders wa.s viewed as being subject to abuse 
only when the size of their holdings afforded the potential 
for access to corporate mformation.27 These different 
perceptions simply reflect the realities of corporate life. 
11 This distinction is especially evident in the following exchange, 
directed to the reporting reqmrements imposed by § 15 (a) of 
. 2693 on beneficial owners 
"Senator KEAN. Suppose a man is not a director at all and does 
not want to be a director, and he happens to own 5 percent or buy 
5 percent Do you think you are going to get him to file with the 
exchange all the time JUSt the number of shares he has? 
"Mr CoRCORAN. 1 thmk so, sir. 
"Senator KEAN. I think it is all right to apply it to a director or 
officer, but I think to reqmre the ordinary mvestor--
''Mr. CoRcoRAN , Five percent IS a lot in a modern corporation. 
Many corporations are controlled by 5 percent or 10 percent. 
"Senator KEAN They may own It or they may sell it. This ap-
:ri>liE'S to !lll corporatiOns 11nd you are getting down to the point wher~ 
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It would not be consistent with this perceived distinc-
tion to impose liability on the basis of a purchase made 
when the percentage of stock ownership requisite to in-
sider status had not been acquired. To be sure, the 
possibility does exist that one who becomes a beneficial 
owner by a purchase will sell on the basis of information 
attained by virtue of his newly acquired holdings. But 
the purchase itself was not one posing dangers that Con-
gress considered intolerable, since it was made when the 
purchaser owned no shares or less than the percentage 
deemed necessary to make one an insider.28 Such a stock-
holder is more analogous to the stockholder who never 
owns more than 10% and IS thereby excluded entirely 
you are interfering with the individual a good deal there. I agree 
with you with respect to the officers and directors. 
"Mr. CoRCORAN. A stockholder owning 5 percent is as much an 
insider as an officer or director. Whether he is a titular director or 
not, he normally is, as a practical matter of fact, a director. 
"Senator KEAN He might not be." 
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6556. The dis-
tinctiOn is also reflected m the discussion of the technical flaw in 
S 2693 See id., at 6555; Hearmgs on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, 
supra, at 133 SE'e also Hearmgs on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, 
at 7741-7743 
2 A Thus, accordmg to the presumption of the statute, the pur-
chaser did not have access to mside mformation in making the 
purchase. It should be noted further that as a matter of practicali-
ties the crumal pomt in the acqwsition of securities is not the tech-
nical "purchase," but rather the decisiOn t<> make an acquisition. 
In the case of an acqUisitiOn of a large block of a corpora-
tion's stock, that decision may precede the "purchase" by a con-
siderable period of time. A prudent mvestor will want to investi-
gate all available mformat10n on the corporation. Such an investor 
also may need time to finance the purchase, and may wish to 
effectuate purchases without mfiuencmg the market price. These 
realities emphasize that the acqUisition decision by a beneficial 
owner normally will occur well m advance of the event that is 
presumed to afford arces..'> to inside information. 
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from the operation of . 16 (b), than to a director or offi-
cer whose every purchase and sale is covered by the stat-
ute. While th1s reasoning might not compel our con~ 
struction of the exemptive provision, it explains why 
Congress may have seen fit to draw the line it did. Cf. 
Adler v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840, 845 (CA2 1959). 
c 
Section 16 (b)'s scope, of course, is not affected by 
whether alternative sanctions might inhibit the abuse of 
inside information. Congress, however, has left some 
problems of the abuse of inside information to other 
remedies. These sanctions a1leviate concern that ordi-
nary investors are unprotected against actual abuses of 
inside information in transactions not covered by 
§ 16 (b). For example, Congress has passed general 
antifraud statutes that sanction abusive practices by 
insiders. See Securities Act of 1933, § 17 (a), 48 Stat. 
84, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a); Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, § 10 (b), 15 U. S, C. § 78j (b) ; 3 L. Loss, supra, 
n. 11, 1423-1429, 1442-1445. Today an investor who 
· can show harm from the actual use of material inside 
;information may have recourse, in particular, to § 10 (b) 
and Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1975).29 It . 
29 Rule 10b-5 has been held to embrace evils that Foremost urges its 
construction of § 16 (b) IS necessary to prevent. The Rule has been 
applied to trading by one who acquired inside information in the 
course of negotiations with a corporation, such as the negotiations 
for Provident's purchase of the Foremost debentures. Van Alstyne, 
Noel & Co., 43 S. E. C. 1080 (1969), 3 L. Loss, supra, n. 11, at 1451-
1452. And a stockholder tradmg on information not generally 
known has been held subJect to the sanctions of the Rule. Shapiro 
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smtth, Inc., 495 F. 2d 228 (CA2 
'1974) ; SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833 (CA2 1968), 
cert. demed, 394 U. S 967 (1969) The liability of insiders who 
"t1p' others, SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F . 2d 1301 (CA2), 
cert. denied, 404 U . S 1005 (1971), may reduce the threat that 
'benefieial Qwners not t.hemselve~ represented on the boa,rd of direc-
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also was thought that § 16 (a)'s publicity requirement 80 
would afford mdirect protectiOn against some potential 
misuses of inside information.31 See Hearings on H. R . 
7852 and H. R. 8720, supra, at 134-135; H. Rep. No. 
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (to accompany H. R. 9323, 
tors will be able to acquire inside information from officers and 
directors. 
80 Section 16 (a), 15 U S. C. § 78p (a) provides : 
"Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial 
owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity secu-
rity (other than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant 
to sectiOn 78l of th1s title, or who is a director or an officer of the 
issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of 
such security on a natiOnal secunties exchange or by the effective 
date of a registratiOn statement filed pursuant to section 78l (g) 
of this title, or within ten days after he becomes such beneficial 
owner, director, or officer, a statement with the Commission (and, 
if such security is registered on a national securities exchange, 
also with the exchange) of the amount of all equity securities of 
such Issuer of which he is the beneficial owner, and within ten days 
after the close of each calendar month thereafter, if there has been 
a change m such ownership during such month, shall file with the 
CommissiOn (and if such security is registered on a national securi-
ties exchange, shall also file with the exchange), a statement indi-
catmg his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such 
changes in h1s ownership as have occurred during such calendar 
month 
3' The drafters clea.rly thought that § 16 (a) would help deter 
abuses not covered by § 16 (b) . 
"[Mr. Corcoran.] [S]ection 15 (a), requires every director, officer, 
ot principal holder of any securities listed on an exchange to file 
with the exchange and with the commission a statement of how 
many shares he owns and to file that statement at the end of each 
month to show whether there has been any change in his position 
durmg the month. That is to prevent the insider from taking ad-
vantage of mformat10n to sell or buy shares ahead of the release of 
information to the public about the company." 
Thesr rrmarks were addressed to S 269~ Hearings on H R. 7852: 
:and H. a 8720, 81tpral .a.t 132. 
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73d Cong., 2d ess., passed by the House, May 7, 19341 
without the present§ 16 (b)) . 
v 
We must still consider briefly Foremost's contention 
that the "before the purchase" construction renders 
other enactments of Congress unnecessary and conflicts 
with the interpretation of § 16 (b) by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. 
Foremost and amicus Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing 
Co. pomt to §§ 16 (d) and 16 (e) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. 
§§ 78p (d), (e), as congr~ssional actions that would not 
have been necessary unless one selling the securities 
the acquisition of which made him a beneficial owner is 
liable under § 16 (b). Section 16 (d), in part, exempts 
from § 16 (b) certain transactions by a securities "dealer 
in the ordinary course of his business and incident to 
the establishment or maintenance by him of a primary 
or secondary market." 82 Section 16 (e) provides an 
exemption for certam "foreign or domestic arbitrage 
a2 Section 16 (d), 15 U. S. C. § 78p (d), provides: 
"The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall not 
apply to any purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, and the pro-
visions of subsection (c) of this section shall not apply to any sale, 
or an equity secunty not then or theretofore held by him in an Ill-
vestment account, by a dealer in the ordinary course of his business 
and inCident to the establishment or mamtenance by him of a pri-
mary or secondary market (otherwise than on a national securities 
exchange or an exchange exempted from registration under section 
78e of this title) for such security. The Commission may, by such 
rules and regulations as it deems necessary or appropriate in the 
pubhc interest, define and prescribe terms and conditions with re-
spect to securities held in an investment account and transactions 
Qlade in the ordmary course of business and incident to the estab-
lishment or maintenance of a primary or secondary market." 
' Dealer ' L.~ definrrl m § :3 (a) (5) of the Act, J5 U S C. § 78c (a) (5), 
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transactions." 83 They argue similarly that the SEC's 
Rule 16b-2, 17 CFR § 240.16b~2 (1975) , is unnecessary 
if our construction of § 16 (b) is correct. Rule 16b-2 
exempts from § 16 (b) specified transactions "in connec-
tion with the distribution of a substantial block of 
securities." 34 
3 8 Section 16(e), 15 u. s. c. §78p(e), provides: 
"The provisions of this section shall not apply to foreign or 
domestic arbitrage transactions unless made in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the Commission may adopt in order to 
carry out the purposes of this section." 
34 Section 16 (b) provides in its final clause that it shall not 
cover "any transaction or transactions which the Commission by 
rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the 
purpose of this subsection " 15 U. S. C. § 78p (b) . Rule 16b- 2 
provides: 
" (a) Any transaction of purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, 
of a security which is effected in connection with the distribution of a 
substantial block of securities shall be exempt from the provisions 
of section 16 (b) of the Act, to the extent specified in this § 240.16b-
2, as not comprehended within the purpose of said section, upon the 
following conditions : 
" ( 1) The person effecting the transaction is engaged in the busi-
ness of distributing securities and is participating in good faith, in 
the ordinary course of such business, in the distribution of such 
block of securit ies; 
" (2 ) The security involved in the transaction is (i) a part of such 
block of secunt1es and is acquired by the person effecting the t rans-
action, with a view to the distribution thereof, from the issuer or 
other person on whose behalf such securities are being distributed 
or from a person who is participating in good faith in the distribu-
t ion of such block of securit ies, or (ii) a security purchased in good 
faith by or for the account of the person effecting the transaction 
for the purpose of stabilizing the market price of securities of the 
class being distnbuted or to cover an over-allotment or other short 
position created m connectiOn wtth such distribution; and 
" (3) Other persons not within the purview of section 16 (b) of 
t he Act are participating in the distribution of such block of securi-
ties on terms at least as favorable as those on which such person is 
p articipatmg and to an extent at least equal to the aggregate par. 
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We do not consider these provisions to be inconsistent 
with our holding. Nothing on their faces would make 
them applicable to one selling the securities the pur-
chase of which made him a beneficial owner. But the 
exemptions would be necessary to protect stockholders 
already qualifying as beneficial owners when they pur-
chased 35 and they would, of course, apply to transactions 
by directors and officers as well. 
Foremost and the amicus also remind us that the 
interpretation of the exemptive provision for which they 
contend has been adopted by the SEC in the past. See 
Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, at 22-27, Reliance 
Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418 
(1972). But the Commission has not appeared as an 
amicus in this case. In any event, even if the Commis-
sion's views have not changed we would not afford them: 
the deference to which the views of the agency adminis-
tering a statute are usually entitled, for in Reliance 
ticipation of all persons exempted from the provisions of section 
16 (b) of the Act by this § 240.16b-2. However, the performance· 
of the functions of manager of a distributing group and the receipt 
of a bona fide payment for performing such functions shall not pre-
clude an exemption which would otherwise be. available under this 
§ 240.16b-2. 
"(b) The exemption of a transaction pursuant to this § 240.16b-2 ' 
with respect to the participation therein of one party thereto shall 
not render such transaction exempt with respect to participation of 
any other party therein unless such other party also meets the · 
conditions of this § 240.16b-2." 
3 ~ The press releasr accompanying the SEC's initial promulgation of' 
Rule 16b-2 demonstrates this point. It explained: "The new Rule 
[16b-2] affords an exemption for certain cases by providing that 
underwriters who happen to have a member of their firm also an 
officer or director of the issuer or one of its principal stockholders 
who are regularly engaged in the business of buying and selling· 
securities need not account to the company for profits realized from 
purchases and sales made in the distribution of a security for the." 
company . . .. " SEC Release No. 34-26.4, June 8, 1935. 
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Electric Co., 404 U. S., at 425-427, the Court rejected the 
basic theory on which the SEC based its interpretation 
of the exemptive provision. Our re-examination of the 
exemptive provision confirms the view that the SEC's 
theory did not reflect the intent of Congress. 
The judgment is 
Affirmed. 
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This case presents an unresolved issue under § 16 (b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Act), 48 
Stat. 896, 15 U. S. C. § 78p (b) . That section of the 
Act was designed to prevent a corporate director or officer 
or "the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum" of a 
corporation 1 from profiteering through short-swing secu-
rities transactions on the basis of inside information. It 
provides that a corporation ma.y capture for itself the 
profits realized on a purchase and sale, or sale and pur-
chase, of its securities within six months by a director, offi-
cer, or beneficial owner 2 Section 16 (b)'s last sentence, 
'1 The corporate "insiders" whose trading is regulated by § 16 (b) 
are defined in § 16 (a) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78p (a), as 11 [e]very 
person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more 
than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than 
111\ exempted security) which is registered pursuant to section 78l of 
this t,itle, or who is a director or an officer of the iS&uer of such 
security!' 
~ Section 16 (b) , 15 U, S. C. § 78p (b), n'B.ds in full : 
"For t.he purpose of preventmg the unfair use of information 
which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, 
ot officer hy l'Pason of his relat.mnsh1p t,o the issuer, any profit 
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however, provides that It "shall not be construed to cover 
any transactwn where such beneficial owner was not 
such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale 
and purchase, of the security mvolved .. .. " The ques~ 
tion presented here IS whether a person purchasing securi-
ties that put his holdings above the 10% level is a bene-
ficial owner <~at the time of the purchase" so that he must 
account for profits realized on a sale of those securities 
within six months. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit answered this question in the nega-
tive. 506 F . 2d 601 (1974) We affirm. 
I 
Respondent, Provident Secunties Co., was a personal 
holding company. In 1968 Provident decided tentatively 
to liquidate and dissolve, and it engaged an agent to find 
realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and pur-
·chase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted 
secunty) witlun any period of less than six months, unless such 
security was acqmred m good fmth in connectwn w1th a debt pre-
viously contracted, shall mure to and be recoverable by the issuer, 
irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, 
d1rector, or officer m entering mto such transaction of holding the 
security purchased or of not repurchasmg the security sold for a 
period exceedmg SIX months. Smt to recover such profit may be 
inst1tuted at law or m eqmty m any court of competent jurisdiction 
by the issuer, or by the owner of any secunty of the issuer in the 
name and in behalf of the issuer 1f the issuer shall fail or refuse to 
brmg such smt withm sixty days after request or shall fail diligently 
to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought 
more than two years after the date such profit was realized. This 
subsectiOn shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such 
beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and 
sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any trans-
actiOn or transactions whiCh the Commission by rules and regula-
twns may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this, 
<>ttb. ectlon. '' 
1' 
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a purchaser for its assets. Petttioner, Foremost-McKes .. 
on, Inc., emerged as a potential purchaser, but extensive 
negotiations were required to resolve a disagreement over 
the nature of the consideration Foremost would pay. 
Provident wanted cash m order to facilitate its dis-
solution, while Foremost wanted to pay with its own 
securities. 
Eventually a compromise was reached, and Provi-
dent and Foremost executed a purchase agreement 
embodying their deal on September 25, 1969. The 
agreement provided that Foremost would buy two-thirds 
of Provident's assets for $4.25 million in cash and $49.75 
million in Foremost convertible subordinated debentures.8 
The agreement further provided that Foremost would 
register under the Securities Act of 1933 $25 million in 
principal amount of the debentures and would participate 
in an underwriting agreement by which those debentures 
would be sold to the public. At the closing on October 
15, 1969, Foremost delivered to Provident the cash and a 
$40 million debenture that was subsequently exchanged 
for two debentures in the principal amounts of $25 mil-
lion and $15 million. Foremost also delivered a $2.5 mil-
lion debenture to an escrow on the closing date. On 
October 20 Foremost delivered to Provident a $7.25 mil-
lion debenture representing the balance of the purchase 
price. These debentures were immediately convertible 
into more than 10% of Foremost's outstanding common 
stock. 
On October 21 Provident, Foremost, and a group of 
underwriters executed an underwriting agreement to be 
closed on October 28. The agreement provided for sale 
to the underwriters of the $25 million debenture. On 
!i The debentures were issued expressly to acquire Provident·~ 
11}.SSefis9 and all of them were used for that purpose. 
]' 
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October 24 Provident distributed the $15 million and 
$7.25 million debentures to its stockholders, reducing the 
amount of Foremost common into which the company's 
holdings were convertible to less than 10%. On October 
28 the closing under the underwriting agreement was 
accomplished.4 Provident thereafter distributed the cash 
proceeds of the debenture sale to its stockholders and 
dissolved, 
Provident's holdings in Foremost debentures as of 
October 20 were large enough to make it a beneficial 
owner of Foremost Withm the meaning of§ 16.~ Having 
acquired and disposed of these securities within six 
months, Provident faced the prospect of a suit by Fore-
most to recover any profits realized on the sale of the 
debenture to the underwriters. Provident therefore sued 
for a declaration that it was not liable to Foremost under 
§ 16 (b). The District Court granted summary judg-
ment for Provident and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Provident's principal argument below for nonliability 
was based on Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., 411 U. S. 582 (1973). There we held 
that an "unorthodox transaction" m securities that did 
not present the possibility of speculative abuse of inside 
4 The underwriters delivered $25,366,666.66 in ca.sh to Foremost. 
'That amount represented a purcha.se price of 1011,4% of the 
principal amount of the debPnture ($25,312,500.00) plus interest 
accrued from October 15 to the date of closing ($54,166 .66) . The 
amount of profit rPahzed by Prov1dent has never been established 
~ A beneficml owner IS one who owns more than 10% of an "equity 
secunty" reg1stered pursuant to § 12 of the Act, 15 U S. C. § 78l. 
See n. 1, supra. The owner of debentures convert1ble mto more than 
10% of a corporatiOn's reg1stered common stock 1s a benefiCial owner 
Withm the meanmg of the Act. SecuntJes Exchange Act of 1934, 
§§3 (a)(lO), (11), 15ll . S C. §§78c (a)(lO), (11); Rule 16a-2 (b) , 
17 CFR § 240.16a-2 (b) (1975) . Foremost.'s common stock was 
re~istered , thus ProvldPnt' holdmgs made 1t a beneficial owner. 
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information was not a ' sale" within the meaning of 
§ 16 (b) . Provident contended that its reluctant accept-
ance of Foremost debentures in exchange for its assets 
was an ttunorthodox transaction" not presenting the pos-
sibility of speculative abuse and therefore was not a 
ttpurchase" within the meaning of § 16 (b). Although 
the District Court's pre-Kern County opinion had 
adopted this type of analysis, 331 F. Supp. 787 (ND 
Cal. 1971), the Court of Appeals rejected it, reasoning 
that Provident's acquisition of the debentures was not 
ttunorthodox" and that the circumstances did not pre-
clude the possibility of speculative abuse.. 506 F. 2d, at 
604-605. 
The Court of Appeals then considered two theories 
of nonliability based on § 16 (b)'s exemptive provision: 
"This subsectiOn shall not be construed to cover any 
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such 
both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale 
and purchase ... / 1 The first was Provident's argu-
ment that it was not a beneficial owner "at the time 
of ... sale." After the October 24 distribution of some 
debentures to stockholders, the debentures held by Provi-
dent were convertible into less than 10% of Foremost's 
outstanding common stock. Provident contended that 
its sale to the underwriters did not occur until the under-
writing agreement was closed on October 28. If this 
were the case, the sale would not have been covered by 
§ 16 (b) , since Provident would not have been a bene-
ficial owner ttat the time of sale." 6 The Court of 
Appeals rejected thi~ argument because it found that 
6 This contention was based on Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson 
Electnc Co , 404 U S. 418 ( 1972) There the Court held that a sale 
made after a former heneficml owner had already reduced Its holdings 
bf"low 10% was exempted from § 16 (b) by the phrase "at the tune· 
Q ••• Sl).le" m the ~xempt1vP prov1s1on. See n . 25, infra. 
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the sale occurred on October 21 upon execution of the 
underwriting agreement.1 
The Court of Appeals then turned to the theory of 
nonliability based on the exemptive provision that we 
consider here.8 It held that in a purchase-sale sequence 
7 Section 3 (a) (14) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a) (14), defines 
"sale" and "sell" to include "any contract to sell or otherwise 
dispose of." But Provident argued that the October 28 closing date 
was the day of sale because contractual conditions prevented the 
contract from becoming binding until closing. The underwriting 
agreement provided in paragraph 7: 
"7. Termination of Agreement: This agreement may be termi-
nated, pnor to the time the Registration Statement becomes effec-
tive, by you or by any group of Underwriters which has agreed 
hereunder to purchase in the aggregate at least 50% of the Deben-
tures, if, in your judgment or in the judgment of any such group 
of Underwriters, there shall have occurred a material unfavorable 
change in political, financial or economic conditions generally." 
(App. A134 .) 
And in paragraph 5, the agreement provided: "The several obliga-
tions of the Underwriters hereunder are subject to the following 
conditions: 
" (h) That, between the time of execution of this agreement and 
the time of purchase, there sha.ll occur no material and unfavorable 
change, financial or otherwise (other than as referred to in the 
Registration Statement and the Prospectus), in the condition of the 
Company and Its consolidated subsidianes as a whole; and the Com-
pany will, at the time of purchase, deliver to you a certificate of 
two of its executive officers to the foregoing effect." (App. A134.) 
The Court of Appeals agreed that conditions to performance 
might prevent a contract from being a "sale" prior to closing. But 
it ruled that all sigmficant conditions here were satisfied when the 
registratwn statement required by paragraph 7 became effective on 
0ctober 21, the day the underwritmg agreement was executed. The 
court also found that after October 21, Provident was no longer 
subJect to the risk of a declme in the market for Foremost's stock, 
506 F. 2d, at 607 For reasons not apparent from its opinion, 
the court did not address the possibility that paragraph 5 (h) left 
'f?rovident subJeCt to market nsks See n 8, infra. 
8 Our holding on this ISSUE' dispose>; of thi~:> case by precluding: 
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the phrase "at the time of the purchase/' "must be 
construed to mean prior to the time when the decision 
to purchase is made.n 506 F . 2d, at 614. Thus, although 
Provident became a beneficial owner of Foremost by ac-
quiring the debentures, it was not a beneficial owner "at 
the time of the purchase." Accordingly, the exemptive 
provision prevf'nted any § 16 (b) liability on Provident's 
part. 
II 
The meaning of the exemptive provision has been 
disputed since § 16 (b) was first enacted. The discus-
sion has focused on the application of the provision to 
a purchase-sale sequence, the principal disagreement 
being whether "at the time of the purchase" means 
"before the purchase'1 or "immediately after the pur-
chase." 9 The difference in construction is determina-
tive of a beneficial owner's liability in cases such as 
Provident's where such owner sells within six months of 
purchase the securities the acquisition of which made him 
a beneficial owner. The commentators divided immedi-
ately over which construction Congress intended/0 and 
they remain divided.11 The courts of appeals also are 
in disagreement over the issue, 
any liability on Provident's part. We therefore do not consider 
whether the Court of Appeals properly rejected Provident's argu-
ments based on Kern County and on the sale not having occurred 
unt!l October 28 
9 The alternative construction to "before the purchase" is some-
times denommated "simultaneously w1th the purchase," as it was 
by the Court of Appeals 506 F. 2d, at 608 
1° Compare C. Meyer, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 
112 (1934) (adoptmg a "before" construction), with Seligman, 
Problems Under the Secunties Exchange Act, 21 Va. L. Rev. 1, 
19-20 ( 1934) (adopting an "immediately after" construction). 
11 Compare, e. g., Munter, Section 16 (b) of the Securities Ex~ 
chanJ?;e Act of 1934 An AlternatlVe to "Burning Down the Bam 
• 
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The question of what Congress intended to accom-
plish by the exemptive provision in a purchase-sale 
sequence came to a court of appeals for the first time 
in Stella v. Graham-Patge Motors Corp., 232 F. 2d 299 
(CA2), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 831 (1956). There the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit without discus-
sion, but over a dissent, affirmed the District Court's 
adoption of the "immediately after the purchase" con-
struction. That court had been impelled to this construc-
tion at least m part by concern over what the phrase 
"at the time of . , purchase" means in a sale-repurchase 
sequence, reasoning 
'If the ['before the purchase'] construction urged 
by [Graham-Paige] IS placed upon the exemption 
provisiOn, It would be possible for a person to pur-
chase a large block of stock, sell it out until his 
ownership was reduced to less than 10%, and then 
repeat the process, ad infinitum." 104 F. Supp. 
957, 959 (SDNY 1952) 
The District Court may have thought that "before 
the purchase" seemed an unlikely construction of the 
exemptive provisiOn m a sale-repurchase sequence, so It 
could not be the proper construction in a purchase-sale 
sequence.12 The Stella construction of the exemptive 
m Order to K1ll the Rats, 52 Corneit L. Q. 69, 74-75 (1966), 
Note, Ins1der L1ab1hty for Short-Swmg Profits : The Substance and 
Funct10n of the Pragmatic Approach, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 592, 616-
619 (1974), Comment, 9 Stan L. Rev 582 (1957) (adopting a 
"before" construction), w1th, e. g., 2 L Loss, Securities Regulation 
1060 (2d ed, 1961) (favoring an "immed1ately after" construction). 
The wmght of the commentary appears to be w1th the "before the 
purchase" construction The ALI Federal Secunties Code (Tenta-
twe Draft No.2, 1973), § 1413 (d) and Comment (6), cons1ders the 
"1mmedw.tely after the purchase" construction "questionable" on the 
statutorv language and propose:; an amendment to codify the result. 
12 Stella was dec1ded he fore § 10 (b) of the Act, 15 U S C. 
Y 7 1 (b) 11!-i •mplrmrnten h, Rnl<" IOb-5, 17 CFR ~ 240.10b-fi 
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provision has been adhered to in the econd Circuit, 
Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F. 2d 348, 355-356 
(CA2), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 854 (1970); 13 Perine v. 
William Norton & Co., 509 F. 2d 114, 118 (CA2 1974), 
and adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit. Emerson Electnc Co. v. Reliance Electric Co., 
434 F. 2d 918,923-924 (CAS 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 
404 U. S. 418 (1972) .14 But in none of the foregoing 
cases did the court examine critically the legislative 
history of § 16 (b) . 
The Court of Appeals considered this case against the 
background, sketched above, of ambiguity in the perti-
nent statutory language, continued disagreement among 
the commentators, and a perce1ved absence in the rela-
tively few decided cases of a full consideration of the 
purpose and legislative history of § 16 (b). The court 
found unpersuasive the rationales offered in Stella and 
its progeny for the "immediately after the purchase" 
constructwn. It noted that construing the provision to 
require that benefimal-ownership status exist before the 
(1975), developed fully as a private remedy for actual abuses 
of ms1de mformat10n . See 6 L Loss, supra, n. 11, at 3559. 
The sale-repurchase abuse that worried the Stella court would 
now mv1te § 10 (b) habJ!Jtv, see n 29, m/ra, as well as possible ha-
bJhty under § 16 (b) 
13 To ratiOnalize its view as applied to the purchase-sale sequence, 
the court in Newmark wrote 
" [T]he presumed a<:cess to [mside] information resulting from 
[the] purchase [that make:s one a benefiCial owner] provides him 
w1th an opportunity, not available to the mvesting public, to sell 
h1s shares at the moment most advantageous to him. Thus, a 
purchase of shares which makes the buyer an insider creates an 
opportunity for the type of speculative abuse the statute was 
enacted to prevent 425 F 2d, at 356 
14 When th1s Court dectded Relwnce Electnc Co., 404 U. S. 418, 
the question presented here was no longer m the case. See n 25, 
infra,, 
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purchase in a purchase-sale sequence would not fore-
close an "immediately after the purchase" construction 
in a sale-repurchase sequence.15 506 F. 2d, at 614--615. 
More sigmficantly, the Court of Appeals challenged 
directly the premise of the earlier cases that a "before 
the purchase" construction m a purchase-sale sequence 
would allow abuses Congress mtended to abate. The 
court reasoned that in § 16 (b) Congress intended to 
reach only those beneficial owners who both bought and 
sold on the basis of inside information, which was pre-
sumptively available to them only after they became 
tatutory "insiders " 506 F . 2d, at 608-614.16 
III 
A 
The general purpose of Congress in enacting § 16 (b) 
is well known. See Kern County Land Co., 411 U. S., 
at 591-592; Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric 
Co., 404 U. S. 418, 422 (1972), and the authorities 
16 The view of the Court of Appeals that "at the time of" may 
mean different thmgs m different contexts is not uruque. See Allis-
Chalmers Mfg . Co v Gulf & Western lndustrtes, - F. 2d -
(1975), ccrt. penrlmg, No. 75-890 Wr Pxpres;; no opimon here on 
this VIeW 
16 Shortly before this case was argued the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circmt reachPd the same conclusion on somewhat dif-
ferent analysis. Allzs-Chalmers Mfg . Co., - F. 2d, at -. The 
court apparently would have reached 1ts result even in the absence 
of the exemptive prov1s1on, reasoning that § 16 (b) covers no 
transactwns by any § 16 (b) msiders who were not ms1ders 
before their mitlal transaction - F. 2d, at -. Since we rely 
on the exemptive proviSion, we intimate no view on the proper 
analysis of a case where a d1rector or officer makes an mitial trans-
action before obt::nnmg ms1der status. See, e. g., Adler v. 
Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840 (CA2 1959) Nor do we have occasion here 
to assess the approach taken by the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh C1rcmt to the PxemptJVf' provJSJOn. -· F 2d, at - & 
n. l 3. Sf'e n 2.'i m fm. 
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eited therein. Congress recognized that insiders may 
have access to mformation about their corporations 
not available to the rest of the investing public. By 
trading on this informatiOn, these persons could reap 
profits at the expense of less well informed investors. In 
§ 16 (b) Congress sought to "curb the evils of insider 
trading [by] . . . taking the profits out of a class of 
transactions in which the possibility of abuse was be-
lieved to be intolerably great." Reliance Electric Co., 
supra, at 422. It accomplished this by defining directors, 
officers, and beneficial owners as those presumed to have 
access to inside mformation 17 and enacting a fiat rule 
that a corporation could recover the profits these insiders 
made on a pair of security transactions within six 
months.1 8 
Foremost points to this purpose, and invokes the obser-
vation in Reliance Electric Co. that "where alternative 
constructions of the terms of § 16 (b) are possible, those 
terms are to be given the construction that best serves 
the congressiOnal purpose of curbing short-swing trading 
by corporate insiders." 404 U. S., at 424 (footnote 
omitted) . From these premises Foremost argues that 
the Court of Appeals' construction of the exemptive pro-
vision must be rejected 19 because it makes § 16 (b) in-
11 The purpose of § 16 (b) is stated explicitly to be "preventing 
the unfa1r use of information which may have been obtained by 
such benefiCial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relation-
hip to the issuer " 15 U S. C. § 78p (b) 
18 Sect10n 16 (b) stat~s that any short-swmg profits "shall inure 
to and be recoverable by the 1ssuer, irrespective of any mtention 
on the part of such benefic1al owner, d1rector, or officer m entering 
into such transaction of holdmg the secur1ty purchased or of not 
repurchasmg the secunty sold for a penod exceeding six months.'~ 
15 u s c. § 78p (b). 
19 In lieu of the Court of Appeals' construction, Foremost offers a 
coostructHm whPteby any purchaRes {lrior to the purchase making: 
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applicable to some possible abuses of inside information 
that the statute would reach under the Stella construe~ 
twn 20 We find this approach unsatisfactory in its 
focus on Situations that § 16 (b) may not reach rather 
than on the language and purpose of the exemptive pro-
VISion itself. Foremost's approach also invites an imposi-
tion of § 16 (b)'s liability without fault that is not 
consistent with the premises upon which Congress en-
acted th ection. 
B 
The exemptive provision, which applies only to bene-
ficial owners and not to other statutory insiders, must 
have been included in § 16 (b) for a purpose. Although 
the extensive legislative history of the Act is bereft 
of any explicit explanation of Congress' intent, see Re-
liance Electric Co., supra, at 424, the evolution of§ 16 (b) 
from its mitial proposal through passage does shed sig-
nificant light on the purpose of the exemptive provision. 
The original version of what would develop into the 
Act was S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).. It pro-
vtded in § 15 (b)· 
"It shall be unlawful for any director, officer, 
or owner of securities, owning as of record and/or 
beneficially more than 5 per centum of any class of 
tock of any issuer, any security of which is registered 
on a national securities exchange--
" ( 1) To purchase any such registered security with 
the mtention or expectation of selling the same se-
curity within six months; and any profit made by 
uch person on any transaction m such a registered 
ecurity extending over a period of less than six 
one a benefiCial owner are exempted from the operation of 16 (h) . 
See 2 L Loss, supra, n 11, at 1060 
20 Newmark describes a possible abuse of inside information covered 
onl nndPr thA Stella conRtruction. See n. l3, supra. 
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months shall inure to and be recoverable by the is-
suer, irrespective of any intention or expectation on 
his part in entering into such transaction of holding 
the security purchased for a period exceeding six 
month .'' 
In the next version of the legislation, H. R. 8720, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), § 15 (b) read almost identically 
to § 16 (b) as it was eventually enacted.21 
"Any profit realized by such beneficial owner, 
director, or officer from any purchase and sale or 
sale and purchase of any such registered equity 
security withm a period of less than six months, un-
less such security was acquired in good faith in con-
nection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure 
to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of 
any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, 
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of 
holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing 
the security sold for a period exceeding six 
months . . . , This subsection shall not be construed 
to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner 
was not such both at the time of the purchase and 
sale or sale and purchase of the security involved, 
nor any transaction or transactions which the Com-
mission by rules and regulations may exempt as not 
comprehended within the purpose of this subsection 
21 As can be seen by comparmg H R. 8720's version of § 15 (b) 
with § 16 (b), supra, n 2, the dlfferences are relatively minor. For-
mally, the statement of purpose was moved to the front of the stat-
ute and vanous grammatical changes were made. A significant sub-
tanttve change not apparent from the faces of the two sections is 
that § 16 (b) beneficial owners are those owmng more than 10% of 
a registered security, while H. R. 8720 retained S. 2693 's 5% require-
ment. Compare Secunhes Exchange Act of 1934, § 16 (a), 15 
U S C. § 78p (a) w11h H R 720, 73d C'ong., 2d Sess , § 15 (a) 
( 19~4). 
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of preventing the unfair use of information which 
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, 
director, or officer by reason of his relationship to 
the issuer/ 1 
Thomas G. Corcoran, a spokesman for S. 2693's draft-
ers, introduced § 15 (b) as forbidding an insider "to 
carry on any short-term specu[la]tions in the stock. 
He cannot, with his inside information get in and out of 
stock within six months." Hearings on H. R. 7852 and 
H . R. 8720 before the House Committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 133 (1934). 
The Court of Appeals concluded that § 15 (b) of S. 2693 
would have applied only to a beneficial owner who had 
that status before a purchase-sale sequence was initiated, 
506 F. 2d, at 609, and we agree. Foremost appears not to 
contest this point. Petitioner's Opening Brief, at 29. 
The question thus becomes whether H. R. 8720's 
change in the language imposing liability and its addi-
tion of the exemptive provision were intended to change 
S. 2693's result in a purchase-sale sequence by a bene-
ficial owner. We think the legislative history shows no 
such intent. 
S. 2693 and its House counterpart, H. R. 7852, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), met substantial criticism on a 
number of scores, including various provisions of § 15. 
See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before the 
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess., pt. 15 (1934); Hearings on H. R. 7852 and 
H. R. 8720, supra, at 1-623.22 S. 2693 was recast into 
22 Corcoran termed § 15 "one of the most important provisions in 
[S. 2693] ." Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before the Senate 
Comm1ttee on Bankmg and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6555 (1934). 
But most of the proposed legislation was directed at regulation of 
the stock exchanges themselves and certain trading practices that 
were considered undesirable rcgardles of who performed them. 
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H. R. 8720 to take account of the criticisms that the 
bill's drafters thought valid. Hearings on H. R. 7852 
and H. R. 8720, supra, at 625, 674. The primary sub-
stantive criticism directed at § 15 (b) of S. 2693 was 
that it did not prevent the use of inside information 
to reap a short-term profit in a sale-repurchase situa-
tion. See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, 
at 6557-6558. Criticism was also directed at making 
liability for short-term profits turn on ownership "as 
of record and/or beneficially." See id., at 6914. H. R. 
8720 remedied these perceived shortcomings by provid-
ing in § 15 (b) : "Any profit realized by such beneficial 
owner, director, or officer from any purchase and sale or 
sale and purchase ... shall inure to and be recoverable 
by the issuer." 23 The term "such beneficial owner" 
was defined in § 15 (a) to mean one "who is directly or 
indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum 
of any class" of a registered security. 
The structure of the clause imposing liability in the 
revised § 15 (b) did not unambiguously retain S. 2693's 
requirement that beneficial ownership precede a pur-
chase-sale sequence. But we cannot assume easily that 
Congress intended to eliminate the ~equirement in the 
revised bill. The legislative history reveals that the 
requirement was made clear in the hearings, yet no com-
plaint was made about it. 
See id., at 6465-6466. Most of the hearings, therefore, dealt with 
other problems. 
23 The other major substantive change effected in § 15 (b) by 
H. R. 8720 was the elimination of the potential criminal liability. 
The cnminal liability aspect of S. 2693's version of § 15 (b) received 
almost no attentwn m hearings. But cf. Hearings on Stock Exc?ange 
Practices, supra, at 6966. It may have been thought, however, that 
a cnmmal case could never be made out. The difficulties of proving 
the mental elements on which criminal liability turned had already 
led the drafters to eliminate those questions of fact in civil suits to 
recover profit". SeP n 26, mfra. 
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The testimony on . 2693 demonstrates that the draft-· 
ers were emphatic about the requirement. In introduc-
ing the bill Corcoran pointed out a technical flaw in 
S. 2693's language: "It shall be unlawful for any direc-
tor, officer, or owner of securities, owning as of record 
and/or beneficially more than 5 per centum of any class 
of stock. ... " It was possible to construe the phrase 
"owning . . . 5 per centum" to apply to directors and 
officers as well as to mere stockholders, so that trading by 
directors and officers would not be subject to § 15 (b) 
if their previous holdings did not exceed 5%. But Cor-
coran made clear that the requirement of pre-existing 
ownership of the specified percentage applied only to 
beneficial owners. 
"Mr. CoRCORAN. . . . The bill is not very well 
drawn there. It ought to read to cover every direc-
tor, every officer, and every stockholder who owns 
more than 5 percent of the stock. That is the way 
it was in tended to read. 
"Mr. MAPES. It ought to read 'and/or bene-
ficially more than 5 percent' followed by 'is a direc-
tor, or officer .' 
"Mr. CoRCORAN. It is badly drawn. We slipped 
on that. It ought to read 'every director and every 
officer' and then 'every big stockholder.' " 
Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, supra, at 133; see 
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6555. 
The legislative record thus reveals that the drafters 
focused directly on the fact that S. 2693 covered a 
short-term purchase-sale sequence by a beneficial owner 
only if his status existed before the purchase, and no 
·concern was expressed about the wisdom of this require-
ment. But the explicit requirement was omitted from 
the operative language of the section when it was restruc-
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tured to cover sale-repurchase sequences. In the same 
draft, however, the exemptive provision was added to 
the section. On this record we are persuaded that the 
exemptive provision was intended to preserve the re-
qmrement of beneficial ownership before the purchase. 
Later discussions of the present § 16 (b) in the hearings 
are consistent with this interpretation. 24 We hold that, 
in a purchase-sale sequence, a beneficial owner must ac-
count for profits only if he was a beneficial owner "before 
the purchase '' 25 
u '' Mr. PECORA. The theory was that the ownership of 5 percent 
of the stock would practiCally constitute him an insider, and by vir-
tue of that position he could acquire confidential information which 
he might use for his own ennchment by trading in the open market, 
agamst the mterests of the general body of the stockholders. That 
is· the main purpose sought to be served." 
Hearings on Stock Exchange Pract1ces, supra, at 7741. Ferdinand 
Pecora was counsel to the subcommittee of the Senate Committee 
on Banking and Currency that conducted extensive hearings on 
stock exchange operatiOns prior to the enactment of the Act. He 
was also one of the draftsmen of S. 2693. Hearings on H. R. 7852 
and H. R. 8720 before the House Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 83 (1934). 
2 5 In Relwnce Electnc Co .. 404 U S. 418, the Court also had 
occasiOn to consider the apphcatwn of the exemptive provision in a 
purchase-sale sequence. There Emerson acquired 13.2% of the 
,;hare::s of Reliance's predecessor pursuant to a tender offer and 
w1thm s1x months disposed of 1ts holdmgs in two sales of 3.24% 
and 9.9G% , The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that 
the purchase, by which Emerson became a beneficial owner, was 
covered by § 16 (b) But 1t ruled that Emerson was liable for the 
profits on only 1ts first sale, because "at the tlffie of ... sale" of 
the 9.96%, It was not a beneficial owner. 
The Court granted certwran on Reliance's petitiOn to review this 
constructiOn of "at the tlme of sale," and affirmed. The con-
structiOn of "at the time of the purchase," however, was not before 
the Court. ld., at 420-422 Emerson thus remained liable for 
the 3.24% sale, although It would have had no hab1lity under 
our holdin~ todav Tht> Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
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IV 
Additional considerations support our reading of the 
legislative histor • 
A 
Section 16 (b) imposes a strict prophylactic rule with 
respect to insider, short-swing trading. In Kern County 
Land Co., 411 U. S., at 595, we noted: 
««The statute requires the [statutorily defined] in-
side, short-swing trader to disgorge all profits 
reahzed on all 'purchases' and 'sales' within the speci-
fied time period, without proof of actual abuse of 
insider information, and without proof of intent to 
profit on the basis of such information." 
In short, this statute imposes liability without fault 
within its narrowly drawn limits,28 
has noted correctly that the construction of "at the time of . 
sale" m Reliance Electrtc Co. IS superfluous in light of the con-
struction of "at the time of the purchase" adopted by the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circmt, wh1ch we affirm here. See Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., - F. 2d, at - n. 12. But the procedural 
posture of Reliance Electrtc Co. prevented a full consideration of 
the meanmg of the exempt1ve provisiOn. See ibid. We express no 
opmion on the interpretation of the prov1s1on by which the Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Cmuit sought to avoid the apparent 
superfluity of the "at the time of •. sale" language. Id ., at -, 
-; supra, n. 16. 
26 "Mr CoRCORAN ou hold the director, irrespective 
of any mtentJOn or expectation to sell the security within 6 months 
after, because it will be absolutely impossible to prove the existence 
of such mtenhon or expectatiOn, and you have to have this crude 
rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of having 
to prove that the director intended, at the time he bought, to get out 
on a short swmg 
"Senator GoRE You infer the intent from the fact. 
"M r CoRCORA From the fact 
[FootnotP 26 i11 continued on p 19] 
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As noted earlier, Foremost recognizes the ambiguity 
of the exemptive provision, but argues that where "alter-
native constructions" of § 16 (b)'s terms are available, 
we should choose the construction that best serves the 
statute's purposes. Foremost relies on statements gener-
ally to this effect in Kern County Land Co., supra, at 
595, and Reliance Electric Co., 404 U. S., at 424. In 
neither of those cases, however, did the Court adopt the 
construction that would have imposed liability, thus 
recognizing that serving the congressional purpose does 
not require resolving every ambiguity in favor of liabil-
ity under § 16 (b). We reiterate that nothing sug-
gests that the construction urged by Foremost would 
serve better to further congressional purposes. Indeed, 
the legislative history of § 16 (b) indicates that by add-
ing the exemptive provision Congress deliberately ex-
pressed a contrary choice.. But even if the legislative 
record were more ambiguous, we would hesitate to adopt 
Foremost's construction. It is inappropriate to reach 
the harsh result of imposing § 16 (b)'s liability without 
·fault on the basis of unclear language. If Congress 
w1shes to Impose such liability, we must assume it will 
do so expressly or by unmistakable inference. 
It IS not irrelevant that Congress itself limited care-
fully the liability imposed by § 16 (b). See Reliance 
Electric Co, supra, at 422--425. Even an insider 
"Senator KEA . Suppo~e he got stuck in something else, and he 
had to sell? 
"Senator BARKLEY All he would get would be what he put into it. 
He would get his origmal mvestment. 
'Mr CoRCORAN He would get Ius money out, but the profit goes 
o the corporatiOn 
"Senator KEAN Suppose he had to sell. 
"Mr CoRcORAN Let h1m get out what he put in, but give the 
corporatiOn the profit " 
Hearmgs on St~:~ck Excilltnge· Practices, supra, at 655&-6557. 
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may trade freely without incurring the statutory liability 
if, for example, he spaces his transactions at intervals 
greater than six months. When Congress has so recog-
nized the need to limit carefully the "arbitrary and 
sweeping coverage" of § 16 (b), Bershad v. McDonough, 
428 F. 2d 69'3, 696 (CA7 1970), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 
992 (1971), courts should not be quick to determine that, 
despite an acknowledged ambiguity, Congress intended 
the section to cover a particular transaction. 
B 
Our construction of § 16 (b) also is supported by the 
distinction Congress recognized between short-term trad-
ing by mere stockholders and such trading by directors 
and officers. The legislative discourse revealed that Con-
gress thought that all short-swing trading by directors 
and officers was vulnerable to abuse because of their 
intimate involvement in corporate affairs. But trading 
by mere stockholders was viewed as being subject to abuse 
only when the size of their holdings afforded the potential 
for access to corporate information.27 These different 
perceptions simply reflect the realities of corporate life. 
27 This distinction is especially evident in the following exchange, 
directed to the reportmg reqmrements imposed by § 15 (a) of 
S, 2693 on benefiCial owners ; 
"Senator KEAN, Suppose a man is not a director at all and does 
not want to be a director, and he happens to own 5 percent or buy 
5 percent. Do you thmk you are going to get him to file with the 
exchange all the time just the number of shares he has? 
"Mr. CoRCORAN. I think so, sir. 
"Senator KEA , I think it is all right to apply it to a director or 
'Officer, but I think to reqmre the ordmary investor--
"Mr. CoRCORAN, Five percent is a lot in a modern corporation. 
Many corporat10ns are controlled by 5 percent or 10 percent. 
"Senator KEAN. They may own it or they may sell it. This ap-
plies to all corporations, and you are getting down to the point where, 
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It would not be consistent with this perceived distinc-
tion to impose liability on the basis of a purchase made 
when the percentage of stock ownership requisite to in~ 
sider status had not been acquired. To be sure, the 
possibility does exist that one who becomes a beneficial 
owner by a purchase will sell on the basis of information 
attained by virtue of his newly acquired holdings. But 
the purchase itself was not one posing dangers that Con-
gress considered intolerable, since it was made when the 
purchaser owned no shares or less than the percentage 
deemed necessary to make one an insider.28 Such a stock-
holder is more analogous to the stockholder who never 
owns more than lOo/a and thereby is excluded entirely 
you are interfermg with the individual a good deal there. I agree 
with you with respect to the officers and directors. 
"Mr. CoRCORAN. A stockholder owning 5 percent is as much an 
insider as an officer or director. Whether he is a titular director or 
not, he normally is, as a practical matter of fact, a director. 
"Senator KEAN. He might not be." 
Hearmgs on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6556. The dis-
tmctwn also IS reflected m the discussiOn of the technical .flaw in 
S 2693. See td., at 6555; Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, 
upra, at 133 See also Hearmgs on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, 
t 7741-7743 
28 Thus, accordmg to the presumption of the statute, the pur-
chaser d1d not have access to mside mformation in making the 
purchase. It should be noted further that as a matter of practicali-
ties the crucial pomt in the acquisitiOn of securities is not the tech-
nical "purchase," but rather the deCision to make an acquisition. 
In the case of an acqmsihon of a large block of a corpora-
tion's stock, that decision may precede the "purchase" by a con-
Siderable penod of tune A prudent mvestor will want to investi-
gate all available mformation on the corporation. Such an investor 
also may need time to finance the purchase, and may wish to 
effectuate purchases Without mfluencmg the market price. These 
realities emphasize that the acqmsitwn deciswn by a beneficial 
owner normally w1ll occur well in advance of the event that is 
presumed to afford acress to inside mformation. 
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from the operation of § 16 (b), than to a director or offi-
cer whose every purchase and sale is covered by the stat-
ute. While th1s reasoning might not compel our con-
tructwn of the exemptive provision, it explains why 
Congress may have seen fit to draw the line it did. Cf. 
Adler v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840, 845 (CA2 1959). 
c 
Section 16 (b)'s scope, of course, is not affected by 
whether alternative sanctions might inhibit the abuse of 
inside information. Congress, however, has left some 
problems of the abuse of inside information to other 
remedies. These sanctions alleviate concern that ordi-
nary investors are unprotected against actual abuses of 
ins1de information in transactions not covered by 
§ 16 (b). For example, Congress has passed general J 
antifraud statutes that proscribe fraudulent practices by 
insiders. See Securities Act of 1933, § 17 (a), 48 Stat. 
84, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a); Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, § 10 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b); 3 L. Loss, supra, 
n. 11, 1423-1429, 1442-1445. Today an investor who 
can show harm from the misuse of material inside 
•informatiOn may have recourse, m particular, to § 10 (b) 
and Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1975).20 It 
29 Rule lOb-5 has been held to embrace evils that Foremost urges its 
constructiOn of § 16 (b) IS necessary to prevent. The Rule has been 
applied to tradmg by one who acquired inside information in the 
course of negotiatiOns with a corporation, such as the negotiations 
for Provident's purchase of the Foremost debentures. Van Alstyne, 
Noel(~ Co., 43 S. E. C. 1080 (1969) ; 3 L. Loss, supra, n. 11, at 1451-
1452. And a stockholder trading on information not generally 
known has been held subJect to the sanctions of the Rule. Shapiro 
Mernll Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smtth, Inc., 495 F. 2d 228 (CA2 
1974), SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833 (CA2 1968), 
cert. demed, 394 U. S. 967 (1969) The liability of insiders who 
improperly "t1p" others, SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 
1301 (CA2), cer1. demed, 404 U S. 1005 (1971), may reduce the 
threat that beneficial owners no1 themH('Ives rrpresented on the boarcf. 
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also was thought that § 16 (a)'s publicity requirement 80 
would afford indirect protection against some potential 
misuses of inside information.81 See Hearings on H. R. 
7852 and H. R. 8720, supra, at 134-135; H. Rep. No. 
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (to accompany H. R. 9323, 
of directors will be able to acquire inside information from officers 
and directors . We Cite these cases for illustrat1ve purposes without 
necessarily implying approval. 
30 Section 16 (a), 15 U. S. C. § 78p (a) provides : 
"Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial 
owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity secu-
rity (other than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant 
to section 78l of this title, or who is a director or an officer of the 
issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of 
such security on a national securities exchange or by the effective 
date of a registration statement filed pursuant to section 78l (g) 
of this title, or within ten days after he becomes such beneficial 
owner, director, or officer, a statement with the Commission (and, 
if such security is registered on a national securities exchange, 
also with the exchange) of the amount of all equity securities of 
such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner, and within ten days 
after the close of each calendar month thereafter, if there has been 
a change in such ownership during such month, shall file with the 
Commission (and if such security is registered on a national securi-
ties exchange, shall also file with the exchange), a statement indi-
cating his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such 
changes in his ownership as have occurred during such calendar 
month." 
81 The drafters clearly thought that § 16 (a) would help deter 
abuses not covered by § 16 (b). 
" [Mr. Corcoran.] [S]ection 15 (a), requires every director, officer, 
or principal holder of any securities listed on an exchange to file 
with the exchange and with the commission a statement of how 
many shares he owns and to file that statement at the end of each 
month to show whether there has been any change in his position 
during the month That is to prevent the insider from taking ad-
vantage of mformation to sell or buy shares ahead of the release of 
information to the public about the company." 
These remarks were addressed to S. 2693. Hearings on H. R. 7852 
and R R 8720, supra, at 132. 
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~3d Cong., 2d Sess., passed by the House, May 7, 19341 
without the present§ 16 (b) ), 
v 
We must still consider briefly Foremost's contention 
that the "before the purchase" construction renders 
other enactments of Congress unnecessary and conflicts 
with the interpretation of § 16 (b) by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. 
For.emost and amicus Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing 
Co. point to §§ 16 (d) and 16 (e) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. 
§§ 78p (d), (e), as congressional actions that would not 
have been necessary unless one selling the securities 
the acquisition of which made him a beneficial owner is 
liable under § 16 (b). Section 16 (d), in part, exempts: 
from § 16 (b) certain transactions by a securities "dealer 
in the ordinary course of his business and incident to 
the establishment or maintenance by him of a primary 
or secondary market." 82 Section 16 (e) provides an 
exemption for certain "foreign or domestic arbitrage 
32 Section 16 (d), 15 U S. C. § 78p (d), provides: 
"The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall not 
apply to any purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, and the pro-
visions of subsection (c) of this section shall not apply to any sale, 
of an eqmty security not then or theretofore held by him in an Ill-
vestment account, by a dealer in the ordinary course of his business 
and incident to the establishment or maintenance by him of a pri-
mary or secondary market (otherwise than on a national securities 
exchange or an exchange exempted from registration under section 
78e of this title) for such security. The Commission may, by such 
rules and regulations as it deems necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest, define and prescribe terms and conditions with re-
spect to securities held in an investment account and transactions 
made in the ordinary course of business and incident to the estab-
lishment or maintenance of a primary or secondary market." 
;'DealPr" i~ defined in§ 3 (a.) (5) of the Act, 15 U. S C. 78c (a) (5), 
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transactions." 88 They argue similarly that the SEC's 
Rule 16b-2, 17 CFR § 240.16b-2 (1975), is unnecessary 
if our construction of § 16 (b) is correct. Rule 16b-2 
exempts from § 16 (b) specified transactions "in connec-
tion with the distribution of a substantial block of 
securities." 34 
33 Section 16(e), 15 U.S. C. §78p(e), provides : 
"The provisions of this section shall not apply to foreign or 
domestic arbitrage transactions unless made in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the Commission may adopt in order to 
carry out the purposes of this section." 
34 Section 16 (b) provides in its final clause that it shall not 
cover "any transaction or transactions which the Commission by 
rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the 
purpose of this subsection." 15 U. S. C. § 78p (b). Rule 16b-2 
provides: 
"(a) Any transaction of purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, 
of a security which is effected in connection with the distribution of a 
substantial block of securities shall be exempt from the provisions 
of section 16 (b) of the Act, to the extent specified in this § 240.16b-
2, as not comprehended within the purpose of said section, upon the 
following conditions : 
" ( 1) The person effecting the transaction is engaged in the busi-
ness of distributing securities and is participating in good faith, in 
the ordinary course of such business, in the distribution of such 
block of securities; 
"(2) The security involved in the transaction is (i) a part of such 
block of securities and is acquired by the person effecting the trans-
action, with a view to the distribution thereof, from the issuer or 
other person on whose behalf such securities are being distributed' 
or from a person who is participating in good faith in the distribu-
tion of such block of securities, or (ii) a security purchased in good 
faith by or for the account of the person effecting the transaction 
for the purpose of stabilizing the market price of securities of the 
class being distributed or to cover an over-allotment or other short 
position created in connection with such distribution; and 
" (3) Other persons not within the purview of section 16 (b) of 
the Act are participating in the distribution of such block of securi-
ties on terms at least as favorable as those on which such person is 
participating and to an extent at least equal to the aggregate par-
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We do not consider these provisions to be inconsistent 
with our holding. Nothing on their faces would make 
them applicable to one selling the securities the pur-
chase of which made him a beneficial owner. But the 
·exemptions would be necessary to protect stockholders 
already qualifying as beneficial owners when they pur-
chased 35 and they would, of course, apply to transactions 
by directors and officers as well. 
Foremost and the amicus also remind us that the 
interpretation of the exemptive provision for which they 
contend has been adopted by the SEC in the past. See 
Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, at 22-27, Reliance 
Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418 
(1972). But the Commission has not appeared as an 
amicus in this case. In any event, even if the Commis-
sion's views have not changed we would not afford them 
the deference to which the views of the agency adminis-
tering a statute are usually entitled, for in Reliance 
ticipation of all persons exempted from the provisions of section 
16 (b) of the Act by this § 240.16b-2. However, the performance 
of the functions of manager of a distributing group and the receipt 
of a bona fide payment for performing such functions shall not pre-
clude an exemption whteh would otherwise be available under this 
§ 240.16b--2. 
" (b) The exemption of a transaction pursuant to this § 240.16b--2 
with respect to the partiCipation therem of one party thereto shall 
not render such transactiOn exempt with respect to participation of 
any other party therein unless such other party also meets the 
conditions of this § 240.16b--2 " 
35 The press release accompanymg the SEC's mitial promulgation of 
Rule 16b-2 demonstrates this pomt. It explained : "The new Rule 
[16b--2] affords an exemptiOn for certam cases by providing that 
underwriters who happen to have a member of their firm also an 
officer or director of the Issuer or one of Its prmcipal stockholders 
who are regularly engaged m the busmess of buymg and selling 
securities need not account to the company for profits realized from 
purchases and sales made m the distribution of a security for the 
rompan .... " SEC Release o 34-264, June 8, 1935. 
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Electric Co., 404 U. S., at 425-427, the Court rejected the 
basic theory on which the SEC based its interpretation 
of the exemptive provision. Our re-examination of the 
exemptive provision confirms the view that the SEC's 
theory did not reflect the intent of Congress. 
The judgment is 
Affirmed. 
MR. JusTICE WHITE joins in the judgment of the 
Court, and in all but Part IV - C of the Court's opinion .. 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case. 
JAN 9 
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be re-
leased, as is being done In connection with this case, at the time 
the opinion Is Issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for 
the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber 
ao., 200 u.s. 321, &37. 
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Respondent, a personal holding company contemplating liquidation, 
sold assets to petitioner corporation. Respondent received from 
petitioner as part of the purchase price convertible debentures 
which if converted into petitioner's common stock would make 
respondent a holder of more than 10% of petitioner's outstanding 
common stock. A few days later, pursuant to an underwriting 
agreement, one of the debentures was sold to a group of under-
writers for cash in an amount exceeding its face value. After 
making debenture and cash distributions to its stockholders, 
respondent dissolved.. Under § 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (Act) a corporation may recover for itself the profits 
realized by an officer, director, or beneficial owner of more than 
10% of its shares from a purchase and sale of its stock within 
a six-month period. An exemptive provision specifies, however, 
that § 16 (b) shall not be construed to cover any transaction 
where the beneficial owner was not such both "at the time of" 
the purchase and sale of the securities involved. Since the 
amount of petitioner's debentures received by respondent was 
large enough to make respondent a beneficial owner of petitioner 
within the meaning of § 16, and its disposal of the securities 
within the six-month period exposed respondent to a suit by 
petitioner to recover profits realized by respondent on the sale 
to the underwriters, respondent sought a declaratory judgment 
of its non liability under § 16 (b). The District Court granted 
summary judgment to respondent, and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed, though for different reasons. Held: By virtue of the 
exemptive provision a beneficial owner is accountable under § 16 
(b) in a purchase-sale sequence such as was involved here only 
I 
· a(Je J>toof of syllabus aB 
\ ~JJptoved. 
: - Lineup ineludcd. 
: - LinPup still to be 
added. l'lt>:1se send 
lin('up to Prin1, Shop 
when available and 
a copy to me. 
\ Another copy of 7>age 7Jtoof of 
, syllab·us a,~ approved to 
.~ho·ur-i 
~- Lineup, which has now 
been added. 
~- Addition:1l changes 
l in syllabus. 
H~~NHY P'U'I.'Zl~r,, jr. 
Reporter of Deei~ions. 
.,. 
II FOREMOST-McKESSON v. PROVIDENT SECURITIES 
Syllabus 
if he was such an owner "before the purchase." Thus, the fact 
that respondent was not a beneficial owner before the purchase 
removed the transaction from the operation of § 16 (b). Pp. 
7-27. 
(a) The legislative history of the exemptive provision reveals 
a legislative intent to deter beneficia.! owners from making both 
a purchase and a sale on the basis of inside information, which 
is presumptively available only after the purchase. Pp. 10--17. 
(b) Had it been Congress' design when it enacted § 16 (b) 
to impose liability in cases such as this, it should have done so 
expressly or by unmistakable inference. Pp, 18-20. 
(c) Congress may have sought to distinguish between purchases 
by persons who have not yet acquired inside status through stock 
ownership of at least 10% and purchases by directors and officers 
because t.l1e latter are more intimately involved in corporate 
affairs. Pp. 20--22. 
(d) Other sanctions ren1ain available against fraudulent use of 
inside information in transn,ctions not covered by § 16 (b). Pp. 
22-24. 
(e) Other provisions exempting certain transactions from § 16 
(b) are not inconsistent with the "before the purchase" con-
struction reached here. Pp. 24-27. 
506 F. 2d 601, affirmed. 
PowELL, J ., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BuRGER, 
C. J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and REHN-
QUIST, JJ., joined, and in all but Part IV-C of which WHITE, J., 
joined. STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision 
of the case. 
